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## The Brussels Capital Region: Demographic and Social Futures

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# **The Brussels Capital Region**

## **Demographic and social futures**

R. Lesthaeghe, P. Deboosere, D. Willaert

### 1. The setting: the BCR and its 19 municipalities

The Brussels story is a rather complicated one, not only because of the growth pains associated with Brussels' development from a small regional town into a national capital of a rapidly industrializing country (19th Century), and then into an international centre (after WWII), but also because the city has been caught in the political turmoil associated with the transformation of Belgium into a federal state. During the 19th Century, the dominant language spoken in Brussels shifted from Flemish to French, and ever since, all administrative constructions had to grapple with linguistic sensitivities. In 1977 the nation's 2000 municipalities ("*gemeenten*", "*communes*") were reduced to a mere 600, but in contrast to what happened to other major urban areas (e.g. Antwerp, Ghent), the original 19 municipalities forming the core of the Brussels agglomeration remained untouched. At that time, one was not willing to return to the "*Gross Brüssel*" of the war years, and yet it was quite evident that the continued fragmentation in 19 separate entities missed important economies of scale. Several propositions were formulated to fuse the 19 into a smaller number (see Deschouwer & Buelens, 1999), but nothing of the sort happened until the more drastic reformation of the Belgian state itself along federalist lines. The solution reached in 1989 was to create a Brussels Capital Region (BCR) alongside the Flemish and Walloon Regions, and all three pillars of the new federal nation would be endowed with similar institutions and prerogatives. In addition, the BCR parliament and executive have a Flemish overrepresentation to guarantee the rights of the Dutch-speaking minority (see Alen & Delpérée, 1999, for details). The outcome is that the BCR still contains its 19 original municipalities, and these are run in the same way as the "*gemeenten*" in Flanders and the "*communes*" in Wallonia.

Morphologically speaking, the Brussels urban area is much larger than the core of 19. On the basis of uninterruptedly built up zones, the Brussels agglomeration contains 36 municipalities with 1,330,000 inhabitants rather than 19 with a population of 950,000. However, this extra ring is situated on the territory of the Flemish Region, and this accounts for the containment of the BCR to the original 19 municipalities. Many of the other 17 in the ring have a linguistically mixed population, and special facilities for the francophone population were created (e.g. French-speaking schools, bilingual administration). So far this typical pacification model (Flemish political overrepresentation in the BCR and facilities for francophones in the ring) has worked rather well despite the fact that more extremist wings on both sides would like to reduce versus expand these linguistic facilities. Other factors contributing to the pacification have been the rapid suburbanization of the adjacent francophone arrondissement of Nivelles (thereby reducing francophone immigration into the ring) and also the greater willingness of the better educated francophone population in the Flemish ring to embrace functional bilingualism. During the last 10 years this *status quo* has not been challenged in any serious way. An international comparison with other capitals of federal and/or multilingual nations furthermore showed that the Brussels BCR-model most closely resembles that of Bern in Switzerland (cf. J. Poirier, S. Dreyfus, 1999).


## 2. The demographic future

In this section we shall present the basic demographic parameters and give a succinct picture of the changing ethnic and social composition. We shall end with our latest population projections for the BCR. These descriptive materials will furthermore be of relevance for the section on the "social future" which will be much more interpretative by nature.


### 2.1. The components of demographic change: dominance of migration

As a whole, the BCR reached its maximum population size, i.e. 1,072,000, in 1968, but ever since the population has been declining to its present size of 959,200 (see Table 1). The main component of this decline has been a succession of suburbanization waves. The BCR can also be divided into a group of "inner city" municipalities, which largely correspond to the expansion before WWI, and into an "outer city" group that grew thereafter. Together these groups form the original 19 (see Map 1). In the inner group, three municipalities had their largest population size between 1907 and 1923, but for several others the growth continued into the 1970s, largely as a result of the influx of foreign labour. Moreover, in several inner


**Map 1: The BCR 19 municipalities**



**Figure 1: Rates of total increase, natural increase and net migration per 1000 population, BCR, 1970-1999.**  
Source: NIS-Register



**Figure 2: BCR migration balance according to nationality of migrants (abs. numbers), 1970-1999.**  
Source: NIS-Register



city municipalities the subsequent decline of the 1980s has also been halted during the 1990s for the same reason.

The outer group of the 19 (also called "the second crown") reached its maximal population size during the 1960s and 1970s, and only one of them (Evere) has had further population growth till present. Population growth during the 1990s in this "second crown" of municipalities is only realised at the outer limits of the BCR.

Hence, the depopulation of the BCR as a whole is by no means solely an affair of the older inner city group, but much more evenly spread over the entire BCR territory. Figures 1 and 2 give further details on the components of this evolution. First of all, the prime component of the population decline since 1970 is the negative net migration rate. Until 1986 this was further enhanced by a smaller but equally negative natural growth rate, but since that date births again exceed deaths in the BCR as the result of a favourable age structure effect and a smaller drop in fertility than in the rest of the country (ethnic minority effect). The net migration rate, i.e. the main component, exhibits a strong cyclical pattern, as is shown in Figure 2 in absolute numbers rather than rates per 1000 population. This cyclical movement in migration of Belgians has a reversed mirror image in the migration of foreigners. Internal migration rates for the BCR (but also for Antwerp for instance) completely reflect suburbanization waves and the strong cyclical movements in the house building industry. These in turn reflect growth or stagnation periods in real disposable household incomes (see Willaert et al., 2000: chapter 3) and in real estate prices (see Willaert, 2000, and KBC, 2000). In other words, suburbanization in Belgium is governed by market forces in an open housing economy and in a setting with a predominance of home ownership and only a residual public housing sector. More specifically, high outmigration and suburbanization occurred throughout the 1970s, and again during the recovery period between 1987 and 1994. The economic crisis of 1980-1986 meant no growth in real household incomes, weak building activity, low suburbanization and less outmigration from the BCR (see also Eggerickx et al., 2000; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1996). The recent weakening, i.e. after 1994, of outbound internal migration again corresponds with a new stagnation in household income and very steep increases in the costs of building plots, especially in Flanders. This is furthermore enhanced by the policy of the Flemish Region to curtail urban sprawl and "rurbanisation" through rather drastic restrictions on the development of new residential zones (i.e. "*Structuurplan Vlaanderen*", see also KBC, 2000). A third contributing factor to weaker

Table 1: Evolution of population size in the 19 BCR-municipalities

	<b>Year of population maximum</b>	<b>Maximum pop. size, in '000 (a)</b>	<b>Pop. size 1.1.1990 in '000 (b)</b>	<b>Pop. size 1.1.2000 in '000 (c)</b>	<b>Ratio (c)/(a)</b>	<b>Ratio (c)/(b)</b>
Total BCR	1968	1079.2	964.4	959.3	.89	.99
Anderlecht*	1970	104.1	89.2	87.8	.84	.98
Bruxelles*	1923	215.5	136.7	133.9	.62	.98
Ixelles*	1962	94.2	73.1	73.2	.78	1.00
Molenbeek-St-Jean*	1977	72.0	68.9	71.2	.99	1.03
Saint-Gilles*	1920	69.8	43.6	42.5	.61	.97
Saint-Josse ten Noode*	1907	33.8	21.5	22.1	.65	1.03
Schaerbeek*	1950	125.5	104.8	105.7	.84	1.01
Auderghem	1972	34.6	29.1	28.8	.83	.99
Berchem-Ste-Agathe	1972	19.1	18.6	18.7	.98	1.01
Etterbeek	1963	53.1	39.6	39.4	.73	.99
Evere	1985	30.6	29.7	31.3	1.02	1.05
Forest	1968	55.8	47.2	45.5	.82	.96
Ganshoren	1975	22.9	20.6	19.8	.86	.96
Jette	1962	42.2	38.8	39.7	.95	1.02
Koekelberg	1970	17.7	16.1	16.2	.92	1.01
Uccle	1972	79.2	75.4	74.2	.94	.98
Watermael-Boisfort	1975	25.7	25.0	24.8	.96	.99
Woluwe-St-Lambert	1983	49.3	48.1	46.5	.94	.97
Woluwe-St-Pierre	1974	41.1	38.4	37.9	.92	.99

Note: \* = inner city municipality

Source: Natl. Institute of Statistics and De Lannoy et al. (1999)

outmigration from urban areas during the later 1990s is increased traffic congestion and inadequate suburban rail service. These turned commuting into a daily adventure.

The economic cycles governing internal migration and suburbanisation also codetermine -- but in a reverse fashion -- the cycles of international migration. The BCR received large numbers of immigrants during the periods of economic growth (e.g. the 1960s and early 1970s, and again from 1987-1994), but lost them partially during the 1980s recession. However, the economic connection is broken during the 1990s as a result of sustained chain migration based on family creation (no longer "reunification") among established foreign groups, and as a consequence of high refugee migration into Belgium in general. Hence the entire 1990s decade is characterised by a high positive international migration rate, and the figures for 2001 and 2002 will furthermore exhibit an exceptional peak given that a substantial proportion of the 50,600 applications of illegal migrants (the *sans papiers*) will be granted permanent residence.

More details on the composition of the migration streams into and out of the BCR can be obtained from tables 2 and 3. Table 2 specifies the origins and destinations for several periods and for all 19 municipalities, whereas table 3 gives the breakdown according to four nationalities groups (Belgians, other EU, Turks & Moroccans, other).

The inner city or "first crown" municipalities have had systematically negative net migration rates with other BCR-municipalities and with areas outside Brussels, but they partially compensate for this loss by highly positive international net migration rates. As can be seen in table 3, it is mainly the Belgian population that leaves the older inner city municipalities whereas the influx is generated by Moroccans, Turks and other non-EU populations mostly originating from the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Hence, for all periods documented in tables 2 and 3 the first crown is becoming more and more ethnic despite the gentrification of restricted areas (e.g. the often cited Dansaert-Saint-Géry area in downtown Brussels). Again, this ethnic influx is generated by chain migration of established groups such as Moroccans and Turks, who have engaged during the 1990s in quite massive import of marriage partners. As shown in table 4, immigration of Turks and Moroccans in Belgium reached new record levels after 1994, and much of this is accomplished via the recruitment of "imported brides" and "imported grooms". We shall obviously revisit this problem in more detail later on.

**Table 2:** Average annual net migration rates (per 1000 pop.) in BCR municipalities according to origin/destination, 1988-1999<sup>1</sup>

	Net migration rate (‰) relative to other municipalities of the BCR			Net migration rate (‰) relative to municipalities outside the BCR			International net migration rate (‰)			Total net migration rate (‰)		
	88-90	94-96	97-99	88-90	94-96	97-99	88-90	94-96	97-99	88-90	94-96	97-99
<b>Brussels Capital Region</b>	-	-	-	-9.5	-8.0	-6.2	4.3	4.3	4.6	-5.3	-1.5	-1.6
<b>Inner city*</b>	-1.9	-5.2	-5.0	-8.0	-7.1	-5.4	5.3	5.3	6.8	-4.6	-3.3	-3.5
<b>Outer city</b>	2.4	6.5	6.3	-11.5	-9.2	-7.3	3.0	3.0	1.8	-6.2	0.7	0.8
<b>Anderlecht*</b>	4.3	4.5	6.2	-10.2	-12.5	-10.0	-2.2	4.0	2.4	-8.0	-4.0	-1.3
<b>Bruxelles*</b>	-0.6	-6.5	-7.1	-7.0	-7.4	-6.9	3.5	8.7	8.0	-4.0	-5.2	-5.9
<b>Ixelles*</b>	-15.6	-14.1	-10.5	-5.1	-0.5	3.2	12.9	9.7	6.8	-7.8	-4.9	-0.4
<b>Molenbeek-Saint-Jean*</b>	7.0	1.3	2.0	-11.9	-8.9	-7.7	2.9	6.9	8.3	-2.0	-0.8	2.7
<b>Saint-Gilles*</b>	-10.8	-13.2	-12.6	-4.7	-2.7	-0.2	12.6	13.2	2.2	-2.8	-2.6	-10.6
<b>Saint-Josse-ten-Noode*</b>	-6.9	-18.7	-26.8	-6.2	-2.8	-6.5	15.1	17.6	19.1	1.9	-3.9	-14.1
<b>Schaerbeek*</b>	-0.3	-3.5	-4.7	-8.5	-8.1	-6.2	4.9	10.8	7.3	-3.8	-0.8	-3.5
<b>Auderghem</b>	5.0	9.0	6.6	-12.4	-10.0	-8.0	2.9	2.4	-1.4	-4.5	1.4	-2.8
<b>Berchem-Sainte-Agathe</b>	10.4	16.8	17.7	-11.4	-13.3	-10.8	-1.5	0.2	-1.3	-2.5	3.7	5.7
<b>Etterbeek</b>	-8.8	-4.7	-4.6	-9.1	-5.5	-1.1	6.3	5.4	9.0	-11.7	-4.8	3.2
<b>Evere</b>	7.7	14.3	16.0	-16.0	-7.5	-10.1	1.5	5.2	2.8	-6.9	12.0	8.8
<b>Forest</b>	2.4	3.2	2.7	-13.4	-10.6	-8.6	0.8	4.2	0.6	-10.2	-3.3	-5.3
<b>Ganshoren</b>	10.8	12.0	13.4	-11.9	-12.6	-9.2	-0.6	-0.8	-1.0	-1.7	-1.3	3.2
<b>Jette</b>	9.2	14.1	14.2	-12.3	-13.0	-8.4	3.1	1.7	0.2	0.1	2.8	5.9
<b>Koekelberg</b>	9.3	-0.3	6.3	-6.1	-12.9	-7.1	0.5	5.4	4.6	3.7	-7.8	3.8
<b>Uccle</b>	0.6	7.6	6.3	-10.9	-8.2	-6.8	4.4	4.0	1.3	-6.0	3.3	0.8
<b>Watermael-Boitsfort</b>	2.9	9.3	6.3	-10.0	-5.6	-7.0	2.8	2.6	0.2	-4.3	6.3	-0.4
<b>Woluwe-Saint-Lambert</b>	-1.4	2.5	1.6	-11.3	-8.5	-6.6	3.9	3.2	2.4	-8.8	-2.8	-2.7
<b>Woluwe-Saint-Pierre</b>	-2.4	2.6	1.8	-11.1	-8.0	-7.3	4.6	4.1	1.9	-8.9	-1.4	-3.5

**Table 3:** Average annual net migration rates (per 1000 pop.) in BCR municipalities according to nationality of migrants, 1988-99<sup>1</sup>

	Belgians			EU-citizens			Turks/Moroccans			Others		
	88-90	94-96	97-99	88-90	94-96	97-99	88-90	94-96	97-99	88-90	94-96	97-99
<b>Brussels Capital Region</b>	-9.5	-8.2	-6.9	1.6	1.5	0.4	1.0	2.5	2.5	1.7	2.7	2.4
<b>Inner city*</b>	-8.7	-10.5	-9.0	1.6	0.9	-0.9	1.4	3.6	3.5	1.1	2.7	3.0
<b>Outer city</b>	-10.5	-5.4	-4.3	1.5	2.2	2.0	0.5	1.2	1.3	2.3	2.7	1.7
<b>Anderlecht*</b>	-8.5	-11.5	-8.4	-0.6	1.1	-0.2	0.9	4.3	4.2	0.3	2.2	3.1
<b>Bruxelles*</b>	-6.6	-10.3	-9.9	0.5	0.4	-0.9	0.6	2.3	2.7	1.5	2.4	2.2
<b>Ixelles*</b>	-14.6	-10.0	-5.0	5.3	4.7	3.8	-0.2	0.2	0.4	1.7	0.2	0.4
<b>Molenbeek-Saint-Jean*</b>	-7.4	-8.4	-7.5	-0.1	-2.2	-1.8	5.0	5.5	7.0	0.4	4.2	5.0
<b>Saint-Gilles*</b>	-7.9	-8.9	-7.8	5.5	0.4	-7.0	-1.1	1.9	1.3	0.7	3.9	2.9
<b>Saint-Josse-ten-Noode*</b>	-10.8	-11.9	-17.0	-0.3	-0.6	-2.5	8.6	7.3	4.8	4.4	1.3	0.6
<b>Schaerbeek*</b>	-8.0	-12.0	-11.1	2.2	1.3	-1.6	1.1	5.9	4.2	0.9	4.0	4.9
<b>Auderghem</b>	-9.6	-5.6	-4.1	1.4	3.6	0.9	0.0	0.6	0.4	3.6	2.8	0.0
<b>Berchem-Sainte-Agathe</b>	-4.6	-1.2	-1.8	1.3	-0.1	2.5	0.0	1.2	2.5	0.8	3.8	2.4
<b>Etterbeek</b>	-18.8	-12.1	-7.7	1.2	3.8	5.9	1.6	1.4	0.7	4.3	2.1	4.4
<b>Evere</b>	-11.8	1.8	0.8	1.7	3.2	1.4	0.5	3.0	4.1	2.8	4.1	2.4
<b>Forest</b>	-11.6	-8.2	-9.1	0.0	1.7	-0.6	0.3	1.3	2.3	1.1	1.9	2.2
<b>Ganshoren</b>	-4.7	-7.1	-2.7	0.9	1.2	1.4	1.0	1.9	1.6	1.0	2.6	3.0
<b>Jette</b>	-6.9	-5.0	-0.6	1.6	2.1	1.5	0.8	2.8	2.8	4.5	3.0	2.2
<b>Koekelberg</b>	0.4	-12.4	-2.8	-0.8	1.1	1.8	1.6	1.7	2.8	2.6	1.9	2.0
<b>Uccle</b>	-9.3	-3.3	-3.1	2.3	2.0	3.2	0.5	0.8	0.4	0.6	3.8	0.4
<b>Watermael-Boitsfort</b>	-8.9	1.6	-3.1	2.0	2.8	0.9	0.4	0.3	0.6	2.3	1.6	1.2
<b>Woluwe-Saint-Lambert</b>	-14.4	-6.7	-6.1	2.0	2.3	2.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	3.6	1.4	1.0
<b>Woluwe-Saint-Pierre</b>	-12.5	-6.1	-6.5	2.3	1.7	1.8	0.1	0.3	0.3	1.2	2.7	0.8

<sup>1</sup> \* = inner city municipality; rates are related to the total population of each municipality



Table 4: Net migration of Turks and Moroccans in Belgium, abs. numbers and average annual rates per 1000 of each population (nationality based), 1988-1999

Period	Migr. balance abs. numbers		Net migration rate per annum	
	Turks	Moroccans	per 1000 Turks	per 1000 Moroccans
1988-90	+970	+1,813	+3.8	+4.3
1991-93	+4,717	+8,041	+18.5	+18.9
1994-96	+6,710	+10,171	+29.0	+25.5
1997-99	+4,389	+10,829	+19.8	+28.9

Source: Council of Europe (various dates) & NIS CD-Rom data.

Table 5: Net migration rate per 1000 population in each category by age and by household position, BCR

age	by age		by household position	
	1991	1999	1991	
0-4	-27.5	-9.2	children of married couple	-20.2
5-9	-17.4	-3.0	children of cohabiting couple	-13.3
10-14	-12.9	-0.6	children of single parent	-15.9
15-19	-7.6	+10.3	singles	+0.7
20-24	+6.0	+30.9	married, no children	-6.1
25-29	-10.5	+10.4	married, with children	-18.1
30-34	-20.5	-5.8	cohabiting, no children	+20.0
35-39	-15.1	-5.1	cohabiting, with children	-12.3
40-44	-9.7	-4.2	single parents	-10.1
45-49	-9.5	-2.5	other, with relatives	-2.3
50-54	-8.2	-4.1	other, in institutions	+4.6
55-59	-10.5	-3.8		
60-64	-9.6	-5.6	All	-10.4
65-69	-6.3	-4.7		
70-74	-3.2	-1.9		
75-79	-3.8	-2.3		
80-84	-5.0	-3.8		
85-89	-5.1	-4.7		
90-94	-3.9	-5.2		
95+	0.0	-5.0		
All	-10.4	+0.4		

Source: D. Willaert et al. (2000): A-30

Note: 1991= high emigration year; 1999 = low immigration year

The municipalities of the "second crown" have mostly positive net migration rates for movements within the BCR, but lose all of that to areas outside Brussels. If some of them still have an overall positive migration balance, it is thanks to the positive contribution of international migration. Table 3 again gives the details by nationality: Belgians also leave the "second crown", whereas the contribution of all other groups -- including that of EU-citizens -- is positive. Hence, the second crown is becoming more international, more multicultural and more multilingual, and in a much more varied and mixed way than the first crown. The latter was already made up of clusters of ethnic enclaves to start with, and the international migration trends have reinforced these ethnic clusters even more. In the neo-marxist geography literature, such ethnic ghettos grow as a result of exclusion and hostility of the host population. This may be partially so, but in the inner BCR municipalities they grow as a result of self-engineered chain migration in the first place.

Migration not only determines the overall course of population size and ethnic composition, but has an equally profound impact on the age and household compositions as well. Table 5 shows the net migration rates by age for 1991 and 1999 which were respectively high and low emigration years. During periods of strong suburbanization (1991), the BCR loses population in all age categories except 20-24, and the losses are particularly heavy for children under 15 and the broad range of adults between 25 and 64. In periods of weak suburbanisation (e.g. 1999), the BCR gains population in the age bracket 15-29, but still suffers losses at all other ages. For 1991 (census year) the net migration rates could also be calculated according to the more precise household position of migrants (see Table 5). As was to be expected suburbanization led to a loss of children irrespective of the type of parental household, to losses of married and cohabiting couples with children and even to a loss of single parents. The latter is all the more surprising since lone parents generally seek housing and child-care facilities in the close vicinity of the workplace. In 1991, the BCR was only attractive to young cohabitants without children, and to a lesser extent also to singles and to elderly persons moving to institutions or senior flats. The present picture is likely to have changed, but we have to wait for the 2001 census before the comparison with 1991 can be made.

To sum up, the demographic dynamics in the BCR are largely conditioned by cycles of suburbanization and cycles in international migration. To this we have to add non-negligible migration streams within the BCR and especially from the municipalities of the first to those of the second crown. In this process, the inner city municipalities have tended to become

even more a set of ethnic clusters, whereas the outer city municipalities are being internationalised in a much more varied and mixed way. Belgians have left their capital during all periods considered, and have become more and more commuters from the ring municipalities or from a much wider commuting basin stretching well into Flanders and Wallonia. In fact, Brussels businesses and administrations are dominant employers for the labour force in the Walloon Region.

## 2.2. Population composition: urban heterogeneity

Of all EU-cities with a population of about one million, the BCR would score very high in terms of population heterogeneity. The BCR is not only a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, but also a "multi-life-style" beehive. So far, this has not resulted in conflicts or violence, and Belgium's historical pacification model has certainly contributed to this outcome. The same can, however, not be said for crime and street safety. The BCR is certainly not a new Chicago of the 1920s, but crime statistics have followed the general upward trend as in many other EU-cities.

Most of what follows in this section documents the BCR population heterogeneity, and these materials are also meant for EU-comparisons of urban centres. We shall start with the ethnic composition.

Table 6 gives an update of the BCR population according to nationality: about 70 percent are Belgians, and half of the foreign population (i.e. about 15 percent) are EU-citizens. The remaining 15 percent is split among Africans (including all Maghreb) and others. The two largest non-EU ethnic minorities are Moroccans and Turks. The Islamic population accounts for nearly 10 percent of the BCR total. Table 7 gives a more detailed breakdown for all groups larger than 3000 or 1 percent of the foreign population, together with the percentages concentrated in the BCR. The Portuguese, Greeks, Moroccans and Congolese (Dem. Republic) have the highest BCR concentration with more than half of their respective populations living in the Brussels Region. The Dutch, Germans and Italians have the weakest BCR-concentration. The Dutch live in Flanders and the Germans in the Brussels periphery (= ring) or in Eastern Wallonia (often just across the border). The Italians have maintained their concentration in the old coal-mining areas and in Liège. Turks in Belgium are typically scattered over small and middle size towns and are underrepresented in the two large agglomerations of Brussels and Antwerp. Indices of residential segregation (cf. Eggerickx et

Table 6: Composition of the BCR population according to nationality, 1999

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Belgian	682,314	71.5
Non-Belgian	272,146	28.5
Total	954,460	100.0
<u>Non-Belgians of which:</u>		
*EU	139,844	14.7
*Africa (incl. Morocco)	79,273	8.3
*Other Europe (incl. Turkey)	27,732	2.9
*Asia	10,566	1.1
*America	6,803	0.7
*Other & unknown	7,928	0.8

Source: NIS (1999); temporary refugees, applying refugees and diplomatic staff not included

Table 7: Foreign populations in BCR (absolute numbers &amp; percentages) and their shares of their respective population sizes in Belgium (BCR-concentration), 1999

Rank in BCR	N in BCR	% of BCR foreign population	N in Belgium	Concentration in BCR (% of N in Belgium)
1. Morocco	63,809	23.4	125,082	51.0
2. France	33,362	12.3	105,113	31.7
3. Italy	29,223	10.7	202,645	14.4
4. Spain	22,003	8.1	46,635	47.2
5. Turkey	18,678	6.8	70,701	26.4
6. Portugal	15,852	5.8	25,507	62.1
7. Greece	9,814	3.6	18,832	52.1
8. UK	8,364	3.1	25,902	32.3
9. Germany	6,733	2.5	34,044	19.8
10. Congo (CR)	6,323	2.3	12,428	50.9
11. Other sub.Sahara	5,111	1.9	13,132	38.9
12. Netherlands	5,072	1.9	84,213	6.0
13. USA	3,162	1.2	12,394	25.2

Source: NIS (1999); all other groups LT 3000 & LT 1% of BCR-foreign population

al., 2000) are highest for Americans and Japanese who live in a few typical ex-patriate clusters. Moroccans and Turks come next, followed by the Mediterranean nationalities (including Italians). The French and particularly the Dutch have the lowest residential segregation index. This is hardly surprising given their language advantage over all others.

The figures in tables 6 and 7 are based on current nationality and they have been affected by nationality changes. Tables 8 and 9 add in the information on place and nationality at birth as of 1991. Table 8, for instance, shows that 34 percent of the BCR-population is foreigner at birth, against 28 percent if counted on the basis of current nationality. Of these 34 percent, a third is second generation and born in Belgium. Hence only 23 percent is actually foreign born. Of these two groups, only a small percentage had acquired Belgian nationality by 1991. Table 9 gives a similar breakdown according to nationality. Again for 1991, the two largest categories for Turks and Moroccans were the first and second generations who had not acquired Belgian citizenship (each about 42 to 45 percent). Changes of nationality were hardly any higher among Spanish and Italian first generation migrants. Only their second generations had started to take advantage of the Gol-Wathelet legislation of the late 1980s to become new Belgians, and the figures are lower in the BCR than in the rest of the country.

However, much changed during the 1990s. Between 1994 and 1997 35 percent of Moroccans and 26 percent of Turks acquired Belgian citizenship. These changes occurred predominantly among the second generation or to persons who immigrated as children, and who are linguistically perfectly integrated by virtue of their Belgian education. After 1997, these figures increased even more following the so called "Quick Belgian" legislation, which essentially requires a permanent residence of 3 years only. This legislation came into effect following the debate on voting rights for non-EU citizens. The outcome was that such rights would not be granted automatically, but that the threshold for acquisition would be so low that a maximum number of persons would qualify. In other words "political exclusion" would be a matter of personal choice. This is all the more so since the majority of the new Belgians also retained their original citizenship. In fact, between 1985 and 2000, the three waves of threshold lowering resulted in the creation of 370,000 new Belgians. This is more than twice the annual number of births, and worth about 37 years of natural increase. Furthermore, the acquisition of Belgian nationality is not contingent on other restricting conditions such as tested linguistic skills or home ownership. It provides all civil rights and not merely voting

Table 8: Distribution of the total BCR population according to place and nationality of birth, and current nationality, census 1.3.1991

<u>Total population BCR:</u>		
954,040		
100%		
<u>A. Belgians by birth</u>	<u>B. Foreigner by birth</u>	
628,474	325,566	
65.9%	34.1%	
<u>A1. born in Belgium</u>	<u>B1. born in Belgium</u>	<u>B2. not born in Belgium</u>
607,446	105,032	220,534
63.7%	11%	23.1%
<u>A2. born in other country</u>	<u>B1a. also acquired Belgian nationality</u>	<u>B2a. also acquired Belgian nationality</u>
21,028	17,045	36,938
2.2%	1.8%	3.9%
	<u>B1b. remained foreigner</u>	<u>B2b. remained foreigner</u>
	87,987	183,596
	9.2%	19.2%
		<u>B2b. "Old - 5+ yrs"</u>
		123,411
		12.9%
		<u>B2b. "New - LT5 yrs"</u>
		60,185
		6.3%

B1 series: 2nd or 3rd generation; B2 series: 1st generation; B2b "Old" = arrival in Belgium before or during 1986; "New" = arrival after 1986.

Source: T. Eggerickx et al (1999): 60-64

Table 9: Percentage distribution of foreigners by birth (five largest groups) according to nationality status per 1.3.1991 (census) in BCR and Belgium as a whole.

Nationality at birth	<u>1st generation</u>			<u>2nd or 3rd generation</u>	
	became Belgian B2a	remained foreigner "old" B2b	remained foreigner "new" B2b	became Belgian B1a	remained foreigner B1b
1. Moroccan					
- in BCR	3.6	42.4	6.0	3.0	44.9
- in Belgium	3.8	42.2	6.3	2.9	44.8
2. Turkish					
- in BCR	4.1	44.2	7.7	1.6	42.4
- in Belgium	2.2	43.7	8.3	1.3	44.5
3. Italian					
- in BCR	4.9	44.5	12.4	7.0	31.2
- in Belgium	6.2	41.2	3.4	12.9	36.3
4. Spanish					
- in BCR	4.8	52.3	11.5	3.2	28.2
- in Belgium	8.4	50.0	7.3	6.1	28.2
5. French					
- in BCR	17.7	35.5	23.7	7.7	15.4
- in Belgium	26.6	34.4	14.0	11.6	13.4

Source: computed from Eggerickx et al. (1999): 65-66; for categories see table 8

Table 10: Percentage distribution of all and foreign headed households (private) according to household size, BCR and Belgium, 1997

	household size						
	Male	singles Female	Total	2	3	4	5+
BCR-all	22.7	27.6	50.3	24.2	11.3	8.1	6.1
Belgium-all	13.2	17.0	30.2	30.6	17.3	14.4	7.5
BCR-foreign headed	26.7	19.9	46.6	17.5	12.6	11.2	12.2
Belgium foreign headed	19.7	13.9	33.6	22.2	16.0	15.0	13.2

Source: NIS (1997)

Table 11: Household positions of women, selected indicators, percentage distribution for Belgium, and over- or underrepresentation (ratio's) in the three regions relative to the national distribution, census 1991

	% distribution Belgium	ratio relative to natl. percentages		
		BCR	Flanders	Wallonia
<u>Pct. of children 0-4</u>				
- living with married couple	84.0	.90	1.05	.94
- with cohabiting couple	5.3	1.32	.66	1.45
- with lone parent	7.3	2.06	.64	1.28
- other	3.4	.82	.86	1.15
<u>Pct. of women 20-24</u>				
- living with parent(s)	53.6	.85	1.04	.96
- living alone	7.9	2.92	.71	.97
- cohabiting, no children	4.7	1.09	.97	1.08
- cohabiting, + children	1.6	1.15	.62	1.68
- married, no children	14.9	.71	1.19	.78
- married, + children	11.6	.64	.91	1.18
- lone mother	1.7	1.69	.55	1.58
- other	4.0	.91	.80	1.25
<u>Pct. of women 75-79</u>				
- living alone	48.6	1.25	.92	1.04
- cohabiting, no children	1.3	.79	.81	1.38
- cohabiting, with children	0.1	.22	.89	1.47
- married, no children	26.4	.93	1.08	.89
- married, + children	2.7	.59	1.19	.83
- lone mother	5.5	.61	1.04	1.07
- other: with other relatives	5.2	.28	1.04	1.20
- other: institutions	10.2	.73	1.08	.97

Source: Deboosere et al. (1997): 73, 89-93

rights in local elections. This plainly means that the recent increase in new Belgians of Moroccan or Turkish origin steeply increases their accessibility to public and political office.

The remaining, but equally essential aspects of population composition relate to BCR household structure. In this respect the BCR exhibits all typical urban features: more than 50 percent of all households are composed of single persons, and almost a quarter contains only two persons (see table 10). The BCR household structure is obviously much more heavily skewed toward these small sizes than the Belgian structure. The same skewness is also present in foreign headed households, despite the fact that Turks and Moroccans contribute households of larger sizes. A more detailed breakdown, as shown in table 11, clearly indicates that the BCR has a considerable overrepresentation of young singles (2.9 times their national share), of lone mothers and their children, of cohabiting couples and their children, and of single elderly persons. Strongly underrepresented in the BCR are married couples with children and older persons living together with kin. The net migration rates by age and household position presented in the previous section illustrate that this is largely due to highly selective migration streams during the successive suburbanisation waves. Obviously, if the recent pattern of weaker suburbanisation could be maintained, the skewedness of the BCR household composition would progress at a slower pace.

### 2.3. BCR population projections

Two sets of population projections are available for the BCR: (i) the set produced in 1995 by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) and the Federal Planning Office (FPO), and (ii) a new set starting in 2000 and produced by the Interface Demography of the Free University of Brussels (VUB). The results presented in table 12 indicate that the BCR population size can be strongly affected by alternative migration streams over the next 20 years. For instance, as the NIS-FPO projections (nrs 2 and 4 in table 12) show, a lower international immigration than witnessed in the 1990-95 period, or the continuation of the faster suburbanisation as in the 1987-94 period, would bring down the BCR population size to well below the 900,000 mark by 2020. Each of these factors is capable of causing a drop of about 14 percent, and the effect of their joint operation would of course be much larger.

The more recent VUB-projections – with very similar mortality and fertility assumptions – are more optimistic than the NIS-FPO central scenario, largely because they have taken the latest migration trends into account. If the BCR could maintain an overall zero net migration



Table 12: Outcomes of BCR population projections for 2020 according to various scenarios

	Total pop. size (000) & index	% 0-19	% 20-59	% 60+
<u>NFS-FPO projections (ref = 1995)</u>				
	959.3 (=100)	23.4	55.4	21.2
1. Central scenario	907.3 (94.6)	22.8	55.3	21.9
2. Lower internat. immigration	827.5 (86.3)	22.1	54.4	23.5
3. Higher internat. immigration	1,023.9 (106.7)	23.6	56.5	19.9
4. Slower suburbanisation	993.2 (103.5)	23.2	55.5	21.3
5. Faster suburbanisation	832.7 (86.8)	22.5	55.1	22.4
<u>VUB projections (ref = 2000)</u>				
6. Net migration (overall) = 0	1,038.6 (108.2)	23.1	56.8	20.1
7. Net migr. from 0 in 2005 to -5000 p.a.	997.1 (103.9)	23.1	56.2	20.7
8. Net migr. from 0 in 2005 to +2500 p.a.	1,059.7 (110.5)	23.2	56.9	19.9

Source: NIS & FPO (1995); D. Willaert

rate, as in the late 1990s, the population would increase by about 8.2 percent by 2020 to over one million (see scenario 6 in table 12). But also, if a new cycle of suburbanisation were to start around 2005, the BCR could still maintain its present level (see scenario 7). Hence, judging from the latest information, the overall depopulation of the BCR could be stopped or even reversed during the next two decades. But, as indicated before, the inner city municipalities would then become even more ethnic and the rest more internationally mixed.

In terms of age structure composition the various scenario's of table 12 do not lead to major shifts prior to 2020. In general, ageing would be slightly more pronounced than at present in the scenarios with weaker international immigration or faster suburbanisation. By contrast, higher immigration would lead to a slightly higher proportion of the population in the potential labour force age bracket 20-59. And in the eventuality of the BCR reaching a modest positive net migration rate (scenario 8 in table 12), the BCR population would become slightly younger than at present.

After 2020, however, the picture will change more dramatically, mainly as a result of the long history of sub-replacement fertility. The present BCR total fertility rate (TFR) is 1.70, but this could go down further given greater fertility control and later ages at marriage of the two largest ethnic populations. The NIS-FPO central scenario for 2050 shows that the share of children below 20 would decline from about 23 percent to 14.5 percent, whereas the share of elderly persons over 60 would increase from about 21 to 27 percent. Moreover, much higher intakes of migrants than the present ones are then needed to maintain the BCR total population size at about 950,000. By 2050, the NIS-FPO central scenario produces a population size of 820,000 only. Hence, the debate on the issue of "replacement migration" is not only of national relevance for the period after 2020 but of even greater importance to the BCR.

### 3. The social future

In this section we shall pay attention to the BCR socio-spatial differentiations and to the dynamics of community reconstruction and social advancement of the Turkish and Moroccan populations.


### 3.1. The socio-spatial aspects of social stratification

Already before the 19<sup>th</sup> Century the town of Brussels was divided into a wealthier area and a poorer, popular part. During the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, when Brussels expanded beyond the central pentagon, this duality became more pronounced. The wealthier bourgeoisie mainly settled in the eastern municipalities, whereas the western section (Molenbeek, Anderlecht) became the immigration area for Flemish labourers and artisans. This spatial aspects of socio-economic stratification is still visible today: wealthier Belgians moved further to the eastern outer city municipalities, leaving the first crown to new waves of immigrants. The present situation is shown in a set of maps with ethnic, demographic and socio-economic indicators for the BCR statistical sectors (i.e. the smallest geographical units).

Maps 2 to 5 show the ethnic divisions. The areas predominantly inhabited by nationals (more than 75%) form a wide circle around the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century inner city. The Moroccan population is the predominant group in the whole of this 19<sup>th</sup> Century central part, from the North (e.g. Schaerbeek) to the South (i.e. Anderlecht, Forest), and also in the eastern part of the inner belt (e.g. Ixelles, Saint-Gilles). The Turks on the other hand have an almost unique concentration in the old part of Schaerbeek, whereas the European Mediterranean populations (i.e. Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese and Greeks) are gradually spreading outward from their original concentration around the southern industrial zone. As a consequence, they have become mixed with the Moroccans of Molenbeek, Anderlecht, Saint Gilles and Forest. All of these ethnic areas taken together are still the prime recipients of the international migration stream into the BCR.

Maps 6 to 9 present a set of demographic indicators. The population under 20 is of course concentrated in the ethnic core, and to a lesser degree in the residential areas at the edge of the BCR. Primary and secondary schools in the seven inner city municipalities have a large non-Belgian student population as a consequence. Another outcome of this ethnic pressure on schools is that francophone Belgian parents increasingly sent their children to Dutch-speaking schools with fewer non-EU foreigners. The negative side of this is evidently the increasing segregation between "brown" and "white" schools, but a minor positive outcome has been increased bilingualism among the younger generation of BCR Belgian francophones. The latter factor at least contributed to the further pacification of the strictly Belgian linguistic issues. Finally, the most segregated schools of all are the private international schools for

## MAPS 2 - 5 : Ethnic BCR




**% Belgian nationality**

■ 75 to 100	(390)
■ 50 to 75	(159)
■ 33 to 50	(56)
□ 0 to 33	(48)
□ < 100 inhabitants	(69)



**% Span., Port., Greek and Italian nationality**

■ 20 to 67	(35)
■ 10 to 20	(115)
■ 5 to 10	(233)
□ 0 to 5	(270)
□ < 100 inhabitants	(69)



**% Turkish nationality**

■ 20 to 41	(13)
■ 10 to 20	(10)
■ 5 to 10	(20)
□ 0 to 5	(610)
□ < 100 inhabitants	(69)



**% Moroccan nationality**


■ 20 to 52	(71)
■ 10 to 20	(54)
■ 5 to 10	(59)
□ 0 to 5	(469)
□ < 100 inhabitants	(69)

## MAPS 6 - 9 : BCR Demographic indicators



% population aged 0-19

■	> 30%	(84)
▨	20% to 30%	(285)
□	< 20%	(284)
□	< 100 inhabitants	(69)



% population aged 65+

■	> 20%	(220)
▨	15% to 20%	(207)
□	< 15%	(226)
□	< 100 inhabitants	(69)



% women 20-29  
single

■	> 33%	(110)
▨	20 to 33%	(168)
□	< 20%	(220)
□	< 100 women aged 20-29	(224)



% women 20-29  
head monoparental household

■	> 7%	(132)
▨	3,5 to 7%	(195)
□	< 3,5%	(171)
□	< 100 women aged 20-29	(224)

## MAPS 10 - 13 : BCR social indicators



Median household income, 1993

■	> 800.000 BF	(110)
▨	700 to 800.000 BF	(169)
▩	600 to 700.000 BF	(200)
□	< 600.000 BF	(132)
□	< 100 declarations	(111)



% dwellings without basic comfort

■	> 20%	(140)
▨	10 to 20%	(170)
▩	5 to 10%	(102)
□	< 5%	(209)
□	< 100 dwellings	(101)



% vocational, technical and lower secondary education  
highest education of 18+ population

■	25 to 36%
▨	20 to 25%
▩	15 to 20%
□	< 15%
□	< 100 inhabitants of 18+



% higher secondary, higher education and students  
highest education of 18+ population

■	40 to 71%
▨	30 to 40%
▩	15 to 30%
□	< 15%
□	< 100 inhabitants 18+

high income EU-nationals and expatriate communities. In fact, the louder the "liberal" discourse, the stronger the factual degree of residential and educational "apartheid".

The population above 60 is scattered mainly over all areas outside the 19th Century inner city, and, ever since the 1950s, this age group has been a major contributor to the within BCR migration from the core to the outer city municipalities. In the areas within the inner city, older Belgians are often found in rented apartments of the public housing sector. This steady displacement of the older national population (also caused by the expansion of the business districts and endemic real estate speculation) has given rise to xenophobic sentiments. But, in strong contrast to what happened in Antwerp, this did not lead to the growth of xenophobic political parties. During the 1980s a sister party of the French *Front National* gained support and even controlled the administration of Schaerbeek, but such parties completely disappeared during the 1990s. At the latest municipal elections, it was also feared that the *Vlaams Blok* would be able to tap xenophobic sentiment even among francophone Belgians, but this did not materialize either. In other words, the BCR has not been in a mood for linguistic and ethnic strife, and by far prefers "business as usual".

Large urban areas often attract the less conventional households such as young singles, young cohabiting couples without children, and lone parent households. Young singles and young cohabitants have a clear preference for the non-ethnic or moderately ethnically mixed areas of the centre and the south-east, i.e. the better educated quarter. They tend to cluster in or around areas characterised by some gentrification and often contribute to it. By contrast, lone mothers are scattered throughout the more blue collar zones with higher concentrations in the northern, western and southern parts of the BCR. Evidently the residential patterns of these households types reflect an educational and social class distinction between singles on the one hand and lone mothers on the other.

Maps 10 to 13, finally, show the socio-economic divisions. The statistical sectors belonging to the top quartile with respect to household income are virtually all located at the outer fringe of the BCR, which also corresponds to the zone with the best housing conditions and post-war construction. As one moves – almost in concentric circles – toward the BCR-centre, median household incomes diminish, with the lowest quartile corresponding to the ethnic central zone. This is also the area with the least adequate housing conditions as indicated on the map

of dwellings which lack basic amenities or comfort (i.e. at least one item missing of the following three: bath/shower, running water, indoor toilet).

The maps representing the educational characteristics show another divide. Apart from the concentration of persons with only primary education (or even less) in the Moroccan and Turkish areas, persons with mainly vocational or technical secondary education are found in all parts of the “second crown”, except for the entire south-eastern section. This latter section shows a high concentration of persons with general higher secondary education and tertiary education. Hence, the outer city municipalities can also be divided into a group with a dominance of blue collar occupations and a group mostly inhabited by white collar employees and professionals. This is a close replica of the late 19th Century division of the Belgian population, when the lower and higher education crescents were still located in the “first crown” municipalities. In short, these two crescents have respectively moved outward, leaving the middle to less educated migrant populations. All of this also largely corresponds to the industrial development phase of Brussels: the blue collar occupations are still more closely located to the railways, canal zone and industrial sites, whereas the higher education area now forms a wide band around the “green lung” of Brussels (i.e. the bois de la Cambre, the forêt de Soignes and the Woluwe valley). Not surprisingly, also the wealthiest suburbs are located on the other side of this “green lung” (Lasnes, La Hulpe, Waterloo, Rixensart, Tervuren...).

### 3.2. For richer, for poorer...

The ecological successions and suburbanisation waves of the BCR population have, not surprisingly, caused a major decline in average per capita incomes in all 19 municipalities. The data are brought together in table 13, where these municipal averages are related to the national level for three periods. In the late 1970s, the BCR average was no less than 20 percent higher than the national figure, and also the population of 16 of the 19 municipalities still had per capita incomes that were higher than this benchmark. Only three inner-city municipalities, which had already a sizeable ethnic component at that time, had a poorer population. However, the set of concentric circles was already firmly established: the further one moves from the core, the higher per capita income becomes, with the highest again in the South-East corner (from Uccle to Woluwe-Saint-Lambert). By the end of the 1980s the BCR had lost its advantageous position, with populations of 7 municipalities dipping below the national average. Six municipalities of the 7 poorer ones were located in the first crown. At



Table 13: Average annual per capita income relative to national level in BCR municipalities, 1977-1998.

	<u>1977-79</u>	<u>1987-89</u>	<u>1996-98</u>
Brussels Capital Region	120	105	92
Inner city*	104	89	78
Outer city	142	124	110
<hr/>			
Anderlecht*	106	97	86
Bruxelles*	109	90	80
Ixelles*	122	102	91
Molenbeek-Saint-Jean*	98	85	75
Saint-Gilles*	85	75	66
Saint-Josse-ten-Noode*	79	64	49
Schaerbeek*	100	87	75
<hr/>			
Auderghem	141	137	119
Berchem-Sainte-Agathe	130	127	113
Etterbeek	115	98	90
Evere	126	116	101
Forest	121	105	93
Ganshoren	138	129	114
Jette	129	123	107
Koekelberg	115	106	91
Uccle	170	135	121
Watermael-Boitsfort	151	137	120
Woluwe-Saint-Lambert	180	132	116
Woluwe-Saint-Pierre	150	142	123
<hr/>			
Belgium (reference)	100	100	100

\*: inner city municipalities

the end of the 1990s, the average income in the BCR as a whole declined further to a mere 92 percent of the national level, and the poorer inner-city populations fell further back. Now, the population of the municipality of Saint-Josse has a per capita income that is just half the national figure. More surprisingly, also three of the outer city municipalities now have poorer populations, whereas the much richer South-East corner has lost much of its 1970s advantage.

All of this is of course bad news for the municipal and regional finances. The BCR has, furthermore, a high debt, which was 1.53 times its annual revenue in 1997 (Herremans & Philipsen, 1999: 227). Fortunately, this indebtedness has been reduced from a peak of 2.10 times the annual revenue in 1994. By comparison, the degree of indebtedness of the Walloon region in 1997 is 1.30 and that of the Flemish region 0.50. Also, the municipal finances are by no means solely influenced by household income taxes, but also by taxes paid by administrations and businesses and by transfers. As a consequence, 17 of the 19 municipalities have higher per capita revenues than the per capita average for all Belgian municipalities (Ibidem: 229). In 1997, for instance, the BCR had a per capita revenue that was 46 percent higher than that of the national mean. Several inner-city municipalities, moreover, scored much higher than the national average thanks to the location of the central business district in and around the old city pentagon. The municipality of Brussels had a per capita revenue of no less than 3.22 times the national municipal average, and a similar picture also holds for Saint-Josse (2.15), Etterbeek (1.63) or Saint-Gilles (1.53). Hence, these municipalities largely compensate for the increased shortfall in revenue from taxes on household incomes. But municipalities with poorer populations located around the southern old industrial axis, such as Anderlecht or Forest, do not benefit from these extra effects and are considerably worse off. The same applies even more to Molenbeek Saint-Jean with its very high concentration of Moroccan population. At this point, it becomes clear that the continued fragmentation of the BCR into 19 separate municipalities considerably hampers inter-municipality solidarity and causes major distortions with respect to local resources. Hence, the old spectre of fragmentation in 19 municipalities has not gone away despite the construction of the BCR as an overarching entity.

### 3.3. Turks and Moroccans: generations and communities

In this section we shall focus on the two larger Islamic communities of the BCR. For both, the 1990s have meant the coming of age of their second generations, who together with those

who immigrated as young children (family reunification), have largely received a Belgian education. Hence, a balance can be drawn up with the following essential points:

- (i) The younger generation reaches a much higher educational level than their parents. This holds particularly for the second generation of Moroccan women in the BCR, not only because of the very low literacy of their mothers, but especially because many have terminated complete secondary education and have progressed further to the various branches of higher education. Among Turkish women, generational differences are less pronounced: the first generation had mostly completed primary schooling and the second generation did not progress much further than partial or full vocational or technical secondary (Stoop and Booms, 1997).
- (ii) The second generation of Moroccan men has a markedly more heterogeneous educational composition than the Turkish male second generation. More Moroccans finished general secondary education and started higher education, but an equal proportion (about 40%) of second generation Turks and Moroccans failed to progress beyond lower secondary. Yet the odds for completing secondary are higher in the BCR and Wallonia than in Flanders. Turkish young men again have a stronger concentration in vocational and technical education (Neels, 2000).
- (iii) Given the educational composition (human capital) and location (employment opportunities), the second generations of men are at a considerable employment disadvantage (Neels & Stoop, 2000). On the basis of the 1991 census figures for the entire country, 66 percent of the Moroccan male second generation ought to occupy positions of schooled labour or better. In reality they reached only 39 percent. For the Turks the expected figure was 61 percent, and the observed 43 percent. Also, for the better educated Moroccans (full secondary or beyond) the relative employment deprivation is actually highest in the BCR and lowest in Wallonia. A factor accounting for this unexpected discrepancy is that the better educated young Moroccans in the BCR had not yet gained access to public sector employment in 1991. The recent opportunities for gaining Belgian nationality should have a noticeable effect in opening up this sector to them.
- (iv) Again after controls for education, age and location, the employment deprivation for the two second generations was most marked with respect to unemployment levels. Given their human capital structure, the expected Moroccan second generation unemployment should have stood at 13 percent in 1991, but the observed figure was 44 percent. For the second generation Turkish men, the expected figure was 15

percent, against 38 percent observed (Neels and Stoop, 2000). Clearly, the human capital and location factors only accounted for a small fraction of the much higher ethnic unemployment levels at the start of the 1990s (see also Veenman, 1995; Veenman and Martens, 1995; Veenman, 1996 for the Netherlands). The present levels of unemployment have come down for all segments of the BCR population, and unemployment rates in 1997 for both foreign-born men and male foreigners in Belgium are around 17 percent against 7 percent for male nationals (OECD, 1999: 43). However, we have to wait for the 2001 census before a detailed statistical decomposition of effects can be repeated nationwide.

- (v) On the demographic side, the median ages at marriage for both Turkish and Moroccan women have increased, but markedly more so for the latter than for the former. Among Moroccan women of the second generation, marriages prior to age 18 have become rare, but the strong practice of importing brides from Turkey has kept the Turkish median lower than 20 years. The differential in female ages at marriage also corresponds to a more rapid weakening of arranged marriages among Moroccans and especially, at all levels of education, of a much stronger accentuation of female autonomy in both economic and social domains by Moroccan women (Lesthaeghe & Surkyn, 1995, 1997).
- (vi) The issue of “import partners” deserves special attention. Of all persons in 1991 (census) who were born in Belgium or who migrated as singles prior to the age of 18, 75 percent of Turkish men, 57 percent of Moroccan men, 69 percent of Turkish women and 56 percent of Moroccan women were subsequently married to an import partner from the country of origin (Lievens, 2000: 112). Evidently, chain migration and family formation (no longer “reunification”) migration are closely connected, and account for a substantial share of current Turkish and Moroccan immigration. As the high immigration figures of table 4 indicate, there is no reason to believe that the import of partners has diminished during the later 1990s either. This feature is a cause of concern for several reasons. First of all, the selectivity that accompanies this process is negative for women: the “imported” Moroccan and especially Turkish brides score lower on educational achievement when compared to the averages of the region of origin (especially the Rif in Morocco, and Western Anatolia and Eastern Turkey), and these themselves are lower than the Moroccan or Turkish national levels of female education (Reniers, 2000: 73-80). The male educational selectivity is less pronounced: they score slightly better than the average for the region of origin, but of

course substantially below that of their second generation age mates. “Imported brides” are furthermore selected for their traditional values in all respects (e.g. concerning gender relations, labour force participation, religion, educational values etc.) (Lesthaeghe & Surkyn, 1995, 1997). “Imported grooms”, on the other hand, find themselves in the most unusual situation of being an expected breadwinner living in with their wife’s family, being at a considerable linguistic disadvantage (especially Turks), and in fact being dependent on their wives for all contacts with the host society. For many “import partners”, lives are strongly confined to the local Turkish and Moroccan concentration areas. The chain migration of import partners is a major break on instrumental or functional integration and strongly contributed to ghetto formation. It is also dysfunctional for the next generation: imported brides tend to keep their children at home till the age of six, so that these children start primary education with a serious language handicap. Problems of this kind are again more serious in the Turkish than in the Moroccan communities.

- (vii) The patterns of community reconstruction equally show major differences between Moroccans and Turks respectively. The Turkish communities have a stronger tendency to retreat and to maintain a strong degree of social control. Similar patterns of segregation are found for Turks in France (Tribalat, 1995) and Germany (Nauck et al., 1997), and Michèle Tribalat has referred to it as “*le repli identitaire turque*”. A corollary thereof is that neither secularism nor Islamic fundamentalism have gained much ground among the Belgian or BCR Turks: most have remained loyal to the mainstream *Diyanet*, whereas the more fundamentalist factions (e.g. the *Milli Görüs*, *Türk-Islam Federasyon...*) barely reach 10 percent of the Turkish population (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2000). On the other hand, the Turkish community shows little interest in Belgian public life: they read Turkish newspapers, follow almost exclusively the Turkish TV channels, are poorly informed about Belgian politics, and an astonishing 42 percent of Turks in the BCR could not even give the name of the Belgian king in a 1996 survey (against only 13 percent for Brussels Moroccans) (Swyngedouw et al., 1999). The Moroccan communities, with their strong concentration in the three large Belgian urban agglomerations, exhibit a high degree of religious fragmentation with about 20 percent accentuating a growing distance to Islam, and, at the other extreme, over 20 percent subscribing to the various fundamentalist factions (Lesthaeghe & Neels, 2000). They furthermore spread their attention over political and cultural affairs in both countries of origin and residence,

and many young Moroccans, for instance, can no longer read the Arabic script. The downside of this Moroccan fragmentation, however, is the high frustration of the better educated with inadequate opportunities for upward social mobility, and the emergence of a marginalised inner-city youth that has escaped parental control and moved toward drug use and criminal activities. In this respect, the BCR situation is probably more serious than in Antwerp or Liège. The victims of this development are in the first place the first generation parents who are often deeply disappointed by the conduct of their sons. Together with the fact that Moroccan daughters have also become more vocal and independent, this puts considerably more strain on traditional Moroccan family life than is the case in Turkish families.

#### 4. The BCR demographic and social futures: key issues

The future of the BCR is likely to be strongly conditioned by international and internal migrations. The population projections referred to in section 2.3 already testified to this effect. But also the BCR social fabric is likely to be largely determined by such spatial movements. The present high immigration from non-EU countries further accentuates the ethnic segregations that characterise the first crown, and inner-city dualities may also become more accentuated as a consequence of gentrification in very specific neighbourhoods. High emigration from EU-countries and further suburbanisation among nationals will further “internationalise” the municipalities of the second crown. Whether this will stop the negative trend in local household income is not to be taken for granted since the BCR household composition contains relatively few double income households and a disproportionately large number of persons dependent on various types of replacement incomes (see Roesems et al., 2000). The fragmentation of the BCR in 19 municipalities is still dysfunctional in this respect since it causes major discrepancies between the poorer and most needy versus the wealthier municipalities that draw on large incomes from sources other than household taxes. Much stronger inter-municipality solidarity is needed to correct for such striking dualities.

The duality caused by the *de facto* segregation of schools according to ethnicity is another source of major concern, particularly when schools lack the means to address the issue of poor student performance among certain segments of the immigrant population. Interface programmes, for instance between schools and ethnic community leaders, are underdeveloped at present. Schools and parents are passing on the problems to each other,

when in fact a joint approach is needed. This is furthermore not reducible to an issue of financial means, since the appropriate interface structure is equally rudimentary in rich and in poorer municipalities alike.

The discrepancies with respect to unemployment and inadequate upward mobility among the ethnic populations equally require a multi-pronged approach. As shown in section 3.3 the lower level of education of the second generation and of “import partners” only accounts for a fraction of the employment gap. Other elements of relevance are forms of hidden discrimination by employers, inadequate search strategies on the side of ethnic populations themselves, or not completely unfounded stereotypes (e.g. concerning different notions of punctuality). A positive element, however, is that the easier access to dual nationality opens new perspectives for employment in the public sector.

Frequently overlooked, and hence insufficiently addressed, are some dysfunctionalities within the immigrant communities themselves. Issues of “exclusion” are commonly laid on the doorstep of national or local authorities or typically attributed to xenophobia on the side of the host population, when in fact they stem to a non-negligible extent from specific dynamics of ethnic community reconstruction. The Turkish cultural and political “retreat”, for instance, is not shared to any comparable extent by other ethnic groups, nor does it stem from any specific action originating in the host society. Similarly, the continued import of marriage partners and low intra-second generation marriage is a major source of slow functional integration (i.e. economically and linguistically). It is indeed difficult to raise average schooling and employment levels when a large influx of new first generation immigrants recreates the lower tail of the distribution. Furthermore this practice of marriage-initiated migration may also be dysfunctional to the ethnic communities themselves since it causes tensions in families and between partners. Of course, the practice of importing partners cannot be stopped since this would run counter to the basic principles of human rights, but at present hardly anyone is aware of its implications or dares to put it in a realistic perspective. This again highlights the common Belgian or EU underestimation of effects of internal dynamics operating within the ethnic setting. In short, what the EU needs in this respect is not another political science or legal study about formal policy measures or an abstract treatise on “exclusion”, but far more in-depth studies with a clear understanding of within ethnic community dynamics. Statistical representativity is of utmost importance in this respect.

Of course, continued and even enhanced vigilance about the enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation remains a part of the solution. But in itself this is not enough. The crucial gap at present in the BCR is the lack of a communication interface between local authorities and ethnic groups. Politicians and media have all too often reduced the ethnic issues to a security problem, and they shift to other pressing issues when all is calm. A much larger degree of ethnic political integration is obviously required, and the recent nationality legislation in Belgium opens major opportunities in this respect. But for this to become efficient we need committed community leaders and not a retreat to the safety of one's "own culture".

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