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New Forms of Household Formation in Central and Eastern Europe: Are they related to newly emerging Value Orientations?

R. Lesthaeghe and J. Surkyn
(rllestha@vub.ac.be and jrsurkyn@vub.ac.be)

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VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL
PLEINLAAN 2, B-1050 BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

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NEW FORMS OF HOUSEHOLD FORMATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:
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1. Introduction

Starting in the 1960s, northwestern Europe underwent a drastic transformation in its pattern of household formation and reproduction. Ages at first marriage rose again after reaching an unprecedented young pattern during the sixties. Premarital and postmarital cohabitation were spreading, and were soon followed by procreation in such informal unions as well. Divorce rates rose further in tandem with high separation rates among cohabitants. Equally starting in the late sixties was a pronounced postponement of fertility in the west, followed by a partial catching up of procreation at later ages.¹ In the 1970s, total fertility rates (TFRs) in western countries essentially measured differential postponement. In the 1990s, national TFRs mainly capture differential catching up after age 30.²

At first it was thought that the economic slump following the 1974 oil crisis was responsible for later marriage and postponement of childbearing,³ but some suspected that the roots of the new forms of household formation were to be found in the 1960s themselves, and more particularly in the marked shift in values that occurred during that decade. They linked the demographic changes to (i) the accentuation of individual autonomy in ethical, moral and political spheres, (ii) to the concomitant rejection of all forms of institutional controls and authority, and (iii) to the rise of expressive values connected to the so called “higher order needs”⁴ of self-actualisation and quest for recognition. This connection between the demographic and ideational transformations became known as “Europe’s second demographic transition”.⁵

Near the end of the 1980s, several features of this “second transition” seemed to stop at the Alps and Pyrenees. Italy, Spain and Portugal had started the postponement phase with respect to marriage and fertility, but the other two features, i.e. cohabitation and procreation

outside wedlock, had either failed to gain ground (Italy) or were just beginning to rise (Spain, Portugal). Until 1990, central and eastern European populations had also maintained their historical early patterns of marriage and fertility. There were not yet any clear signs of postponement or of the diffusion of premarital cohabitation. It then seemed that the “second demographic transition” was a northern and western European feature capable of sprouting across the oceans (Canada, Australia, US, New Zealand), but not capable of crossing the old European cultural and political divides.

After 1990 all of that changed. On the Iberian Peninsula, proportions of births outside wedlock rose more rapidly, signalling that both cohabitation and procreation within informal unions were spreading. In central and eastern Europe (but not in the CIS countries), postponement of marriage and childbearing started and progressed to the point of causing a fall in national TFRs to levels below 1.5 children and even below 1.3. A new term was coined: “lowest low fertility”.⁶ Obviously, a direct connection was made between marriage and fertility postponement on the one hand and all the effects of the difficult economic transition on the other. These demographic changes were directly linked to rising unemployment, a reduction in activity rates particularly for women, to the end of life-long employment guarantees, the drop in real household incomes, the decline of state supports for families and the enhanced visibility of poverty.⁷

Yet, not everyone in central and eastern Europe was convinced that the economic crisis was the sole explanation for the demographic changes. Mainly younger members of the demography profession in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Russia suspected that “western values” had penetrated their societies. They felt that the younger generations, which were to marry and start childbearing during the 1990s, had different priorities and aspirations compared to those of the older cohorts who had spent much of their lives during the Communist era.⁸ The outcome was a debate between the “crisis-thesis” and the “second demographic transition-thesis”. As is common with such debates about the essentials of life, the two explanations were pitted against each other, and were viewed as mutually exclusive by their respective proponents.

In this contribution we do not subscribe to such an “either-or” proposition. There is nothing mutually exclusive about the operation of both economic and cultural factors. In fact, they may be interwoven and mutually reinforcing.⁹ To state it simply and metaphorically, the

cart of demographic change can be pulled by two horses simultaneously. At the onset, it may well be that the horse of the economic crisis is doing much of the pulling, while the other one is quietly trotting along. But in the longer run, i.e. when the transitional recession has been fully overcome in central Europe and when there has been a sustained improvement of the economic situation, the second horse may be taking over. This proposition has important consequences for the future: an improvement of the economic situation would then not lead to a restoration of the old demographic pattern with early marriage and fertility schedules, but to patterns of family formation that tend to converge to those of the west. In addition to later marriage and fertility postponement, also the emergence of the other “second demographic transition” features can be expected: premarital and postmarital cohabitation, procreation within cohabitation, and possibly also longer spells of single living.

The aim of the present chapter is to look for more precise indicators that signal the presence of the second horse in our metaphor.¹⁰ A new source with ample information on types of living arrangement and values is the 1999 round of the European Values Surveys. But this source is not flawless, as we shall show in the next section.

2. The European Values Surveys of 1999

Since 1980 the European Values Surveys (EVS) have become a major source of information on changing value orientations and their covariates.¹¹ The EVS has had three rounds by now (1981, 1990, 1999) in a fairly large number of countries. Attitude and value measurements cover a broad variety of domains: marriage and family, gender, religion, civil morality and ethics, political preferences, trust in institutions, protest-proneness, “postmaterialism”,¹² social distance and tolerance for minorities, qualities valued in socialisation and in work, world orientation, economic ideology (free enterprise versus state intervention), community involvement and organisation membership, etc. Most of these topics are covered by multiple questions or items which improves measurement validity. In the 1999 round, many countries also fine-tuned the household questions, *inter alia* by inserting a probe for earlier premarital cohabitation. As a consequence, a finer typology for living arrangements could be constructed for this latest round.

The major drawback of the EVS has always been its small national sample sizes. The EVS standard practice is that a sample of 1000 respondents suffices to cover the entire population, i.e. both sexes and all ages from 18 to 80. Only a few countries have larger

sample sizes.¹³ But on the whole, such small samples are inadequate for crucial topics such as the study of value orientations of the newly arriving cohorts of young adults, or for addressing any questions pertaining to more narrow age groups or subcategories.

Also the present study has been hampered by the small national EVS samples, and we have been forced to pool information for countries. For the present purpose, three such pooled groups are formed:

1. WEST-8: Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, Spain and Portugal;
2. CENTRAL-7: Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Lithuania;
3. EAST-5: Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation.¹⁴

We also have refrained from weighting the samples according to national population sizes, so that possible idiosyncrasies in a small sample for a large country could not overshadow the overall pattern. Hence, in everything that follows for the three groups, all countries have received an equal weight of unity.

As already mentioned, the 1999 EVS permits a more meaningful classification of respondents according to household situation than the earlier EVS rounds. More specifically, use will be made of the following eight categories:

1. Res.par.: respondents residing in the parental household without a partner or spouse. Most of them are never married or were never in a union, and never left home either (88%). The remaining group has returned to the parental household after a different history.
2. Single: Respondents who are not living with their parents, are never married and are not currently in a partnership either. Some had an earlier relationship, but none have children.
3. Coh.0: currently unmarried but cohabiting respondents without children, irrespective of earlier histories;
4. Coh.+: currently cohabiting respondents with children, again irrespective of earlier histories;
5. Mar.0: currently married respondents with a spouse present but without children;
6. Mar.+N: currently married respondents with a spouse and children, but who never passed through premarital cohabitation (N = *never* cohabited);

7. Mar.+E: currently married with spouse and children, but who passed through premarital cohabitation (E = *ever* cohabited);
8. FmNu: formerly married or cohabiting respondents who are currently divorced or separated, but not yet in a new union. The majority of these respondents (85%) have children and many women among them form a lone parent household.

The sample sizes for the eight household types in each of the three groups of countries are given in Table 1 (absolute numbers and percentage distribution). These pertain to respondents aged 18 to 45. Despite our pooling of national samples, sample sizes are still small for several household categories in the central and eastern countries. This obviously reflects their smaller prevalence in the population. But, for further work relating household positions to value orientations, these sample sizes are adequate.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The question on current cohabitation in the 1999 EVS also gives a rough idea of the incidence of premarital cohabitation among the younger adults. In Table 2 we have compared these 1999 figures with those reported for the 1990s in the Family and Fertility Surveys (FFS).¹⁵ In table 2 one immediately notices that the EVS sample sizes are only a fraction of those used in the FFS. Furthermore, the FFS survey dates are heterogeneous and spread over a period of 6 years, i.e. between 1991 and 1997. Finally, the information is gathered via different procedures in the two sources. This implies that the data in this table are merely *indicative* of the prevailing trend, and especially that *the 1999 EVS orders of magnitude are definitely subject to confirmation or correction by later and more representative sources.*

With this major caveat in mind, the comparison of FFS and EVS 1999 still suggests that a rise has taken place in the percentages of women aged 20-24 and 25-29 who are currently cohabiting. Hence, unmarried cohabitation has become a significant new household type in most Baltic and central European populations since the early 1990s. This holds in particular for Estonia and Latvia, and for Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The EVS 1999 also suggests more modest rises in Poland and Lithuania. In Slovakia cohabitation among young women is still exceptional. In most of these central European countries, cohabiting women aged 20-29 are still childless, but in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia more significant proportions of cohabiting women with children are found.

Table 1: EVS 1999 sample sizes for the various household positions in three regional groups of countries; respondents aged 18 to 45.

	<u>WEST-8</u>		<u>CENTRAL-7</u>		<u>EAST-5</u>	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Respar: resident in parental households	783	15.1	984	22.9	602	19.2
Single: living alone	474	9.1	154	3.6	97	3.1
Coh 0: cohabiting without children	719	13.9	337	7.8	102	3.3
Coh +: cohabiting with children	385	7.4	198	4.6	127	4.1
Mar 0: married without children	278	5.4	145	3.4	154	4.9
Mar +N: married with children, never cohabited	1548	29.8	2114	49.2	1622	51.8
Mar +E: married with children, ever cohabited	740	14.3	198	4.6	188	6.0
Fm Nu: Formerly married/in union; not in new union	259	5.0	164	3.8	242	7.7
Total:	5186	100.0	4294	100.0	3134	100.0

Source: EVS Consortium -- National data sets.

Table 2: The rise of unmarried cohabitation during the 1990s in the transition economy countries; FFS and EVS results.

		% women 20-24 cohabiting			% women 25-29 cohabiting			N
		<u>total</u>	<u>without children</u>	<u>with children</u>	<u>total</u>	<u>without children</u>	<u>with children</u>	
A. Baltic States								
Estonia	FFS 1991	13	9	4	19	5	14	659
	EVS 1999	42	33	9	22	4	18	99
Latvia	FFS 1995	8	5	3	6	2	4	778
	EVS 1999	40	26	14	37	19	18	73
Lithuania	FFS 1994	3	2	1	1	0	1	990
	EVS 1999	10	5	5	10	4	6	91
B. Central Europe								
Czech Rep.	FFS 1997	10	8	2	9	3	6	601
	EVS 1999	24	22	2	17	11	0	146
Poland	FFS 1991	0	0	0	0	0	0	1194
	EVS 1999	16	11	5	3	0	3	85
Hungary	FFS 1992	7	5	2	2	1	1	1456
	EVS 1999	33	28	5	27	16	11	87
Slovenia	FFS 1994	15	6	9	14	4	10	875
	EVS 1999	37	29	8	31	15	16	109
Croatia*	EVS 1999	30	30	0	13	13	0	146
Slovakia*	EVS 1999	6	6	0	3	3	0	125
C. Eastern Europe								
Bulgaria	FFS 1997	4	2	2	3	2	1	843
	EVS 1999	3	0	3	0	0	0	60
Romania*	EVS 1999	20	20	0	10	7	3	85
Russian Fed.*	EVS 1999	2	1	1	16	5	11	171
Belarus*	EVS 2000	8	6	2	22	14	8	88
Ukraine*	EVS 1999	0	0	0	10	5	5	99

Note: * = countries without Family & Fertility Survey (FFS)

Sources: FFS: UN Econ. Commission for Europe & UNFPA, FFS-country reports, Table 4.

EVS: EVS Consortium – National data sets.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

In eastern Europe the incidence of cohabitation is still lower than in central Europe. The low figures recorded in the 1997 FFS in Bulgaria are confirmed by the 1999 EVS, but there could have been a rise in Romania, Russia and Belarus, and more particularly for women 25-29. In Ukraine, as in Bulgaria, households of young cohabitants are still rare.

Taken at face value, the latest EVS results show a major jump in cohabitation in four countries (Estonia, Latvia, Hungary and Slovenia) that brings its prevalence (30 to 50%) to western levels. Pending confirmation, this would mean that two Baltic states increasingly resemble the Scandinavian situation, and that Slovenia and Hungary are moving toward the Austrian example.

Despite the caveats, one can safely conclude that premarital cohabitation is spreading in central Europe. Procreation within this new household type may not be far off or has already started. And, as expected, eastern Europe displays a lag in both respects.

3. Which values matter?

The initial article on “the second demographic transition”¹⁶ posited that the new living arrangements, and cohabitation in particular, were the expression of secular and anti-authoritarian sentiments of better educated young cohorts with an egalitarian world view and an accentuation of the “higher order needs” (i.e. self-actualisation, expressive values, recognition). This reflects the picture of cohabitants in the Low Countries during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, Belgium and the Netherlands had a plethora of political parties that represented the entire spectrum from “old values” to “new values”,¹⁷ and voting behaviour according to living arrangement provided the initial empirical check. At the same time the correlates of Inglehart’s “post-materialist” orientation were high on the research agenda of political scientists, and both the EU Eurobarometer surveys and the first EVS round of 1981 provided measurements for more detailed empirical verification in several western European countries. Also in the US statistical associations between value orientations and living arrangements were drawing attention. Moreover, the US demographers and sociologists had moved on to panel studies in which specific value orientations were recorded at each wave in tandem with the recording of vital events occurring in the windows between

successive waves.¹⁸ As a result, American colleagues could verify whether or not specific value orientations had a truly predictive power with respect to later household choices, and furthermore, they could assess to what extent earlier transitions in household position led to the accentuation or the adjustment of previously held values and attitudes. In other words, a recursive model emerged with (i) *values-based selection* into alternative living arrangements, and (ii) *event-based values adaptation*. This feedback model of selection and adaptation provides the dynamics of the process, whereas the cross-sectional overall correlations between values and household positions are merely *footprints* of this recursive mechanism.¹⁹

As indicated, the initial set of values that were thought to cause the selection along alternate pathways of household formation mainly dealt with the following dimensions in the West:

- (i) *Secularisation*, or the reduction in religious practice, the abandoning of traditional religious beliefs (heaven, sin...) and the decline in individual sentiments of religiosity (prayer, meditation, ...).
- (ii) *The "new political left"*, with indicators pertaining to Inglehart's "postmaterialism", voting for the Green parties or left-wing liberals, protest-proneness, distrust in institutions, and anti-authoritarianism more generally.
- (iii) *Egalitarianism*, with the accentuation of symmetrical gender relations, tolerance for minorities, rejection of social class distinctions, and a preoccupation with North-South equity associated with "world citizenship".
- (iv) *Unconventional civil morality and ethics*, with a higher degree of permissiveness for forms of uncivil conduct (e.g. joyriding, drugs, tax evasion...) and also a higher degree of tolerance for interference in matters of life and death (euthanasia, abortion, suicide).
- (v) *Accentuation of expressive values*, showing an enhanced preoccupation with individuality and self-fulfilment. Typical indicators thereof are the ranking of the traits of "imagination" and "independence" above all other qualities to be stimulated in the education of children, or the preferences for the intrinsic job qualities (challenging, interesting, permitting social contact and initiative) rather than for the material advantages (pay, vacations, promotion).
- (vi) *Companionship and unconventional marital ethics*, stressing the quality aspects of a relationship (communication, tolerance and understanding, happy sexual relationship) over the conventional and institutional foundations of marriage and

parenthood, and tolerating deviations from strict marital morality (adultery, casual sex...).

During the 1990s, aspects related to social cohesion and social capital were added to the list. One suspected that traditional families had maintained stronger community ties and a higher degree of involvement in various types of local associations, whereas others had relinquished such links in favour of social networks based on personal friendships. These connections have not been adequately researched so far,²⁰ but in this chapter association membership and voluntary work are added as extra items.

At this point we do not wish to create the impression that only value orientations matter. Besides value orientations also other factors matter and empirical research has found a role for:

1. Family antecedents: the experience of parental divorce and/or of family reconstruction after a parental divorce frequently lead to earlier home leaving, single living, premarital cohabitation and even lone parenthood.²¹
2. Regional historical contexts: in several European countries, cohabitation and procreation within cohabitation have increased much faster in regions (often rural ones) that had a much older history of tolerance for such forms of family formation (e.g. northern Scandinavia, Austrian alpine regions).²² In other countries, the current emergence of new forms of household formation displays a strong correlation with the regional patterning of the “first demographic transition”, i.e. with the onset of fertility control and the weakening of the late Malthusian marriage pattern during the 19th Century (e.g. France, Belgium, Switzerland).²³
3. Diffusion mechanisms: with the passing of time new forms of behaviour gain acceptability and legitimation, even to the point that they are accommodated by the legal system. Increased legitimation is both the motor and the outcome of social diffusion from an “innovative core” to other population segments.
4. Economic differentiation: new living arrangements may accommodate different economic aspirations and situations. For instance, cohabitation may suit the motivation to maintain economic independence of women, as postulated in neo-classic economic theory. Alternatively, it may be the expression of economic uncertainty, as proposed by R. Easterlin’s relative deprivation theory.²⁴ In the former instance, cohabitation is likely to be found among better-educated women with a career

orientation, whereas in the latter case, it would be a dominant trait for lower social strata with less income security. Moreover, cohabitation would be an interim-phase that is a correlate of the overall destandardisation of the life course, including the destandardisation of job and career paths. Obviously, the “crisis-theory” invoked in central and eastern Europe to explain the rise of new household types refers to the latter mechanism.

5. Policy effects, labour market characteristics and housing conditions: earlier home leaving, single living and premarital cohabitation in the west are more typical for countries with income support policies for young adults via scholarships, cheap student accommodation and transportation subsidies.²⁵ Also the existence of flexible labour markets with ample availability of part-time jobs contributes to earlier economic independence for younger adults. At the other end of the spectrum, prolonged residence in the parental home is more typical in countries without such policies and with expensive housing.²⁶

To sum up, the shift toward the “unconventional” values, often occurring via the succession of generations, is by no means the only factor that has shaped the “second demographic transition” in the west, but it has been a *non-redundant* factor in sustaining a long term demographic trend through periods of slower and faster economic growth alike.

4. The footprints of selection and adaptation: what to expect?

In this section there is an analysis of the expected value effects as they are operating in the selection process with respect to the paths chosen in family formation, and to the value reinforcements or adaptations following such life course events. The overall picture of expectations is summarised in figure 1. First, on the vertical axis we have made a distinction between two poles. One pole brings together the values that are non-conformist and more libertarian. They are accompanied by expressive values accentuating personality and self-actualisation in non-material domains, by the stress on individual autonomy with respect to all choices (morality and ethics included), and correspondingly by the refusal of institutional authority. This pole is a secular one, with tolerance for all types of minorities, but also with a low identification or involvement in local community affairs. The opposite pole of diagram 1 is obviously characterised by high conformity and respect for tradition, higher religiosity, respect for ethical and moral values that uphold social cohesion, and respect for authority coupled to a greater trust in institutions.




Figure 1 : Flow chart of life course development and hypothesised changes in value orientations stemming from selection-adaptation mechanism.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

The starting position in figure 1 is the respondent's residence in the parental household (Respar). At that point the "informative years", or the late adolescent period of values formation, are nearing their completion, and individuals have undergone the influence of parents, schools and peers. The influence of the latter is often in the opposite direction from that of the other two, and it may have risen over time.²⁷ Also, as already indicated, problems in the parental household (discord, separation, divorce) have a major influence on both children's values and options followed in the life course. We therefore expect that the position of young adults is already shifting toward the non-conformist pole prior to home leaving.

During the next steps in the unfolding of the life course, we expect that home leaving in favour of living alone is predicated on the dominance of the non-conformist set of values, whereas home leaving in favour of a direct marriage involves a selection based on conventional value orientations.²⁸ At the same time, these two alternative options reinforce the sets of values that were responsible for the choice in the first place.²⁹ Hence, we have moved up the position of "single" toward the non-conformist pole in diagram 1, whereas we have placed "married without children" (Mar0) more toward the conformist end.

Singles face the option of moving into cohabitation (Coh0) or to marry (Mar0). The former option again reinforces non-conformist values.³⁰ For instance, also partners are likely to be chosen for their preference for unconventional values that underpin the choice in favour of cohabitation. Such mutually reinforcing orientations of both partners may then enhance the consistency of various values sets more generally, so that we expect childless cohabitants (Coh0) to score *highest* and most *consistently* on the value orientations associated with pole 1. By contrast, singles who move into marriage may do so because of a higher respect for traditional institutions, because of respect for parental preferences, or because of a partner with more conventional attitudes. Once the institution of marriage is accepted, values consistency is again reinforced, and we expect a move in the opposite direction, i.e. toward pole 2. A similar mechanism would also apply to cohabitants who marry prior to parenthood. For them, the values reorientation associated with a transition into marriage could be quite substantial given that they come from a strongly non-conventional position. However, we

also suspect that the earlier convictions are not obliterated altogether, and that the *experience of cohabitation leaves a durable imprint*.

We expect the readjustment effects of parenthood to be even stronger than those of marriage. In fact, value shifts in the conformist direction already occur in anticipation of parenthood,³¹ and also the transition from cohabitation to marriage is often made in anticipation of the arrival of the first child. Parenthood corresponds with a firm commitment to both partner and child, closes “open futures”, and redirects attention to the well being of the next generation. Moral, civil and ethical values are reaccentuated, and social networks associated with children are activated. Tolerance for deviance diminishes, authority regains prominence, and self-actualisation takes second place. Priorities are centred on the “priceless child”, and preoccupations shift in favour of those upholding greater social cohesion. In figure 1, all positions with children are therefore located further toward the conformist pole. Nevertheless, we still hypothesize that the earlier experience of cohabitation acts as a brake on this ideational readjustment. The position of Mar+E (= ever cohabited) therefore remains above that of Mar+N (= never cohabited) on figure 1.

Finally, a separation or divorce not yet followed by a new partnership (= FmNu) causes a complete overhaul of the values structure. New doubts emerge with respect to religion, traditional family values and trust in institutions. One is also more likely to become more preoccupied with one’s own person, and hence with the expressive values and with individual autonomy. We therefore hypothesize that the FmNu-position shifts toward the non-conformist pole.

The household positions in figure 1 are incomplete, and so are the types of transitions. However, they capture the dominant streams through the life course. Moreover, the EVS only captures sections of the life course, and the sample sizes are too small to separate certain categories into more meaningful ones. For instance, there is no question on an earlier divorce or separation, so that the currently married cannot be split up into the ever and never divorced, and the category Mar0, i.e. married without children, is too small for an added contrast between those who ever and never cohabited. This highlights once more the need for larger samples, and it shows the usefulness of “ever questions” probing for the occurrence of earlier events or life markers.

The overall outcome of this section is that there should be an ordering of the individual household positions along the vertical axis of figure 1, i.e. roughly from “traditional” to “non-conformist”. In this ordering, cohabitants without children should score highest on non-conformism, followed by singles and formerly married. Residents in parental households should come next. More toward the opposite pole are married persons without children, cohabiting parents and married parents who ever cohabited. The most conservative values should be found among married parents who never cohabited. It should also be noted that we formulated these expectations about the “footprints” of the recursive life cycle model *in tempore non suspecto*, i.e. well before the present analysis of the EVS survey results.³²

5. Measurement and profiles: do we find the footprints of selection and adaptation?

In this section the use of 80 values items is proposed, and these are analysed for respondents aged 18 to 45. The selected items were common to all the country-specific questionnaires of the 1999 EVS round. We then proceed with the inspection of the item profiles according to household positions of respondents to check whether the expectations just formulated are indeed emerging in all three pooled country data sets. In doing so, the question is being addressed as to whether the profiles of central and eastern European countries are similar to those found in the west. Such similarity indicates that the selection and adjustment mechanisms that connect value orientations and life course choices are more universal and not idiosyncratic of western countries only.

Firstly, the selection of 80 items was made on the basis of the individual country data sets. In this exploratory analysis use was made of Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) of over 150 items. For each item the covariates were household position (8 categories), age and age squared (continuous), education level (4 categories), profession (8 categories, including unemployed, housewives and students), gender, and urbanity (2 categories). The selection of the final 80 items was based on (i) *the topic*, i.e. making sure that items were represented covering all major domains or subjects, and (ii) the *strength of their association* with household positions, i.e. leaving out the least discriminating items.³³ A set of 80 items is still very large, but we wanted to maintain multiple items per subject to increase measurement validity. The list of the 80 items is given in table 3. Also, *all* items are coded as dummy variables and in such a way that the value of unity is always assigned to the non-conformist or unconventional opinion. Such a *uniform coding direction* facilitates the subsequent inspection of values profiles across covariates and countries.

The list in table 3 contains nine major subjects. The largest number of items (15) pertains to attitudes related to marriage as an institution, to qualities needed for the success of a marriage, to the meaning of parenthood and parent-child duties, and to the degree of permissiveness with respect to sexual freedom, divorce and abortion. Secularism is represented by 9 items indicating a loss of traditional religious beliefs, a low level of the individual religious sentiment, and distrust in the churches as institutions. The civil morality set with 12 items captures permissiveness with respect to different forms of deviant behaviour, but also the ethical acceptability of forms of interference in matters of life and death. The political set contains 11 items dealing with distrust in institutions, protest-proneness, Inglehart's postmaterialism index and the rejection of authority more generally. The social distance or tolerance set is made up of 8 items that are all indicative of the type of persons that are either tolerated as neighbours or considered as undesirable. The expressive values are spread over the socialisation and work qualities sets. The former (7 items) show the preference for imagination and independence as education traits rather than conformity and respect for others. The latter (8 items) indicate a similar preference for intrinsic work qualities over material or status conferring rewards. The identification set (6 items) deals with a world orientation rather than a local identification or national pride, but with distrust in established international organisations. The last set of 4 items are indicative of a retreat from social and political life, and it contains the absence of any memberships or voluntary work, a distrust in people in general, and a lack of any interest in politics. In all further analyses these 80 values items will be used without any prior data reduction, such as factor analysis. Hence, no particular structure will be imposed prior to further statistical work.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

At this point the item profiles according to household position can be established. We recall that (i) all items are coded in the unconventional or non-conformist direction, and (ii) that controls are present for other covariates (i.e. gender, age, education, profession and urbanity). The data set now takes the form of *net* deviations from the item mean associated with each of the eight household positions. Such net deviations are available for each of the 80 items and for each of the three groups of countries. A positive value of a net deviation from the item mean indicates that a particular household position has a more non-conformist

Table 3: Overview of 80 items used in the current analysis, EVS 1999

Topic & n of items	Item description
Marriage and family MF (15)	Marriage outdated institution; children not necessary life fulfilment; parents must not sacrifice for children; justified: casual sex, adultery, divorce, abortion; important for marriage: tolerance & understanding, sharing chores, talking, time together, happy sexual relations; not very important for success marriage: faithfulness, children; single motherhood acceptable.
Religion RL (9)	Not believing in: god, sin, hell, heaven; no comfort from religion, no moments of prayer or meditation; god not at all important in life; distrust church, religious faith not mentioned as socialisation trait.
Civil morality CM(12)	Justified: soft drugs, homosexuality, joyriding, suicide, euthanasia, speeding, drunk driving, accepting bribe, tax cheating, lying, tax evasion by paying cash, claiming unentitled state benefits.
Politics PO (11)	Distrust in institutions: education system, army, police, justice system, civil service; participated or willing to participate in: unofficial strikes, attending unlawful demonstrations, joining boycotts, occupying buildings; not more respect for authority; postmaterialist.
Social distance SD (8)	Not wanted as neighbours: large families, right wing people; no objection to have as neighbours: aids patients, unstable people, criminal record, drug addicts, homosexuals, immigrants (western countries) or gypsies (central European countries).
Socialisation SO (7)	Not mentioned as desirable trait in educating children: hard work, obedience, good manners, unselfishness, tolerance & respect; stressed as desirable: independence, imagination.
Work qualities WQ (8)	Not mentioned as desirable job aspect: good hours, promotion; stressed as desirable: respected job, meeting people, useful for society, interesting work, enabling initiative.
Identification ID (6)	Identification with "Europe and World", not with "own village or town", not very or quite proud with own nationality; no priority for national workers; no trust EU or UN.
Retreat RT(4)	Not member any voluntary organisation; no voluntary work; people cannot be trusted; never discuss politics.

Note: all items have been coded in the "non-conformist" direction.


attitude than average for the item concerned. Hence, a single tally of the number of positive deviations for each household position is already highly revealing of the overall profile.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

The results of such a tally for each of the groups of countries are displayed in figure 2. Respondents who are still residing with parents (Respar) are close to having positive net deviations for 40 items in the set of 80. This puts them closely to the “neutral” position in figure 1. The groups of central European countries had a slightly higher score (45 items), and the group of eastern European nations a slightly lower one (37). As expected, a move to single living increases the number of positive net deviations. This holds for all three regions, but the effect is more pronounced in the western countries (60 against 55 and 48). A further move to cohabitation without children (Coh0) increases the overall non-conformism score even more in western countries (66 items), but only slightly in the central European group (57) and not in the eastern European populations (47). The progression to parenthood prior to a marriage and still within a consensual union (Coh+) has the expected readjustment effect in western and central Europe, but not in eastern Europe. In the latter group of countries, cohabitants with children have the higher score for overall non-conformity (55). The exact reason for this cannot be established, but it is likely that parenthood within cohabitation, i.e. a rare transition in eastern Europe, is produced as a result of a strong selection for non-conformity which outweighs the adjustment effect associated with parenthood. On the whole, home leaving and cohabitation with or without children are clearly associated with higher non-conformity scores, and this pattern holds in all three groups of countries. There is no particular western idiosyncrasy in this respect.

The overall pattern holds further for the remaining household positions as well. Married couples without children (Mar0) have positive net deviations for less than half the number of items, and married couples with children who never cohabited (Mar+N) have by far the most conservative attitudes. They were both selected in this household position because of initial conformism, and have further adjusted or reaffirmed their opinions in this direction as a consequence of parenthood as well. By contrast, married couples with children but who passed through cohabitation before (Mar+E), did not have the selection effect associated with direct marriage, and have apparently not experienced the adjustment effect of parenthood to the same degree either. In other words, the earlier experience of cohabitation

	Res.par	Single	Coh 0	Coh +	Marr 0	Mar+N	Mar+E	FmNu	
West 8	42	60	66	53	32	32	11	47	56
Central 7	45	55	57	54	38	38	15	68	53
East 5	37	48	47	47	55	37	20	55	55



leaves a lasting mark, and largely prohibits the return to conformity. The distinction between the Mar+N and the Mar+E groups is just as large in central and eastern Europe as in the West. In fact, the Mar+E category in central Europe has the highest non-conformity score of all (68 items). Finally, a divorce or separation (FmNu) has also the expected increase in non-conformity when compared to Mar0 or Mar+N, and to all married groups in western Europe.

So far, the results of the comparisons in figure 2 indicate unambiguously that there is a systematic profile of association between current household position and earlier life course history on the one hand, and value orientations on the other. The magnitude of selection and adaptation effects may vary in the three broader European regions – as they may in individual countries as well – but the resulting profiles are essentially similar and in line with the “second demographic transition” hypothesis.

The data of figure 2 can be disaggregated according to topic. In figure 3, the set of 80 non-conformity items has been divided into a subset A, with the secularisation, marriage and parenthood, and the civil morality items (total = 36), a subset B, with items pertaining to politics, identification and retreat (total = 21), and a subset C, with the remaining items on socialisation traits, work qualities and social distance (total = 23). The tally of the number of positive net deviations is now plotted for each of these subsets. The overall picture in figure 3 is that the pattern according to household position for the entire set is essentially being replicated for each of the three subsets. This furthermore holds in the three regions. In other words, the outcome displayed in figure 2 is not produced by a concentration of positive deviations in a particular cluster of items, but a reflection of non-conformity across most topics.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

In fact, there are only a few anomalies in figure 3. The most striking one is that childless cohabitants (Coh0) in eastern Europe score lower than expected on the items of subset B. A closer item-by-item inspection of net deviations reveals that these respondents score high on nationalism and trust in institutions (except international ones), and that they want more respect for authority as well. On the other hand, they fit the classic picture for childless cohabitants by scoring high on protest proneness and postmaterialism. It seems that eastern European childless cohabitants are vocal (as expected), but wish to express their


	Res.par.	Single	Coh 0	Coh +	Marr 0	Mar+N	Mar+E	FmNu	
West A	19	29	33	27	12	2	24	28	
Central A	18	28	25	25	16	7	31	29	
East A	12	21	22	29	15	10	30	30	
West B	15	16	16	14	9	2	8	14	
Central B	10	14	14	13	10	4	20	16	
East B	10	14	7	15	10	3	13	17	
West C	8	15	17	12	11	7	15	13	
Central C	17	13	18	16	12	4	15	10	
East C	15	13	18	11	12	7	11	8	

Figure 3 : Number of positive (= non-conformist) net deviations for groups of items and countries, EVS 1999 :

A = 36 items marriage and family, religion, civil morality;

B = 21 items politics, identification, retreat;

C = 23 items socialisation, work qualities, social distance.



loyalty to national institutions. This latter trait sets them apart from childless cohabitant in western and central Europe.

The overall conclusion from these findings is that the footprints of the proposed selection and adaptation mechanisms of figure 1 are indeed clearly visible in all three regions, and not solely in western Europe, and furthermore, that the footprints are detectable in all domains for which we could set up indicators of non-conformity. This means that not only unconventional views with respect to marriage, family and parenthood are responsible for selection into single living and cohabitation, but that a much broader array of non-conformist attitudes are involved as well.

6. Finer distinctions

So far we have only relied on simple tallies of net positive deviations generated by MCA. In what follows, we shall push the item-by-item analysis much further by using the net positive deviations as inputs into a correspondence analysis.³⁴ The aim is to bring out the *proximities* of value items and household positions by trying to project them on a plane. Since proximities rely on distances, which obviously cannot be negative, the net deviations generated by the MCA are converted into rankings.³⁵ Hence, the input is now the ranking of a household position (from 1 to 8) on each of the 80 items. A household position takes rank 1 if it has the highest positive net deviation for a particular item. We recall that the net deviations are measured *after* controls for gender, age, education, profession and urbanity. The correspondence analyses furthermore show that two dimensions (hence a plane) suffice to summarise 50 percent of the information, and that a third dimension would add only about 12 percent in all three regions.


With 80 items and 8 household positions, the projection of proximities yields a plot with 88 dots. Since all of these need to be identified with labels, such “busy” plots are not readily readable. To overcome this drawback, new figures were prepared using the following procedure:

1. The 8 household positions are plotted on their exact location on the plane, but the items are grouped according to their own proximities. Such a group of items is then represented by an arrow on the plane starting in the origin. Hence, items in a group are all located near their arrow.

2. It turned out in all three regions that 7 groups of items, and hence also 7 arrows, could give an adequate description of the item plots. The content of these groups, however, varies across the three regions, and so does the direction of the arrows. It is at this point that finer distinctions between the three groups of countries emerge.
3. It is helpful to add the information from the previous section, and to indicate to what extent each household position contributes to the overall non-conformity score from 0 to 80. We have therefore tilted the projection plane, so that a third dimension could be used to indicate the overall non-conformity score of each household position.
4. The tilted projection plane is located at a non-conformity score of 40. The vertical bars for each household position then indicate the number of items in the non-conventional direction above or below 40 recorded for that household position.

The resulting three-dimensional figures now contain a large amount of information. If a household type has an overall non-conformity score well in excess of 40 and located near the edges of the plane, then it draws disproportionately on these non-conformity items that are identified by the nearest arrows. In other words, these are the items for which the household position has produced the higher rankings with respect to the net deviations. Conversely, if the household type has a low overall non-conformity score well below 40, it would still draw higher rankings on the items identified by the nearest arrows. Household positions that are located closely to the origin draw higher rankings from all items, and not mainly from a particular group identified by an arrow. When this is coupled with a high overall non-conformity score, then that household position produced high rankings on a great variety of items, and if such a position near the origin is coupled with a low overall score, then it draws its small set of the higher rankings for all sorts of items as well. Finally, household types that are located at the opposite end of certain arrows draw nothing or almost nothing from the items that identify these arrows. For instance, in figure 4, the two arrows that point to the left mainly refer to items that deal with relaxed civil, ethical and marital morality, to greater distrust in institutions, higher protest proneness and more “postmaterialism”. The group of singles is located at a small distance from both arrows, which means that these items are highly characteristic for them. Moreover, the singles group has a surplus of +20 on the overall non-conformity score, and the items mentioned above are strongly contributing to this surplus. The group Mar+N in figure 4 is located at the diametrically opposite side, which means that they are far away from subscribing to the items concerning relaxed morality, “postmaterialism”, etc. Also, they have a large deficit on the overall non-conformity score of

Figure 4 : Correspondence between household positions and 80 non-conformism items, EVS 1999 : results for 8 western European countries (pooled samples).



-29. Hence, the few items of non-conformity that characterise them are disproportionately found among those identified by the nearest arrow, i.e. companionship (talking, time together...) and lack of trust in people in general. No doubt, the comments that accompany the results will be of further help in reading the figures.

The correspondence analysis results are given in figures 4, 5 and 6 respectively for the three groups of countries. The outcomes for the eight western European populations display the most classic profiles and we can use them as a reference.

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

At the onset, respondents still residing in the parental household (Respar) display the more “youthful” form of non-conformism: family considerations and parenthood are still a matter of a more distant future, and unconventional household forms are fully acceptable to them in tandem with a more relaxed sexual morality. Other expressions of uncivil behaviour that are more typical for younger ages are also tolerated, such as using soft drugs, joyriding or speeding. This is linked to distrust in institutions and to the rejection of forms of authority with which they are confronted more directly: the educational system, the police, the justice system and the army. But a number of new traits equally emerge: home dwellers score low on memberships of voluntary associations and on voluntary work. On the whole, however, this category of respondents has only a modest surplus of unconventional scores (+2), mainly because they do not score as highly on a series on other dimensions such as expressive values in socialisation and work, tolerance for ethnic and sexual minorities, world citizenship, protest-proneness or secularism. These issues still seem too remote for them.

Single respondents living on their own carry a number of these non-conformism items with them, and even reinforce this pattern by adding extra items in the spheres of weaker civil and sexual morality. Their larger surplus (+20) of non-conformist items is furthermore produced by higher scores on secularism, protest proneness, postmaterialism and world orientation. Also, “imagination” as a socialisation trait comes to the fore. When a move into cohabitation is made (Coh0), these features are again reinforced, probably as a result of both selection and further articulation. From that point onward, the high non-conformism surplus (+26) is equally made up of many features of secularism, a tolerance for interference in matters of life and death (abortion, suicide, euthanasia), a further strengthening of expressive


values (independence in socialisation at the detriment of good manners; jobs permitting initiative) and greater tolerance for the more adult forms of uncivil behaviour (tax evasion, tax cheating). This latter set of value orientations equally typifies cohabitants with children (Coh+), but non-conformist value orientations associated with earlier forms of living arrangements are fading away. This accounts for their lower overall non-conformism score (surplus = +13), and for their location at the edge of the projection plane as well.

The experience of earlier cohabitation has apparently a lasting impact after marriage and parenthood (see Mar+E). This group continues along the lines of high protest proneness (demonstrations, boycotts) and of emphasis on expressive values (responsible and interesting job; obedience not stressed in education). But the refusal of nationalist reflexes is added (lower national pride, no priority for own workers, no exclusion of immigrants, no right wing neighbours). However, the values that are diametrically opposite on the projection plane are refuted. This holds particularly for expressions of lax civil and sexual morality, which are incompatible with parenthood. The outcome is a further reduction in the non-conformist surplus (+7).

Married respondents without children (Mar0) have a deficit on the non-conformist scale (-8), as expected. As a result of small sample sizes this group is also undifferentiated according to presence or absence of earlier transitions (living alone, cohabitation) and it remains therefore quite heterogeneous. In figure 4, however, childless married persons have retained certain characteristics of home stayers (Respar), such as low membership rates, absence of voluntary work and distrust in certain institutions. To these, they also tend to add other aspects of low community orientation, such as not stressing tolerance and respect or unselfishness in socialisation and a lack of political interests. They only wish to compensate for that via a job that is useful for society.

Married respondents with children who never cohabited (Coh+N) have a very low non-conformist score with a deficit of -29. They are located at the edge of the projection plane at the opposite end of singles and childless cohabitants. Hence, they score very low on all the items associated with these two positions. Conversely, if there is a contribution to non-conformism, it stems from stressing companionship in marriage rather than social homogamy, and from a few more isolated items such as a reduced trust in people, not stressing hard work in socialisation, seeking a respected job but accepting unstable people as neighbours.

Figure 5 : Correspondence between household positions and 80 non-conformism items, EVS 1999 : results for 7 central European countries (pooled samples).



Divorced or separated respondents who are not yet in a new union (FmNu), finally, exhibit the expected return to much higher overall non-conformism scores (surplus = +16), but they are located closely to the origin in the projection plane. This means that they draw from a wider variety of items than all other positions. The group they resemble most is that of married parents who ever cohabited (Mar+E).

The detailed central European profile on Figure 5 displays both similarities and differences when compared to the western picture. Respondents residing in the parental home (Respar) also have a modest surplus on the overall non-conformity scale (+5), and similar items are equally overrepresented. These pertain to the remoteness of parenthood, high tolerance for unconventional living arrangements, acceptability of neighbours with deviant characteristics, lower standards of marital morality, and the classic distrust in the education system and civil service. A move to single living, which is a more rare transition in central Europe, adds a number of traits (surplus = +15) that are a further accentuation of acceptability of uncivil morality. Also conformity in socialisation is rejected (no stress on good manners, obedience or tolerance and respect). To this a new feature is added: low national pride and a weaker identification with village or town. But this broader outlook is matched by distrust in supranational institutions (EU, UN). What is missing among central European singles is a selection for and an articulation of secularism.

FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

Childless cohabitants (Coh0) in central Europe strongly resemble their western counterparts with respect to protest proneness (permitting strikes, occupation of buildings, boycotts...), “world citizenship” and tolerance for homosexuals. There is also a parallel – but a weaker one – with respect to expressive values (independence and imagination in education, expressive job qualities). But again, central European childless cohabitants do not share the pronounced articulation of secularism of their western counterparts. Instead, they are already moving towards the accentuation of companionship. The overall surplus of non-conformism items among central European childless cohabitants is also lower (+17) than in the West (+27), largely as a result of less articulation of secularism and less tolerance for expressions of uncivil morality.

The secularism items in central Europe show up rather strikingly for cohabitants with children (Coh+). Also other traits typical for western cohabitants now emerge among central European cohabiting parents: stronger protest proneness and distrust in institutions. Similarly, tolerance for expressions of uncivil behaviour has faded away with parenthood.

In central Europe too the experience of earlier cohabitation leaves its marks after marriage and parenthood (see Mar+E). Despite the fact that the surplus of non-conformist choices (+7) has been reduced and that the position Mar+E has shifted closer to the origin, the earlier cohabitation experience still tends to be associated with traits typical for cohabiting couples with or without children. There is also a resemblance with their western counterparts with the accentuation of expressive job traits, the higher acceptability of ethnic minorities (here: gypsies) and the aversion to right wing neighbours.

Also relatively close to the origin of the projection plane are the central European childless married respondents (Mar0). Their deficit on the overall non-conformism scale is small (-2). Both features taken together imply that this group as a whole has the most undifferentiated profile of all. As in the West, central European childless married persons are not accentuating parenthood, and are relatively tolerant to deviations from strict marital morality and from a civil code of conduct. Similarly, they tend to score high on postmaterialism. The main difference is that childless married respondents in central Europe tend to be less choosy about their neighbours and more willing to accept persons with a deviant profile.

Western and central European married parents who never cohabited (Mar+N) obviously share the overall conservative profile, with the highest deficit on the non-conformism scale (-29 and -25 respectively). But the two small sets of contributing items have little more in common than distrust in people in general. Central European married parents who never cohabited extend this pattern to a lack of memberships and the absence of voluntary work in all types of associations. Also, unselfishness is not stressed in educating children. More surprisingly is the finding that they are relatively overrepresented among those who consider marriage as an outdated institution. Evidently, these married couples with children are older and belong disproportionately to generations with earlier marriage and parenthood. They could therefore express some regret about not having had the options of the later 1990s.

The divorced and separated respondents who are not yet in a new union (FmNu) in central Europe equally display the marked increase in the overall non-conformism score (surplus = +15). But the composition of this score is different from that in the West. Western divorcees have no return to a higher tolerance for uncivil behaviour, but central European divorcees do. They also score high on distrust for the UN and EU despite their lower national pride and lack of local identification. Except for not focussing on promotion, they also lack the stress on intrinsic work values of their western counterparts. The only features that the western and central groups of FmNu have in common are the lack of stress on obedience in rearing children.


To sum up, the values profiles of persons according to living arrangements in western and central Europe share many similarities both in terms of overall non-conformism scores and the more precise composition of these scores. The largest differences are, however, noted for the singles, childless cohabitants and those who were formerly in a union. Singles and childless cohabitants in central Europe are not selected on the basis of secularism as in the west, and childless cohabitants in central Europe are less tolerant toward expressions of uncivil morality. By contrast, the latter features emerge particularly among central European divorcees, whereas they have disappeared as characteristic traits among western divorcees.

FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE

Before turning to the details of the eastern European profiles, it should be recalled that single living, cohabitation and parenthood within consensual unions are all much more rare forms of living arrangement in this area. The selection into these slots could therefore be the outcome of a different process or trajectory than in the other two regions.

Eastern European respondents still residing in the parental home (Respar) have a fairly undifferentiated profile. Their position on Figure 6 is fairly close to the origin of the projection plane, and they have a small deficit (-3) on the overall non-conformism scale. There is, however, already a slight overrepresentation in the direction of secularism, a lack of community involvement (no memberships, no voluntary work), a refusal of authority and a broader world outlook, but matched by a distrust in international organisations. The feature of low community involvement is shared with western home stayers, but for the rest, eastern

Figure 6 : Correspondence between household positions and 80 non-conformism items, EVS 1999 : results for 5 eastern European countries (pooled samples).



Europeans in this category do not exhibit the high tolerance for alternative living arrangements or childlessness, nor the more lax attitudes in matters of civil morality and ethics. In other words, they start from an overall more conservative profile than in western or central Europe.

As usual, the non-conformity score increases with single living (surplus = +8). Besides secularism and continued low community involvement (also never discuss politics), the features of acceptability of unconventional household types, tolerance for deviance, and an orientation to expressive values (interesting job, no stress on hard work and obedience) now emerge more clearly. Most of these features are shared with both their central and western European counterparts. Only the distrust in national institutions is not yet accentuated among eastern European singles.

The marked rise in overall non-conformism associated with cohabitation (Coh0) is also absent in eastern Europe, as already noticed on Figures 1 and 2. The position of childless cohabitants is located at the opposite side of the projection plane compared to that of the earlier household positions. Eastern childless cohabitants share higher protest proneness, postmaterialism and expressive work and socialisation values with both western and central cohabitants, and also an orientation toward companionship with the central European ones. What they lack is secularism, tolerance for expressions of uncivil conduct, and distrust in national institutions. These three features are fully surfacing at the next stage, i.e. when the selection into unmarried parenthood is made (Coh+). In this respect there is a parallel with central European cohabiting parents who were also selected for high levels of secularisation. The overall outcome is that procreation within consensual unions in all three parts of Europe is associated with secularism, distrust in institutions, protest proneness, accentuation of expressive values and lowering of standards in matters of civil morality. Eastern European cohabiting parents, furthermore, share low national pride and weaker local identification with their western counterparts.

As in the two other regions, eastern European married parents who experienced cohabitation (Mar+E) are clearly distinct from childless married persons (Mar0) and from married parents who did not experience cohabitation (Mar+N). This not only pertains to the marked difference in the total non-conformism score, but equally to the underlying values profiles. The positions of Mar0 and Mar+N are close to the origin of the projection plane,

indicating that value profiles are rather undifferentiated. The position of Mar+E, by contrast, reveals a strong accentuation of particular traits: low civil morality (bribing, tax cheating and tax evasion, collecting unentitled state benefits, soft drugs), distrust in the civil service, lower marital fidelity despite companionship (talking, chores, sex), protest proneness (boycotts, demonstrations), and a preference for “imagination” over “good manners” in education.

Finally, eastern European divorcees who are not yet in another union (FmNu) retain or regain non-conformist traits indicative of secularism, distrust in institutions (education, police, justice) and lower national pride. As their position on the projection plane shows, they resemble cohabiting parents in most respects.

On the whole, the most striking differences with the other two regions is that parenthood among currently or formerly cohabiting couples is not associated in eastern Europe with a reduction in overall non-conformism, nor with a correction in the spheres of civil morality in particular. In fact, rather the opposite is true, which suggests that the smaller Coh+ and Mar+E groups in eastern Europe are more composed of respondents with complex and perturbed partnerships and marital histories than in western and central Europe. Unfortunately this hypothesis cannot be checked with the EVS data for lack of more detailed retrospective questions on these issues.

7. Changes in value orientations during the 1990s

It would of course be totally erroneous to assume that all ideational changes in central and eastern Europe were absent during the Communist period, and that everything started to move in 1989. Rather, the events of that year were the culmination of political groundswells that were also grounded in shifting aspirations and value orientations, and not exclusively in deteriorating state efficiency in economic and material spheres. In fact, one of the crucial political elements leading to the 1989 events was the constant quest for the rebirth of a “civil society”.³⁶ This envisaged the contraction of the party-state and the creation of political space for voluntary civic organisations such as independent labour unions, professional organisations, student associations, church groups, free press etc. Hence, the quest for political autonomy and grass-roots democracy was steadily on the rise prior to 1989. During the 1990s, however, not much was left of the “civil society” discourse: economic restructuring caused social disruption, uncertainty and inequality. Individual autonomy and

freedom of choice were restored, including that of opting for other forms of living arrangements, but the ideal of an “energised population” supportive of social cohesion proved to be illusory.³⁷ Instead, central and eastern European societies became much more atomistic and individualistic, and they faced problems of inclusion and exclusion similar to or more serious than those in western countries.

The features of this transformation can also be traced in the opinions and attitudes measured in the 1990 and 1999 EVS-rounds. To document this, we retraced the 1990 data sets in search for comparable items.³⁸ The 1990 questionnaires in the various countries were not yet as standardised as the 1999 instrument, so that the set of comparable items across countries and for two points in time is much more limited than the set of 80 used so far. Nevertheless, table 4 reports on 26 items that passed the test, and they pertain to family values, trust in institutions, civil morality, socialisation values and identification. Given small national sample sizes, results are again produced for groups of countries.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

The most striking changes emerging from table 4 are found for several family items, and more particularly for those that are directly related to the tolerance for new living arrangements and to procreation. In each of the three groups of countries (Baltic, central and eastern Europe), there is a substantial rise of the opinion that women do not need children for life fulfilment, that marriage is an outdated institution, and that motherhood for women without a partner or husband is acceptable. The increments in the proportions with these opinions are of the order of 10 to 25 percentage points for the period 1990-1999. Also the tolerance for homosexuality has increased, whereas the acceptability of adultery and divorce has remained stable. Evidently, the presumed rise in premarital cohabitation displayed in table 2 is matched by a similar rise in legitimacy of non-conformist household types.

The other items that display a rise in *each of the three groups* of countries are related to:

- (i) Greater distrust in several institutions, and more specifically in the church, the civil service, and the justice system (but not in the police or the education system). This is coupled to much higher proportions stating that they never discuss politics,

Table 4: Trends in selected comparable items among respondents aged 18-49, 3 groups of countries with transition economies, 1990 and 1999

	3 Baltic		5 Central		4 East	
	Estonia Lithuania Latvia		Poland Czech + Slovak. Hungary, Slovenia		Russia Belarus Bulgaria Romania	
	<u>1990</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1999</u>
Family						
Women does not need children life fulfilment	8.3%	26.5%	23.5%	44.6%	10.8%	25.1%
Marriage outdated institution	11.1	23.8	12.7	19.5	14.3	23.2
Single motherhood acceptable	57.8	83.9	69.4	78.4	78.5	80.7
Parents must not sacrifice for children	36.1	32.0	22.9	20.7	28.6	30.3
Homosexuality acceptable	2.3	4.5	11.8	16.0	2.2	4.3
Adultery acceptable	62.6	61.0	56.7	52.6	59.4	58.2
Divorce acceptable	17.1	14.0	21.1	22.6	17.2	18.4
Distrust institutions & politics						
No trust in church	8.0	11.7	20.2	26.6	17.5	15.4
No trust civil service	7.3	13.6	10.4	16.4	24.2	27.6
No trust police	80.8	70.4	61.3	56.1	67.6	64.1
No trust justice system	13.2	17.5	10.9	15.7	18.6	21.5
No trust education system	54.4	33.5	37.1	29.9	48.4	30.4
Never discuss politics	3.5	19.6	12.9	25.3	13.8	25.0
One cannot trust people	75.9	77.9	74.4	78.6	72.9	75.0
Expressiveness						
Independence stressed	67.4	54.4	34.5	61.2	41.0	38.9
Imagination stressed	12.0	10.2	8.3	13.1	15.9	15.7
Obedience not mentioned	82.2	79.8	71.4	74.7	79.6	79.0
Good manners not mentioned	44.1	39.1	34.5	29.3	25.6	30.0
Unselfishness not mentioned	74.4	82.4	73.5	72.5	75.7	84.2
Civil Morality						
Claiming unentitled benefits justified	40.2	54.5	59.1	47.8	38.8	46.7
Taking soft drugs justified	12.2	16.8	21.1	29.7	14.6	18.2
Accepting a bribe justified	38.0	37.4	33.2	43.5	28.0	39.3
Tax cheating justified	51.0	64.4	58.2	59.2	57.5	61.1
Identification						
Identification: Europe + world	6.2	8.3	9.9	7.6	11.9	11.7
Identification: not own locality or town	71.0	52.5	61.0	45.3	54.4	52.7
National pride: not proud	13.8	37.1	15.7	12.7	30.6	30.0

Source: original data sets, EVS-consortium and World Values Studies.

Note: each individual country has a weight of unity; in 1999 the data for the Czech and Slovak Republics were merged since the 1990 data covered the whole of Czechoslovakia.

and to a more modest increase in the percentages displaying distrust in people in general.

- (ii) Greater tolerance for several forms of uncivil behaviour, and especially for claiming unentitled state benefits, tax cheating, using soft drugs and accepting bribes. Among the socialisation items, “unselfishness” is more frequently absent among the traits that were given priority. And among the identification items, there is a decline in identification with the national or supranational levels in favour of a stronger link with the local settings.

Aside from these general trends, there are also a few remarkable shifts in specific groups of countries. For instance, independence and imagination as socialisation traits have gained ground in central Europe, and there is a clear dip in national pride in the Baltic states.

To sum up, the general pattern displayed in table 4 indicates that the acceptability of non-conventional household forms and life course transition is clearly on the rise, and that this tolerance is imbedded in a more general “atomisation” of society. Individuals are free to choose, but have to do so at their own risk and with their own coping strategies. As a colleague noted: “the second demographic transition is not kind to all”.³⁹

8. Conclusions

The EVS-surveys for central Europe indicate that new forms of household formation have gained ground during the 1990s, and that their acceptability and legitimacy have increased as well. However, the precise orders of magnitude need validation via other and especially larger surveys. The trend toward unconventional living arrangements is less pronounced in eastern Europe, as expected, but here too the tolerance for such forms is increasing.

The cross-sectional “footprints” of the selection-adaptation model are found in all instances including eastern Europe, and the overall profiles of non-conformity according to living arrangement are following the western pattern to a remarkable degree. In all three groups of countries, those who never cohabited and moved into marriage and parenthood have by far the most conservative profiles, whereas cohabitants and divorced persons occupy the most non-conformist positions. Similarly, an earlier cohabitation experience leaves a durable

imprint in the direction of non-conformity as well. This effect is stronger than anticipated in all three regions.

A more detailed analysis at the item level reveals several differences between the groups of countries. For instance, the selection of cohabitants on the basis of secularism, which is still highly typical in the west, is not as pronounced in central and eastern Europe. This can be attributed to historical factors, and more particularly to the secular tradition stemming from the Communist era. Also, childless cohabitants in central and eastern Europe are less tolerant to expressions of uncivil morality. Instead, this has become a more pronounced trait among their divorcees and among those selected cohabitants who progress to parenthood without prior marriage.

Other items that were comparable over time furthermore indicate that the rise in new living arrangements and their value profiles are associated with a weakening of social cohesion and the “atomisation” of society. The latter factor is obviously linked to the economic crisis of the 1990s, but it is also a trait associated with capitalism more generally, and therefore a lasting characteristic. Hence, an economic recovery is not likely to alter the demographic trend in a fundamental way, since the “second horse” in our metaphor is highly likely to take over. In short, a capitalist restructuring leads to greater individual autonomy in the ideational sphere, and this in its turn means more convergence of family formation patterns to the western types. Not so much the economic crisis *per se*, but the entire restructuring of society is an accelerator of the ideational and demographic changes.

This is not to say that all central European countries will end up with household patterns that are perfect copies of the western ones. There is substantial variation in the west to start with, and hence we equally expect such heterogeneity to emerge among central European nations. Only, the road back to a restoration of more stable and conventional patterns of household formation with early procreation seems no longer open.

The bottom line from this exploration of the 1999 EVS data is that many features of the “second demographic transition”, including the values patterning along the lines of the “selection-adaptation” model of life course progression, are by now clearly visible in central Europe too. In terms of actual behaviour, eastern Europe has not yet made it to the “take-off” phase, but in terms of values shifts since 1990, new household formation patterns have gained

acceptability. Hence, a further eastward spread of “second demographic transition” features to include eastern Europe would no longer come as a surprise.

In terms of fertility trends, this means that the growth of new patterns of household formation continues to be one of the causes of the postponement of parenthood. In the short run this implies that such a tempo shift will contribute to the prolongation of a period of very low fertility. However, if the younger generations will reach older ages (say age 30), some catching up of fertility can occur and this can cause a modest rise in period fertility measures. The exact degree of fertility “recuperation” after age 30 will then be a crucial element, and it is highly likely that this degree will substantially vary between the various central and eastern European populations as well. It is also possible that those countries with the faster transition in household structures will be the first to move to the fertility recuperation stage at older ages, and hence to be the first to bounce back to more acceptable levels of sub-replacement fertility. At this point, an economic recovery will also help, but in the meantime the “second demographic transition” will have become a fact of life for much of Europe.

- ¹ A detailed analysis of these tempo shifts in successive cohorts is given in T. Frejka and G. Calot, "Cohort Reproductive Patterns in Low-fertility Countries", *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2001, pp. 103-132. See also R. Lesthaeghe, "Postponement and Recuperation – Recent Fertility Trends and Forecasts in six Western European Countries", paper IUSSP Seminar on International Perspectives on Low Fertility, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, (Tokyo), March 21-23, 2001.
- ² For the repercussion of shifts in cohort fertility patterns on TFRs, see R. Lesthaeghe, G. Moors, "Recent Trends in Fertility and Household Formation in the Industrialized West", *Review of Population and Social Policy*, No. 9, 2000, pp. 121-170.
- ³ In the initial article on the second demographic transition produced in 1986, van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe were still considering that the tempo shifts in fertility and nuptiality were enhanced by the economic depression of the 1975-85 decade. Hence they were envisaging the possibility of the joint operation of economic and cultural factors. See R. Lesthaeghe and D.J. van de Kaa, "Twee demografische transitie?" In: R. Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, *Groei of Krimp?* 1986 book volume of "Mens en Maatschappij", Van Loghum-Slaterus, (Deventer), pp. 9-24.
- ⁴ The term was introduced by the psychologist A. Maslow in 1954: A. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, Harper and Row, (New York). His 'lower order needs' mainly pertain to subsistence needs (not luxury goods!), safety and longer term material security.
- ⁵ The term first appears in the already cited Dutch language journal, but it spread following van de Kaa's subsequent article of 1987: D.J. van de Kaa, "Europe's Second Demographic Transition", *Population Bulletin*, 1987, Vol. 42, No. 1.
- ⁶ H.-P. Kohler, F. Billari, J.A. Ortega, "Towards a Theory of Lowest-low Fertility", Paper General Conference IUSSP, (Salvador, Brazil), August 2001.
- ⁷ UN/ECE, "Fertility Decline in the Transition Economies, 1989-1998: Economic and Social Factors Revisited", *Economic Survey of Europe*, 2000, No. 1, pp. 189-207.
- ⁸ S.V. Zakharov, *Fertility Trends in Russia and the European New Independent States: Crisis or Turning Point?* United Nations, Population Division, Expert Group Meeting on Below-Replacement Fertility, (New York), 4-6 November 1997. ESA./P/WP.140, pp. 271-290. S.V. Zakharov, E.I. Ivanova, "Fertility Decline and Recent Changes in Russia: On the Threshold of the Second Demographic Transition", in J. Davanzo (ed.), *Russia's Demographic Crisis*, Rand Corporation, (Santa Monica), 1996, pp. 36-82. E. Fraczak, "Declining Fertility in Poland during the Transition Period 1989-1997". Paper Workshop on Lowest-low Fertility, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, (Rostock), December 10-11, 1998. D. Philipov: "Low Fertility in Central and Eastern Europe – Culture or Economy?" Paper IUSSP-seminar on International Perspectives on Low Fertility, National Institute for Population and Social Security Research (Tokyo), March 21-23, 2001. K. Zeman, T. Sobotka, V. Kantorova, "Halfway between Socialist Greenhouse and Postmodern Plurality: Life Course Transitions of young Czech Women", Paper ESF-Conference on the Second Demographic Transition, (Bad Herrenalb), June 23-28, 2001, session 2B. J. Rychtarikova, "The Second Demographic Transition and the Transformation of Fertility and Partnership in the Czech Republic and other eastern European Countries", *ibidem*, session 2A. L. Rabusic: "On Marriage and Family Trends in the Czech Republic in the mid-1990s", (in Czech), *Demografie*, 1996, 38 (3): 173-180.
- ⁹ R. Lesthaeghe, "On Theory Development and Applications to the Study of Family Formation", *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1998, pp. 1-14. See also: R. Lesthaeghe, J. Surkyn, "Cultural Dynamics and Economic Theories of Fertility Change", *Population and Development Review*, 1988, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 1-45.
- ¹⁰ Demographic surveys such as the rounds of Family and Fertility Surveys (FFS) commonly measure detailed event histories and socio-economic indicators, but at most only include a short module on value orientations. Furthermore, this module was rarely incorporated in the national surveys. At the concluding conference of the 1990s FFS round, not a single paper covered this subject.
- ¹¹ For an overview of indicators and national results, see L. Halman, *The European Values Study – A Third Wave*, WORC Tilburg University, Tilburg, 2001. At this point, we would also like to acknowledge the permission given by the EVS Consortium for the use of the 1999 data files. Most of the national data sets are now in the public domain. They can be obtained from Halman@kub.nl.
- ¹² R. Inglehart's term "postmaterialism" has been a constant source of misinterpretation. Inglehart coined the term largely as the expression of Maslow's "higher order needs" in the political sphere (democratic participation, grass-roots democracy, concerns related to environmental quality, freedom of speech, emancipation, new political ideas etc.). The "materialist" orientation in Inglehart's formulation deals with income security, safeguarding of the social security system, political stability and "law and order". This

- concept has nothing to do with consumerism or conspicuous consumption of luxury goods. See R. Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*, Princeton University Press, (Princeton N.J.), 1977.
- ¹³ Sample sizes of 2000-2500 are used only in Germany, Italy, Russia and Belgium.
- ¹⁴ The results of the present analysis are also available for smaller groups of countries or for countries with larger sample sizes. At present the analysis is completed for Germany, Belgium, France, the Czech Republic, Denmark + Sweden, Spain + Portugal, Slovakia + Hungary, Poland + Lithuania, and Slovenia + Croatia. The outcomes will be put on the following web site: [www.vub.ac.be/SOCO/Interface Demography/publications](http://www.vub.ac.be/SOCO/Interface%20Demography/publications) on line.
- ¹⁵ The FFS-results are published in the form of a series of country reports with standardised graphs and tables. See UN/ECE and UNPF, FFS-Standard Country Report, *Economic Studies* No. 10, (New York and Geneva), various dates.
- ¹⁶ R. Lesthaeghe, D.J. van de Kaa, "Twee Demografische Transitities?" In: Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa (eds), *Groei of Krimp?* Book volume of "Mens en Maatschappij", 1986, Van Loghum-Slaterus, (Deventer). The first broader empirical check using the 1981 EVS data can be found in R. Lesthaeghe, D. Meekers, "Value Changes and the Dimensions of Familism in the European Community", *European Journal of Population*, 1986, No. 2, pp. 225-268. The 1990 EVS data served again in R. Lesthaeghe, G. Moors, "Living Arrangements, Socio-economic Position and Values among Young Adults – A pattern Description for France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands", in: D. Coleman (ed), *Europe's Population in the 1990s*, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 1996, pp. 163-221.
- ¹⁷ A. Felling, J. Peters, O. Schreuder, *Burgerlijk en Onburgerlijk Nederland*, Van Loghum-Slaterus, (Deventer), 1983 contains a thorough exploration of the connections between voting behaviour and value orientations for the late 1970s in the Netherlands. A similar analysis for Belgium including household positions as well is R. Lesthaeghe, G. Moors, "De gezinsrelaties: de ontwikkeling en stabilisatie van patronen", in J. Kerkhofs, K. Dobbelaere, L. Voyé (eds), *De Versnelde Ommeekeer*, Uitgeverij Lannoo and King Baudouin Foundation, (Tielt), 1992, pp. 19-68.
- ¹⁸ The most important US panel studies with adequate values and attitudes measurements are: The Detroit Intergenerational Panel Study of Parents and Children, the US National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, the US National Education Longitudinal Study, and the US National Survey of Families and Households. Panel studies with similar questions came much later in Europe, and only two have adequate data for the present purposes: the Bielefeld Panel Study "Familienentwicklung in Nordrhein-Westfalen", and the Panel Study on Social Integration in the Netherlands.
- ¹⁹ R. Lesthaeghe, G. Moors, "Life Course Transitions and Value Orientations: Selection and Adaptation", in R. Lesthaeghe (ed), *Meaning and Choice – Value Orientations and Life Course Decisions*, NIDI-CBGS Monograph No. 37, Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, (The Hague), 2002 (in press), chapter 1.
- ²⁰ The issues of social capital, association memberships and social cohesion are mainly studied from a political science perspective, i.e. focussing on the roles of such network memberships in fostering democratic values and in creating barriers to the extreme right. Association memberships and social networks are rarely related to household formation and life course transitions.
- ²¹ There is a very extensive literature in both psychology and sociology on the effect of parental household dissolution, particularly in Anglosaxon countries where these effects are enhanced, partly as a result of less adequate family support policies than in the rest of western Europe.
- ²² J. Kytir, "Unehelich, Vorehelich, Ehelich: Familiengründung im Wandel", *Demografische Informationen 1992-93*, Institut für Demografie, Oesterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, (Vienna), 1993, pp. 29-40. For the levels of illegitimate fertility for all European provinces at the end of the 19th Century, see A.J. Coale, R. Treadway, "A Summary of the Changing Distribution of Overall Fertility, Marital Fertility and of Proportions Married in the Provinces of Europe", in A.J. Coale and S. Cotts Watkins (eds), *The Decline of Fertility in Europe*, Princeton University Press, (Princeton N.J.), 1986, pp. 31-79. These figures illustrate that procreation within consensual unions was still widespread by 1900 in several areas of Austria, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Most of these areas were rural.
- ²³ R. Lesthaeghe, K. Neels, "From the First to the Second Demographic Transition – An Interpretation of the Spatial Continuity of Demographic Innovation in France, Belgium and Switzerland", *European Journal of Population*, 2002, forthcoming.
- ²⁴ R. Easterlin, *Birth and Fortune*. University of Chicago Press (Chicago), 1987. Also: R. Easterlin: "The Conflict between Aspirations and Resources", *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1976, pp. 417-425, and R. Easterlin "Relative Economic Status and the American Fertility Swing", in E.B. Sheldon (ed) *Family Economic Behavior*, Lippincot (Philadelphia), pp. 170-223.

- ²⁵ OECD, *Preparing Youth for the 21st Century*, OECD Publications, Paris, 1999. R. Lesthaeghe, *Europe's Demographic Issues: Fertility, Household Formation and Replacement Migration*. UN Expert Group Meeting on Policy Responses to Population Decline and Ageing, (New York), October 16-18, 2000.
- ²⁶ T. Castro-Martin, "Delayed Childbearing in Contemporary Spain – Trends and Differentials", *European Journal of Population*, 1992, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 217-246. P. Miret-Gamundi, "Nuptiality Patterns in Spain in the Eighties", *Genus*, 1997, Vol. 53, No. 3-4, pp. 185-200. G. Dalla Zuana, M. Atoh, et al., "Late Marriage among Young People: the Case of Italy and Japan", *Genus*, 1997, Vol. 53, No. 3-4, pp. 187-232.
- ²⁷ D. Alwin, "Historical Changes in Parental Orientations to Children", *Sociological Studies of Child Development*, 1990, No. 3, pp. 65-86.
- ²⁸ F. Kobrin-Goldscheider, C. Goldscheider, *Leaving Home before Marriage – Ethnicity, Familism and Generational Relationships*, University of Wisconsin Press, (Madison WI), 1993. F. Kobrin-Goldscheider, L. Waite, "Nest-leaving Patterns and the Transition to Marriage for Young Men and Women", *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, Vol. 49, 1987, pp. 507-516. F. Kobrin-Goldscheider, J. Davanzo, "Semi-autonomy and Leaving Home in Early Adulthood", *Social Forces*, Vol. 65, No. 1, 1986, pp. 187-201. E. Marchena, L. Waite, "Reassessing Family Goals and Attitudes in Late Adolescence: the Effects of Natal Family Experiences and Early Family Formation", in R. Lesthaeghe (ed), *Meaning and Choice*, op. cit., chapter 3.
- ²⁹ A. Thornton, W. Axinn, et. al., "Reciprocal Effects of Religiosity, Cohabitation and Marriage", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 98, No. 3, 1992, pp. 628-6511. L. Waite and F. Kobrin-Goldscheider, "Non-family Living and the Erosion of Traditional Family Orientations among Young Adults", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 51, 1986, pp. 541-554. G. Moors, "Values and Living Arrangements: A Recursive Relationship", in L. Waite et al. (eds), *Ties that bind: Perspectives on Marriage and Cohabitation*, Aldine de Gruyter Publishers, (Hawthorne), 2001, chapter 11.
- ³⁰ J.S. Barber, W. Axinn, A. Thornton, "The Influence of Attitudes on Family Formation Processes", in R. Lesthaeghe (ed), *Meaning and Choice*, op. cit., chapter 2. M. Jansen, M. Kalmijn, "Investment in Family Life – The Impact of Value Orientations on Patterns of Consumption, Production and Reproduction in Married and Cohabiting Couples", in R. Lesthaeghe (ed), *Meaning and Choice*, op. cit., chapter 4.
- ³¹ G. Moors, "Reciprocal Relations between Gender Role Values and Family Formation", in R. Lesthaeghe (ed), *Meaning and Choice*, op. cit., chapter 7. Also: M. Jansen, M. Kalmijn, "Emancipatiewaarden en de Levensloop van Jong-volwassen Vrouwen", *Sociologische Gids*, 2000, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 293-314.
- ³² The "selection-adaptation" hypothesis was also the starting point of a symposium held in October 2000 at the Belgian Academy. The participants were all authors who had documented these recursive effects in their work with panel data. A translation of such effects into cross-sectional profiles is given in R. Lesthaeghe, J. Surkyn, J. Anson, "Household Positions and Value Orientations – An Exploration with Belgian and German EVS-data", EFS-Conference on The Second Demographic Transition, (Bad Herrenalb), June 23-28, 2001, session 4B.
- ³³ The items that dropped out were related to "left-right" dimension in economic and social policies (state and labour union interference versus free enterprise) and economic equity, perceived causes of poverty, overall job satisfaction, political items covering the functioning of democracy, more detailed attitudes toward elderly and immigrants. Also several items pertaining to female autonomy and gender inequality could not be included since they were not incorporated in all national questionnaires.
- ³⁴ For the philosophy and technical details, see J.-P. Benzecri, *L'analyse des données – L'analyse des correspondances*, Eds Dunod, Paris, 1973, and M.J. Greenacre, *Theory and Applications of Correspondence Analysis*, Academic Press, London, 1984. In the current application, the SAS software was used. See SAS Institute Inc., *Statistics and Graphics Guide*, Version 3.1 JMP, 1995, Cary, NC, pp. 105-111.
- ³⁵ We owe this useful methodological suggestion to J. Anson, who also put us on the path of correspondence analysis as a powerful tool for visualising the proximities between household positions and values items.
- ³⁶ For a succinct overview, see: J. Ehrenberg: *Civil Society – The Critical History of an Idea*, New York University Press (New York), 1999, especially chapter 7.
- ³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 199.
- ³⁸ Not only the wording has to be identical in both rounds, but also the battery composition and scoring options need to match perfectly.
- ³⁹ Kathleen Kiernan's comment at the ESF-seminar on "The second demographic transition", Bad Herrenalb, June 23-28, 2001.