LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND PARENTHOOD: DO VALUES MATTER?

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1. Introduction

Since the 1960s life cycle transitions with respect to household and family formation have become considerably more complex in virtually all Western countries. New intermediate states have been added to the life cycle of young adults, such as independent living, sharing, and premarital cohabitation. At later stages, rising divorce rates have produced various forms of reconstituted families, and lower remarriage rates resulted in post-marital cohabitation as well.

The transitions between these various states are, furthermore, no longer unidirectional since returns to previous states occur more frequently. Also the states themselves are less clearly defined. For instance, independent living or cohabitation can be combined with periodic returns to the parental "hotel family". Similarly, LAT-relations involve spells of independent living and spells of cohabitation. As a result, the classification of individuals according to the type of living arrangement depends on the definitions that are used, on the type of sampling unit, and on legal or administrative biases in the sampling frame. Results from censuses, based on the official household register, and results from sample surveys, based on detailed interviewing of individuals, are producing diverging results. A study of Belgian sources, for instance, shows that the 1991 census substantially underestimates cohabitation and overestimates the proportion living alone, whereas surveys equally differ in proportions cohabiting depending on whether coresidence or sexual partnership is being stressed (see P. Deboosere, 1992; J-M. Boulanger et.al., 1994).

2. Theories, measurement and causality

One of the main reasons for the emergence of the intermediate living arrangements among young adults (such as independent living, sharing and premarital cohabitation) is clearly prolonged education and delayed economic independence. We are referring here to the mere mechanistic effect: continued education results in complete or partial financial dependence on the family of origin, which automatically postpones marriage and parenthood. However, other theories postulate major additional effects.

2.1. Overview of major theories

According to the neo-classic economic theory (e.g. G. Becker, 1981), cohabitation, later marriage and delayed parenthood are essentially the outcome of a general reduction of gains to marriage for women and of a substantial increase in the opportunity costs of motherhood. The latter stem from increased female schooling, greater earning capacity, and therefore from enhanced female economic autonomy. This factor would equally account for the rise in divorce and the decline of remarriage. The neo-classic economic theory not only starts from the newly acquired position of women, but it equally posits a long-term structural effect: the intermediate states in household formation and delayed marriage and

parenthood are here to stay for as long as the newly acquired economic autonomy of women remains intact.

So far, Beckers explanation is predominantly oriented at those who have enjoyed better education and have the largest opportunity costs associated with higher incomes. But the passage through the intermediate states is also found among other segments of the population. In France for instance, C. Villeneuve-Gokalp (1990) clearly documents that the innovators in the 1970s with respect to premarital cohabitation were students and professionals. By the beginning of the 1980s, however, the proportions starting a union in this fashion rapidly caught up among blue collar workers and especially among the unemployed.

Hence, the economic deprivation theory of R. Easterlin and colleagues (1990) seems to be relevant as well. In this economic theory, postponed home-leaving, sharing, and cohabitation are not the outcome of the valuation of the female human resource potential, but of the combination of sustained or even increased consumption aspirations and deteriorating economic opportunities for new cohorts of young males, who have been facing less favourable labour market conditions since the 1970s. In such circumstances additional household incomes earned by women are most welcome to satisfy these high consumption aspirations, and this contributes further to delayed family formation.

So far, the neo-classic economic theory and the theory of relative economic deprivation are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary in the sense that they respectively point at underlying motivations that may differ by gender and by social class. Yet, Easterlin's thesis leaves room for major fluctuations depending on prevailing consumption aspirations and especially on economic opportunities for incoming cohorts of young men. Logically, the measurement of consumption aspirations has become a more central topic in this line of research (e.g. R. Easterlin and E. Crimmins, 1991; Crimmins et al., 1991).

Other factors, of a more sociological nature, seem equally necessary in understanding the multiplicity of motivations that underspin the new forms of behaviour. According to V. Oppenheimer (1988), for instance, the growth of the intermediate living arrangements stem from marriage market conditions as well. Higher education for women have increased the quality standards for what constitutes a "minimally acceptable match". Prolonged dating and premarital cohabitation reflect a more careful search or a trial run in matching the two utility functions of the partners concerned. In the neo-classic economic view, diminishing returns to marriage for women would result in larger proportions not at all entering marriage and parenthood. In Oppenheimer's view there is only a postponement effect, not a complete economically induced "desinstitutionalization".

The notion of quality is also central in social exchange theory or economic transaction theory (e.g. R. Rezsohasy, 1991; P. England and G. Farkas, 1986). The quality of a relationship can be defined as the degree of satisfaction partners experience as the result of the incorporation of each other's needs and well-being into their own utility function. Hence, aside from alterations in purely economic living conditions and individual consumption aspirations, also expectations of what partners can get out of a marriage in terms of mutual trust, understanding, recognition etc. could play a major role.

Support for the latter proposition stems from the rise of A. Maslow's (1954) "higher order needs". In Maslowian needs theory, the "higher order needs" associated with self-

fulfilment, emancipation, personal recognition and individual <u>ethical autonomy</u> emerge once the "lower order needs" associated with basic economic and physical security are satisfied. R. Inglehart's (1970, 1990) measurement of "post-materialism" in the economic-political domain shows that the Maslowian "existential needs" have been accentuated to a higher degree by each successive cohort born in the 20th century.

Within the ethical and moral domain, individual autonomy manifests itself in further secularization, the refusal of institutional morality and ethical patronage, the accentuation of freedom of choice, the rejection of conformism, and greater tolerance for the life-styles of others. It was therefore no surprise to find that premarital cohabitation during the late 1960s and 1970s was almost a rite of passage for the secularized "new left" in Belgium and the Netherlands (W. Dumon, 1977; R. Lesthaeghe and D. van de Kaa, 1986). It was a manifestation of a refusal of the conventional "bourgeois marriage" which was being regarded as hypocritical in the sense that its conformism was more important than the quality of the relationship.

If "post-materialists" expect more individual recognition and satisfaction from a partnership, the evaluation of quality becomes a fundamental issue. If returns are unsatisfactory, reversibility should be an open possibility. Also, positions need to be calibrated repeatedly to work out satisfactory solutions. Making such positions and aspirations overt therefore becomes a basic ingredient, especially when two young adults are not solely facing strictly domestic issues but also elements of professional life and their impact on the domestic sphere.

The two economic theories obviously connect the passage through the various types of living arrangements to the transitions in socio-economic position. These theories furthermore assume that value orientations and the choice of living arrangement are codetermined by the economic aspects of the life-course. In other words, they assume that there is no independent or autonomous additional effect originating in ideational factors. In this sense, Becker's and Easterlin's versions constitute <u>minimal</u> theories.

Yet, in Easterlin's version of the relative economic deprivation theory (1976), attention has always being paid to consumption aspirations as developing during the individual's socialization phase. In fact, the consumption pattern of the parental household and the expectations that are stemming from it are the yardstick for establishing the relative degree of satisfaction with income and career opportunities. By the same token, not only consumption aspirations but a much wider spectrum of value orientations are generated during these formative years (e.g. P. Beck and M. Jennings, 1975). Parents, peers and professors all play a major role in the process. Hence, the quality of parental relationships and values developed during adolescence may equally direct ambitions, life-chances, study careers, professional options and ultimately later socio-economic positions.

2.2. The problem of causality and the measurement of recursive effects
If socialization is added to the framework, the dynamics between choices in living arrangements and the formation of value orientations can be described in terms of i) <u>selection effects</u> and ii) <u>affirmation effects</u>. By selection effects, we refer to the mechanisms whereby individuals select themselves over the various living arrangements and life cycle stages depending on their <u>prior</u> value orientations and meaning-giving goals in life. By the affirmation (or negation) effect we mean the <u>subsequent</u> reinforcement (or weakening) of certain values depending on living arrangement, life cycle stage or

socioeconomic position. The resulting model is not one of unidirectional causality but with repeated recursivity.

Cross-sectional data, of the kind we shall use subsequently, capture the whole of this recursive process, but not the constituting part of it. All we get is an overall degree of association between value orientations and living arrangements without knowing whether this is predominantly the result of a strong selection effect or of an affirmation effect. The sociological and psychological theories tend to interpret these associations as being the result of a dominant selection effect stemming from the socialization phase, whereas economic theories, and especially the neo-classic variant, expect a strong affirmation effect in which values are mainly the ex post rationalization of an earlier choice based on a cost-benefit evaluation.

There are two ways of measuring selection effects more adequately. The first method consists of asking <u>retrospective</u> questions in a <u>single</u> survey. These retrospective questions pertain to earlier circumstances or positions. The retrospective method is, however, far less suitable if earlier value orientations need to be measured. The second method uses <u>panel data</u> with the measurement of positions, material conditions and values at each wave. Life cycle transitions occurring between waves can also be recorded. In this fashion the propabilities of such a life cycle event can be predicted on the basis of the values measured during the preceeding wave(s). Hence, panel data are more trustworthy than retrospective data in establishing the net effects of values based selection.

The retrospective method has been successfully applied by a number of authors (e.g. K. Kiernan, 1992, for the UK; A. Liefbroer, 1991, for the Netherlands; C. Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1990, for France; A. Thornton, 1989; Wu and Martinson, 1991, for the USA) to show that selections with respect to living arrangements and life cycle transitions are related to characteristics of socialization and of the parental household. Problems in the parental family, such as poor relations between parents, parental separation or divorce, single parent household or reconstituted families are all significantly related to earlier home-leaving of the child, a greater probability of entering a partnership via premarital cohabitation, and a greater likelihood of a premarital pregnancy or of becoming a lone parent. Similarly, questions pertaining to parental religiosity revealed that religious values are passed on between generations, and instill pro-marriage and pro-parenthood orientations in tandem with a more conservative gender ideology (e.g. D. Lye and I. Waldron, 1993; W. Miller, 1992; M. Weinstein and A. Thornton, 1989). Higher parental religiosity and religious upbringing are associated with less cohabitation, less divorce and higher fertility (A. Liefbroer, 1991; C. Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1990; R. Lesthaeghe and G. Moors, 1994 and this paper).

As already indicated, the second method of measuring selection effects requires panel data. If value orientations can be measured well before actual transitions occur, their impact can be assessed controlling for a series of other socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. parental education and financial resources, respondent's education etc.). Two such panels, both American, have been particularly useful in measuring such values based selection. The first one is the Detroit panel, mainly analyzed by A. Thornton and colleagues, which started with a probability sample of women giving birth in 1961 in the Detroit Metropolitan Area. These mothers were interviewed six times between 1962 and 1985, and the children were also interviewed at age 18 in 1980 and at age 23 in 1985. By the latter date 82 percent of the original families of 1962 remained in the study, yielding complete information for 867 families (W. Axinn and A. Thornton, 1993). The second panel covers only one generation,

but is a national sample of the High School class graduating in 1972 in the USA. This sample has been interviewed six times between 1972 and 1986, and followed nearly 13000 individuals participating in all six waves.

The wealth of information in the two-generation Detroit panel shows that strong net effects (i.e. after controlling for socioeconomic background characteristics of parents and/or of children) persists of maternal values on values of the children, and further on, on the choices made by the children prior to age 23 concerning living arrangements and family formation. Particularly maternal religiosity and the mother's gender relation attitudes proved to have strong net effects on the value orientations of the children themselves (W. Axinn and A. Thornton, 1993; A. Thornton and D. Camburn, 1987). Furthermore, also religiosity in the children's generation continued to produce a clear selection effect on their subsequent behaviour. Such effects equally emerged in the analysis of the determinants of cohabitation in the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972 (M. Clarkberg, R. Stolzenberg, L. Waite, 1993). Moreover, a major differentiation by gender emerged. For women, the likelihood of subsequent selection into cohabitation rather than marriage increased significantly with career and consumption aspirations, higher degrees of secularization at the onset, and with more egalitarian gender role orientations. These associations are all resistant for controls for ethnicity, parental income, intact or broken family of origin, own education, student or employment status, and individual income. For men, however, the likelihood of cohabitation was unrelated to stronger career or consumption aspirations. Rather the opposite emerged: selection into cohabitation for men slightly increased with an earlier taste development in favour of leasure and a more casual life. At this point, it is interesting to note that W. Aquilino (1991) detected a similar gender differential in a cross-sectional survey. More specifically, the impact of the structure of the parental family on earlier home leaving was stronger for girls than for boys. In the materials that will be analyzed in this paper, further evidence of gender differentiated effects will be presented.

Studies documenting the affirmation (or negation) effects are much rarer than those oriented at selection effects. It seems highly normal that people rationalize ex post facto and adjust their value orientations accordingly, especially since events like marriage, parenthood or divorce completely change people's lives and outlooks. Yet, the choice of type of living arrangement may generate affirmation effects in all corners of the individuals' value structure. For instance, the Detroit panel study clearly indicates a recursive effect on religiosity, with direct selection into marriage strengthening a more religious outlook, and selection into cohabitation fostering further secularization. Values pertaining to gender roles were affected similarly (A. Thornton, D. Alwin, D. Camburn, 1993; A. Thornton, W. Axinn, D. Hill, 1992). Moreover, the two generation design of the Detroit panel permitted to document the "reverse socialization effect", by showing that the life course choices of the children equally affected the value orientations of their mothers with respect to cohabitation (cfr. V. Gecas and M. Seff, 1990; or G. Peterson and B. Rollins, 1987). As a result, affirmation effects may cross generational boundaries so that older generations' values may partially converge toward those of the younger generations.

To sum up, the two dominant economic theories only connect choices in the life cycle to two sets of motivations anchored respectively to enhanced female financial autonomy and to relative deprivation of consumption aspirations. The cultural components, either operating at the macro-level and manifesting themselves in longer term ideational trends or at the micro-level and instilled in differential individual value orientations, have been neglected in these theories. Their incorporation, as shown very clearly by the results of the panel studies, via an analysis of the content of socialization and via a futher recursive

process of selection and affirmation, has proved to be both highly relevant theoretically and highly significant empirically.

3. Further evidence: the results of the 1990 European Values Survey for France, West Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium

The 1990-round of the European Values Survey (EVS) merely constitutes a cross-sectional study of a variety of individual value orientations and is therefore not suitable for disentangling selection and affirmation effects. With respect to selection-effects, there are only two exceptions: we have information concerning the respondents' socialization in the form of i) his/her education and ii) his/her religious upbringing (+ denomination). For all other characteristics, the EVS-data cannot go beyond the mere measurement of overall associations.

The prime value of the EVS-data, however, lies in the broadness of the various value dimensions covered. In the present analysis, for instance, we have made use of over 30 indicators (for an even larger set, see: R. Lesthaeghe and G. Moors, 1994) pertaining to religious values and beliefs, political values, values concerning partner relations and gender roles, attitudes concerning female labour force participation, values to be stressed in educating children, meaning of parenthood, values concerning the intergenerational obligations, attitudes toward minorities, and toward sexuality.

3.1. Statistical procedures

The present analysis proceeds as follows:

i) In order to incorporate interactions with gender and age group, the sample sizes needed to be enlarged. We opted therefore for pooling the results for the four countries concerned and for weighting the national sample sizes according to the countries' relative population share. In so doing, we shall neglect specific country effects. Originally, also the Danish data set had been considered for inclusion, but a country by country exploration of signs and magnitudes of statistical associations suggested that the Scandinavian patterns may be different.

ii) The large number of items measuring values and attitudes used in our earlier study (R. Lesthaeghe and G. Moors, 1994) were brought together in 11 subscales, and these were again subjected to a principle component analysis, ultimately yielding three orthogonal dimensions. These three dimensions seem to capture main components of cultural conservatism. However, these three dimensions have a slightly different structure depending on the age group (20-29 or 30-50) considered.

iii) The dependent variables are all dichotomous outcomes related to the current status with respect to living arrangement or life cycle stage. We would have preferred to include earlier passages through states as well (e.g. ever cohabited, ever divorced....), but such information is not available in the EVS-surveys. The result is a considerable loss of precision. For instance, we are unable to make the rather crucial distinction between the respondents who entered a first marriage via premarital cohabitation and those who did so directly. In most instances, the bias is a conservative one: if there is a significant difference between the currently cohabiting and the currently married (of which a fraction cohabited earlier), the difference is presumably even larger between the currently cohabiting and the married respondents who never cohabited.

iv) The dependent variables are related to the predictors by means of logistic regression. The results will be presented in the form of relative risks (exp. B), i.e. in terms of odds ratios relative to the reference category, controlling for the other variables in the logistic regression. There are three types of independent variables:

I. Variables that are clear antecedents that produce a selection effect. These variables are education and religious upbringing combined with denomination. Age is also introduced as a classic control variable.

II. A socioeconomic position variable that is, however, not a causal antecedent since it refers to the present status of the respondent. The relative risks associated with this variable should therefore be interpreted as associations and not as causal effects.

III. The dimensions of cultural conservatism, which are entered in the form of residuals from the regression of the raw scores on all the preceeding variables (age, education, religious upbringing, socioeconomic position). The reason for entering the residuals of the cultural dimension rather than the raw measurements is that current attitudes and value orientations are also shaped by the other four variables in the regression. This leads to problems of multicollinearity. The residuals measure the relative attitudes of respondents: a positive residual, for instance, indicates that a person scores higher on the dimension of cultural conservatism concerned than one would expect on the basis of his/her age, education, religious upbringing and current socioeconomic position. The problem of multicollinearity is now completely eliminated since these residuals obviously no longer correlate with the other four predictors in the equation. The procedure of using residuals for the cultural dimensions is furthermore a conservative one with respect to the assessment of their net effects: if their effects prove to be statistically significant, then this is definitely not because of an indirect effect stemming from age, education, religious upbringing and socioeconomic position, but because of a direct link to current living arrangement or life cycle phase. As stated before, such a link cannot be broken down into a pure selection or a pure affirmation effect with the present data. Such a significant statistical link is only an indicator of the existence of an overall, but highly robust, association.

3.2. The cultural dimensions of conservatism

As indicated, 30 value items brought together in 11 subscales were used in the construction of three "master scales". The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 for the age groups 20-29 and 30-50 respectively. In these tables we have only reported the factor loadings (i.e. correlations) of the original value items that are larger than 0.30 (i.e. the "best indicators"). This enables the reader to attach a meaning to the three orthogonal factors that are extracted.

For the respondents aged 20-29, the first dimension of cultural conservatism is directly related to high religiosity and the maintenance of strict civil morality (see Table 1). This is exemplified by the strong positive correlations with indicators such as the belief in God, having moments of prayer, rejection of induced abortion, and considering tax evasion, joy riding, use of drugs etc. as never justified. Moreover, this factor is also positively related to stressing the conformism items in the socialization battery, such as good manners or religious faith as important traits in a child's education. The second dimension is closely connected with right wing political orientation and a low tolerance for sexual minorities or for emancipation movements. Conservatism is now associated with the disapproval for the anti-apartheid, ecological, human rights and women's movements and with not wanting AIDS-patients or homosexuals as neighbours. Negative correlations emerge with the

autonomy items in the socialization battery: respect for others, imagination and independence are not picked as desirable traits. Thrift and obedience, by contrast, are much more likely to be stressed. The third dimension of cultural conservatism for those aged 20-29 is related to the <u>preference for traditional gender roles</u>. Sexual freedom is rejected and there is also an aversion for considering sharing household chores or the same tastes and interests as necessary for a successful marriage. Moreover, conservatives along this dimension do not consider it necessary for both partners to have a job, nor do they consider female employment the best way of ensuring independence. Finally, in this set of items with factor loadings as high as 0.30 or more, there is only one item correlating with more than one dimension: considering children as a necessity for a successful marriage is strongly correlated with both the "religiosity/civil morality"-factor and the "political right, low tolerance"-dimension.

For the older respondents, aged 30-50, there is a shift in the structure of the conservatism dimension (see Table 2). First, high religiosity and rejection of abortion are still strongly connected, but the civil morality items are being replaced by traditional gender roles as correlates of high religiosity. The civil morality items are emerging in the second factor in tandem with stricter sexual morality, traditional marital values and more companionship in marriage. For instance, faithfulness, same tastes and interests, and sharing of household chores are positively related to the second factor. The third factor for the older respondents is clearly a preference for the political right and aversion for all emancipation movements. This is furthermore associated with intolerance for both sexual and ethnic minorities, aversion for the autonomy traits in socialization and a preference for good manners and thrift instead. On the whole, this last dimension of cultural conservatism maintains its basic structure in both age groups considered.

The following diagram summarizes these findings:

Cultural Conservatism	Respondents 20-29	Respondents 30-50
Dimension I	High religiosity + strict civil morality	High religiosity + traditional gender roles
Dimension II	Traditional gender roles	Strict civil & sexual morality + companionship in union and traditional marital values
Dimension III	Political right, intolerance minorities, authority, aversion for autonomy in socialization	Political right, intolerance minorities, authority, aversion for autonomy in socialization

3.3. Statistical results for the age group 20-29

With the EVS-data, it is possible to distinguish between the following living arrangements:

- single, living with parents (= home stayers)
- single, not living with parents (but without distinction between living alone or sharing) (= home leavers)
- with partner and cohabiting
- with partner and married

For the age group 20-29 the divorced or separated respondents were omitted due to small numbers. From this information two dichotomous living arrangement variables have been constructed. In Table 3 we have presented the precise operationalisation, together with the incidence and the sample sizes for both sexes separately. The first dependant variable measures the incidence of being a home leaver among all those who have never been in a union. The second variable measures the incidence of cohabitation for all those who are currently in a union.

The EVS-1990 also contains information on the number of children, and for women, on being a housewife. This permitted the construction of three additional variables. The third variable in Table 3 is the incidence of parenthood among all those currently in a union. The fourth variable is equally the incidence of parenthood, but only measured for currently married respondents. Finally, the fifth variable in Table 3 is the incidence of being a housewife for all women who are no longer a student and are currently in a union.

The results of the logistic regressions are shown in Tables 4 and 5 for women and men aged 20-29 respectively. The values in brackets are the R statistics of partial contribution of the independant variable concerned, and the other values are the relative risks compared to the reference category. These reference categories are always the first category mentioned and have of course a relative risk of unity. Significance levels are also indicated. We shall now turn to the results for women 20-29.

Of the seven predictors considered in the prediction of home leaving among women without a partner, only two make a significant contribution: age and the residual of the second dimension of conservatism (political right, anti-emancipation movements, intolerance). As expected, home leaving increases with age. It also increases quite markedly with having a more "new left" attitude (pro emancipation movements, high scores on tolerance, stressing imagination and autonomy) than could be expected on the basis of age, education, religious upbringing and socioeconomic status. The two selection variables, education and religious upbringing have minor and non-significant effects: higher education is only slightly associated with home leaving of young single women, and also those with a religious Catholic upbringing are slightly less likely to be home leavers. Both of these small selection effects are in line with the expectations. The same holds for a weak association with socioeconomic status: students and those with a upper or middle level white collar job are more likely to be home leavers than single young women with a blue collar job. Finally, those who score lowest on religiosity and strict civil morality are also slightly more likely to be home leavers.

In the prediction of cohabitation versus marriage, all dependant variables make a significant contribution. Cohabitation is consequently far more differentiated according to the predictors used here than is home leaving. As expected for the four countries concerned, cohabitation among women 20-29 in a union increases quite markedly with education and declines significantly for women with a Catholic upbringing. Cohabitation declines with age as the probability of legalizing the union in the form of a marriage obviously increases with age. The socioeconomic position variable is significant mainly because housewives are far less likely to be cohabitants than married women. Nevertheless, women with upper or middle level white collar jobs are, controlling for all other variables, less likely to be cohabitants than women with blue collar jobs or female students. Cohabitation is also strongly negatively related to the relative individual positions on the three scales of conservatism. Cohabitation increases markedly with secularization and more circumstancial civil morality (residuals factor I, lowest quartiles). In fact, the residual of this

dimension of conservatism is the best predictor of cohabitation. Cohabitation furthermore increases strikingly with the higher relative scores in favour of the "new left" (residuals factor II, lowest quartiles). The association between cohabitation and the relative position with respect to traditional gender roles is weaker and not linear. A higher incidence of cohabitation is found among the two extreme categories, being those with the relative most traditional and the most non-traditional views on gender roles. This finding is not entirely in line with the prediction: we had expected a steady linear increase of the likelihood of cohabitation with having lower scores of relative traditionalism with respect to gender roles.

The likelihood of already being a parent is of course different depending on whether one considers all women in a union or married women only. This is obviously due to the fact that cohabitants are less likely to have moved on to parenthood, and that a pregnancy among cohabitants frequently led to the legalization of the union during the 1980s in the four countries considered here. If we consider parenthood solely for married women, then the only statistically significant contribution is made by socioeconomic position: women with a upper and middle level white collar job are by far the least likely to have made it to motherhood, controlling for all the other variables, and women who have selected themselves in the position of housewife are by far the most likely to be mothers. This outcome clearly shows once again that female career orientations and orientations toward parenthood are antagonistic options for younger women. Yet, in this process it is interesting to know who is inclined to opt for the position of being a housewife. In this matter, most predictors are again highly significant. The likelihood of being a housewife tends to decline with education, and quite markedly with relative secularization, "new left"-political orientation and with non-traditionalist views on gender roles. Hence, the value orientations of young married women are strongly associated with their being employed or housewives, and through this option with still being childless or already being a parent.

The corresponding results for men are presented in Table 5. A striking difference with the results for women is that the two selection variables, education and religious upbringing, are never statistically significant, and that socioeconomic position is only significant in determining home leaving among single men without a partner. As expected in this regard, such men with the higher socioeconomic positions are more likely to be home leavers.

Aside from age, significant associations only emerge with the relative positions of men for the three cultural dimensions of concervatism. Those most likely to be home leavers (among the single) or cohabitants (among those with a partner) are men who are more secularized than predicted on the basis of their background characteristics, have the least strict views on civil morality, have the stronger "new left" political views, have the highest relative scores on tolerance for minorities and on cultural autonomy in general, and have the least traditionalist views with respect to gender roles. Similarly, the young men in a union with the lowest likelihood of having progressed to parenthood are also those with the relative value orientations just mentioned.

The conclusions for this section is that relative positions of individuals of either sex on the three cultural dimensions of conservatism, and especially on the religious and political aspects involved, contribute significantly to the statistical model. For women, also the variables education and religious upbringing contribute in a significant manner, not only in determining cohabitation versus marriage but also in producing a selection effect regarding employment versus becoming a housewife. Through cohabitation and the option

for continued employment, the two selection variables and the relative positions of conservatism have strong effects on the progression to motherhood.

3.4. Statistical results for the age group 30-50

The four dependant variables considered in this section are current cohabitation versus marriage, currently being divorced or separated versus being in a marriage, still being childless for respondents who have ever been in a union, and having progressed to a third child for respondents with children. The exact definitions, incidence and sample sizes are shown in Table 6. The analysis is again performed for women and men separately. It should also be noted that sample sizes are now about three times larger than in the previous analyses, which increases the likelihood of effects becoming significant.

For women aged 30-50 and in a union, the likelihood of cohabitation increases strongly in the case of prolonged education (school leaving at age 22 or beyond) (see Table 7). This seems indeed typical for the cohort of "pioneers" with respect to cohabitation. However, controlling for all other variables, education included, the effect of socioeconomic position shows that the highest likelihood of being in a cohabiting union is blue collar and junior white collar status. Hence, it is possible that a cultural component of higher education, rather than the mere economic opportunities or higher social status associated with it, is responsible for the selection effect in favour of cohabitation. It should also be noted that religious upbringing is no longer significant in this age group, but that the differentials go in the expected direction, with those not experiencing a religious upbringing having the highest likelihood of being found in a cohabiting union. There is futhermore a robust statistical association between cohabitation and the relative positions of individuals on the cultural dimensions of conservatism. Particularly the residuals of dimensions I and II, being religiosity, traditional gender roles, strict civil and sexual morality, and traditional marital values are correlates of being married. We suspect that this could equally well be the outcome of affirmation as of selection.

The likelihood of being divorced is not linearly related to education: the highest relative risks are being found for those women who left school at ages 16-17 and at ages 20-21. The differences according to socioeconomic position are more pronounced with women in blue collar jobs or being in junior white collar positions, and particularly the unemployed women, having the highest likelihood of being currently divorced or separated. At this point, the reader should be reminded of the fact that the EVS-1990 regretably contains no information on ever being divorced or separated, so that the interpretation of the indicator used here is seriously hampered by differentials with respect to remarriage or entering cohabitation subsequently.

The analyses with respect to childlessness or progression to parity three are not affected by such a problem, and the results are quite clear. The likelihood of still being childless in the age group 30-50 first increases with education and then declines. There is hence a curvilinear relationship, with women with the least education and most education being more likely to be mothers. Religious upbringing has also a strong net selection effect: particularly women with a Catholic upbringing are least likely to be childless and those without religious upbringing most likely. Also women with upper and middle level white collar jobs are most likely to be childless, although they are less likely than their blue collar and junior white collar counterparts to be cohabiting. Not surprisingly, housewives are least likely to be childless. A very strong effect is generated by current living arrangements: currently cohabiting women have a very much larger incidence of childlessness than all the

others. There is furthermore a robust association between childlessness and being in the most secularized quartile of the residual of the first cultural component. Furthermore, this association can be extended to the women who are below the median of the residual of the second component, which means that this half of the female population aged 30-50 with the less traditional moral and ethical values and with the less traditional marital values than expected on the basis of their background characteristics, are more than twice as likely to be childless than the other half. The effect of the third component of cultural conservatism, i.e. right-wing political sympathy and low tolerance toward minorities, is essentially uncorrelated to childlessness in this age category of women.

Progression to parity three or beyond for women with children is least likely in the middle education category, but not for women with the highest education levels. There is furthermore little difference among working women depending on the type of job. Only housewives are more than twice as likely to having progressed to parity three. The selection effect of religious upbringing shows that women with a Catholic education are more likely to have at least three children than women without religious socialization. However, mothers with a Protestant upbringing are less likely to progress beyond parity two. The current living arrangement is not significantly associated with reaching higher parities among women who already have children; only cohabitants are slightly less likely to move on to the third child. The patterns according to the three dimensions of cultural conservatism, however, are all significant. Non-childless women who belong to the lowest quartile of the residual factors are all significantly less likely to progress to parity three. In other words, mothers that are more secularized, have less traditional gender roles, have a more circumstancial view of civil and sexual morality, hold positive views on political emancipation movements, ethnic and sexual minorities, and prefer the autonomy traits in educating children to a greater degree than predicted on the basis of their educational and professional backgrounds, are significantly less likely to go further than two children.

The results for men aged 30-50 are presented in Table 8. With respect to cohabitation (versus being married), the likelihood increases more steeply with education for men than for women. Similarly, also the contrast between those with a religious upbringing, either Catholic or Protestant, and those without a religious socialization is larger for these older men than for women. The selection effect of religious upbringing for men aged 30-50 is furthermore statistically significant and operates entirely in the expected direction. Controlling for these factors and for age, the pattern according to socioeconomic position shows than men with blue collar and lower level white collar jobs are more likely to be cohabiting. As was found for older women, this is again suggestive of the fact that there may be at least two mechanisms at work: cultural components associated with higher education may have been linked to a greater acceptability of cohabitation (cfr. also the historical trend by education in the four countries concerned), whereas a better financial position and the achievement of higher social status later on in life may have fostered marriage. If such a process exists, then higher social status and greater financial resources may lead to an embourgeoisement, and hence to more marriage, thereby partially neutralizing the earlier effect of having received a higher education and having lived longer as a student, both of which were conducive to experiencing cohabitation. Finally, the residuals of the first two dimensions of cultural conservatism are also significant. Men aged 30-50 who are more secularized than expected on the basis of their background characteristics, with the least traditional views on gender roles and with the least strict civil and sexual morality are all more likely to be cohabiting. The effects of the residuals of the political dimension are not significant, but the pattern is counterintuitive: men aged 30-50 with the relative most right-wing orientations are most and not least likely to be cohabiting.

This is a complete reversal of the pattern found for younger men aged 20-29 (cf. Table 5) and for women of all ages (cf. Tables 4 and 7). At this point, we have no explanation for this puzzling result.

In the analysis for the currently divorced or separated, very few factors are significant. This is largely due to the intervention of remarriage or post-divorce cohabitation, as mentioned earlier. In fact, the only statistical significant predictor in the set is the residual of factor II, indicating that men aged 30-50 with the least strict morality and not adhering to traditional marital values are the more likely still to be divorced or separated. This is probably also the outcome of an important affirmation effect.

The patterns of male childlessness and progression to parity three are more interesting. First, by far the strongest predictor of childlessness is again the type of current living arrangement, with the classic finding that cohabiting men are considerably more likely to have no offspring than married or even divorced men. Having become a parent, cohabiting men are also less likely to be fathers of three or more children, although this effect is not significant in the EVS-sample. Being raised in the Catholic tradition slightly reduces the chances of being childless, but significantly increases the chances of progressing to at least parity three. A religious upbringing in a Protestant family, however, increases the likelihood of not being a parent and at the same time slightly increases the likelihood of those with children to progress beyond parity two. In all cases, the lack of a religious upbringing reduces the probability for fathers to go beyond parity two. The effects of the relative positions on the three dimensions of cultural conservatism are less pronounced in the instance of the male fertility variables than in the case of cohabitation. The same patterns are, however, repeated. A relative position indicative of less strict civil and sexual morality and of less traditional marital values is associated with more childlessness and less progression to higher parities. Having a relative sympathy for right-wing political orientations, however, diminishes the likelihood of progressing to three or more children, contrary to what we had expected. This result, which is statistically significant, echoes the similar finding concerning cohabitation for men aged 30-50, and is absent among women or younger men where the opposite holds.

4. Conclusions

First and foremost, we wish to stress that a _particular_ outcome with respect to living arrangement or pattern of family building can be the result of _different_ motivations. This implies that theories, each focussing on a particular mechanism are more likely to be complementary rather than being mutually exclusive. However, different mechanisms may have a different explanatory power in different segments of the population. Secondly, in integrating different theoretical frameworks, we found it fruitful to follow the logical temporal sequence based on the unfolding of the life cycle starting from the "formative years". At this point, Easterlin's economic framework with respect to material aspirations, the structural theories focussing on the form and living conditions of the parental household(s), and the socio-psychological theories focussing on broader values formation all have a common ground: they find it necessary to work back to the socialization phase. From then onward a recursive process develops during young adulthood: the initial selection effects are followed by affirmation - or more rarely, negation - effects. This process involves a two generation model as well: not only is the older generation a part of the conditioning of the younger generation during the socialization phase, but it is also subject to reverse socialization itself.

The analysis of the 1990 European Values Surveys for the pooled sample of West Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands sheds light on these processes in the following ways:

i) Selection effect of religious upbringing. This selection effect, and particularly that of a Catholic upbringing, shows up in virtually all analyses performed here. As expected, a Catholic socialization lowers the likelihood of cohabitation at all ages, increases the likelihood of parenthood for men and women before age 30, reduces childlessness after age 30, and enhances progression beyond parity two. The socialization in a Protestant tradition, however, has no such straight effects. Among women older than 30, for instance, a Protestant education equally lowers the likelihood of cohabitation or childlessness, but it does not promote progression to higher parities beyond two. On the whole, however, it should be clear from the literature and from the panel studies that these selection effects of religious upbringing are a necessary ingredient in any theory of the life course evolution.

ii) Effects of education and socioeconomic position. The discussion of these effects often requires the incorporation of important differences according to gender. These differences are less important with respect to cohabitation, but they become crucial with respect to parenthood and progression to higher parities. We shall treat cohabitation first.

The fact that cohabitation had its roots among the better educated in the four countries still shows up in the positive education effect measured here. These effects are significant and quite strong, except, however, for the group of young men where such an effect has virtually disappeared. Controlling for education, cohabitation is also more clearly associated with having a blue collar or lower level white collar job. We suspect that those with higher level white collar jobs are better able to afford the transition into marriage as a result of greater financial security and the undergoing of subsequent cultural embourgeoisement. Hence, the originally greater selection in favour of cohabitation predicated on student status and higher education may wear off and be neutralized later on in life. The exception to this finding is again provided by the younger men aged 20-29, where cohabitation is undifferentiated by education, but considerably more likely for those with upper and middle level white collar jobs. Among young women cohabitation is not associated with upper and middle level white collar positions as was to be expected on the basis of the neo-classic economic theory. Quite the opposite holds.

The likelihood of parenthood declines for both sexes with later ages at school leaving, as expected. But the effect of current socioeconomic position goes in opposite directions depending on gender. In accordance with Easterlin's thesis, the likelihood of fatherhood increases for younger men as one moves up on the social stratification scale. Greater financial security and higher status are positive correlates of fatherhood prior to age 30. For younger women, the Beckerian view seems to hold: the likelihood of being a mother is substantially lower for women with upper and middle level white collar jobs than for the others. Equally important in this respect is that earlier motherhood is greatly affected by a choice concerning being employed versus becoming a housewife. At this point, the neoclassic theory concerning the prohibitive opportunity costs of motherhood needs to be qualified. The options in favour of becoming a housewife is not solely predicated on having only a lower level of education, but also influenced by a selection effect stemming from a religious upbringing (Catholic or Protestant). This selection effect for women

suggests that there is a major cultural component to the subsequent career orientation and further on to postponement of motherhood.

The differences according to gender are equally witnessed among older respondents aged 30-50 with respect to childlessness and progression to at least parity three. First, education beyond age 20 lowers the chances of remaining childless among women, but increases this likelihood among men. Second, having an upper or middle level white collar job increases the chances of childlessness among women, but lowers them for men. So far, a late transition to parenthood again seems to follow the Easterlin mechanism for men and the neo-classic mechanism for women. But the plot thickens when progression beyond parity two is introduced. Here the gender differential vanishes again, and men and women aged 30-50 in upper and middle level white collar jobs are essentially undifferentiated from those in blue collar jobs or junior white collar ones. For women, only those who are currently housewives have significantly greater chances of moving beyond two children.

iii) <u>Effects of the cultural components of conservatism</u>. In all but one of the various analyses, the relative positions of individuals with respect to the three cultural components of conservatism produce associations in the expected direction. These residual variables furthermore work particularly well in the prediction of cohabitation in all age groups concerned. Persons with high relative scores on these dimensions of religiosity, civil and sexual morality, traditional marital values, traditional gender roles and socialization values, and concommitantly lower scores on tolerance for minorities, are all more likely to be married than cohabiting, to have become parents and to have progressed to higher parities. The only exception was found for males aged 30-50, for whom the "political right"-dimension had reversed effects. We have no explanation for this puzzling feature. As indicated before, these associations are robust in the sense that they are not affected by the background variables, but they reflect the affirmation effects as much as the selection effects. Panel data, of the type used in the two American examples, would be required to disentangle these recursive processes.

The final conclusion is that the results of the European Values Survey of 1990 of the four countries are largely in agreement with what is found in the American cross-sections and panels: value orientations do matter. Furthermore, the two economic theories considered here seem to have a gender-specific validity only: it is indeed easier to trace the Easterlin effects in the results for males and the Becker effects in the results for females.

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Table 1: Three orthogonal dimensions of conservatism and their best indicators (r ≥ .30) (a). Respondents aged 20-29 in the European Values Surveys for West Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands (weighted pooled sample), 1990 (N = 1245)

Factor I: High religiosity & strict civil morality	Factor II: Political right; anti-emancipation; pro authority, law & order	Factor III: Traditional gender roles
- Abortion <u>not</u> justified if couple desires no more children (.58)	- <u>Di</u>sapproves of anti-apartheid movement (.55)	- Both partners should work (-.55)
- Abortion <u>not</u> justified if women not married (.57)	- Thrift important in socialization (.53)	- Sharing household chores are necessary for successful marriage (-.54)
- Believes in God (.56)	- <u>Di</u>sapproves of human rights movement (.51)	- Sharing same tastes and interests are necessary for successful marriage (-.50)
- Having children necessary for successful marriage (.54)	- <u>No</u> homosexuals as neighbours (.50)	- Job is best way for women to gain independence (-.50)
- Use of drugs <u>never</u> justified (.53)	- <u>No</u> AIDS-patiens as neighbours (.41)	- <u>Di</u>sapproves of sexual freedom (.47)
- Has moments of prayer outside church (.49)	- Respect for others important in socialization (-.40)	
- Faithfulness of partner requirement for successful marriage (.49)	- <u>Di</u>sapproves of ecology movement (.39)	
- Tax cheating never justified (.46)	- Women need children for life fulfilment (.37)	
- Religious faith important in socialization (.43)	- Housewife has equal life fulfilment (.35)	
- Joy riding <u>never</u> justified (.41)	- <u>Di</u>sapproves of women's movement (.31)	
- Believes in sin (.32)	- Imagination important in socialization (-.31)	
- Good manners important in socialization (.32)	- Independence important in socialization (-.31)	
- Imagination important in socialization (-.32)		

(a) Results from principle component analysis involving 30 value items brought together in an original set of 11 sub-scales (see also Lesthaeghe and Moors, 1992, table 20 for details). Missing values procedure: if 5 item-scores were missing or if all items on one of the subscales were missing, the listwise deletion procedure was applied; in the other instances, the item-score was set equal to the gender-specific mean.

Table 2: Three orthogonal dimensions of conservatism and their best indicators (r ≥ .30) (a). Respondents aged 30-50 in the European Values Surveys for West Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands (weighted pooled sample), 1990 (N = 2174)

Factor I: High religiosity, anti-abortion, traditional gender roles	Factor II: Companionship in union, strict sexual & civil morality, importance of children	Factor III: Political right, intolerance, anti-emancipation, authority
- Abortion <u>not</u> justified if no more children desired (.65) - Abortion <u>not</u> justified if woman not married (.55) - Believes in God (.50) - Both partners should work (-.50) - Job best way for women's independance (-.47) - Has moments of prayer outside church (.47) - Believes in sin (.46) - Gets comfort & strength from religion (.46) - Complete sexual freedom (-.35) - Trust in church as institution (.33) - Religious faith important in socialization (.33) - Sharing household chores (-.32) - Marriage outdated institution (-.31)	- Having children necessary for successful marriage (.63) - Faithfulness necessity for successful marriage (.50) - Same tastes and interests necessary for successful marriage (.47) - Tax cheating <u>never</u> justified (.44) - Sharing household chores necessary for successful marriage (.42) - Drugs <u>never</u> justified (.40) - Women need children for life fulfilment (.35) - Married persons having an affair is <u>never</u> justified (.33) - Children should always love & respect parents (.32) - Joy riding <u>never</u> justified (.30)	- <u>No</u> homosexuals as neighbours (.54) - <u>No</u> AIDS-patients as neighbours (.50) - Thrift important in socialization (.49) - <u>Dis</u>approves of anti-apartheid movements (.49) - <u>Dis</u>approves of human rights-movements (.47) - Respect for others important in socialization (-.44) - <u>Dis</u>approves of ecology movement (.39) - Responsability important in socialization (-.36) - Imagination important in socialization (-.35) - Independance important in socialization (-.32) - <u>No</u> immigrants & foreigners as neighbours (.32) - Good manners important in socialization (.30) - <u>Dis</u>approves of women's movement (.30)

(a) See also footnotes Table 1.

Table 3: Sub-samples, dependant variables and incidence of demographic characteristics. Respondents aged 20-29 in the European Values Surveys for West Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands (weighted pooled sample), 1990.

Sub-sample (Respondents 20-29)	Dependant variable	Incidence & sample sizes:	
		Women (N)	Men (N)
1. Never in a union	% home -leavers (=1) versus home stayers (=0)	44.4% (255)	40.5% (359)
2. Currently cohabiting and currently married	% cohabiting (=1) versus married (=0)	36.0% (378)	43.0% (242)
3. Currently cohabiting and currently married	% parent (=1) versus non-parent (=0)	62.9% (376)	40.6% (242)
4. Currently married	% parent (=1) versus non-parent	82.6% (267)	61.5% (155)
5. Female non-students currently cohabiting or married	% housewife (=1) versus other (=0)	38.6% (340)	---

Table 4: Likelihood for current status characteristics according to three sets of covariates. Women aged 20-29 in the
European Values Surveys for West Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands (weighted pooled sample), 1990

WOMEN 20-29	Dependant variable & relative risks				
	Home-leaver (vs. home-stayer)	Cohabiting (vs. married)	Parent (vs. non-parent) (cohab. + marr.)	Parent (vs. non-parent) (married)	Housewife (vs. other)
I-A. Education (age at leaving school) (a)	[.00]	[.12**]	[.04]	[.00]	[.16**]
Before 16 (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
16-17	2.04	2.57	1.72	2.59	2.07
18-19	1.77	8.23**	.47	1.43	.61
20-21	2.11	3.82	.85	2.59	1.08
22+	2.39	11.59**	.58	8.74	.09**
I-B. Religious upbringing & denomination	[.00]	[.17**]	[.10*]	[.00]	[.00]
No religious upbringing (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Relig. brought up & Catholic	.73	.24**	1.97*	1.16	.65
& Protestant	(1.01)	(1.05)	(.18*)	(.18)	(.50)
& other	(2.22)	(0.05*)	(1.23)	(.60)	(2.14)
I-C. Age	[.23**]	[.22**]	[.24**]	[.02]	[.13**]
20-21 (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
22-23	7.54**	.20**	2.90	1.32	5.25*
24-25	6.63**	.06**	14.50**	8.01	1.64
26-27	9.89**	.05**	4.34*	2.09	2.98
28-29	23.92**	.05**	34.43**	7.07	5.93**
II-A. Socioeconomic position	[.00]	[.24**]	[.32**]	[.28**]	
Blue collar + Junior white col. (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	-
Upper & middle white collar	2.98	.49	.83	.25*	-
Unemployed	(2.60)	(2.02)	(2.44)	(3.93)	-
Student	(2.53)	(4.28)	(4.96)	(.21)	-
Housewife	-	.11**	28.85**	11.67**	-
III-A. RESIDUAL factor I (Religio-sity, strict civil morality	[0.0]	[.25**]	[.20**]	[.00]	[.21**]
Highest quartile (Q1) (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	.79	6.00**	.29*	.29	.82
Q3	.75	10.18**	.22**	.32	.21**
Lowest quartile (Q4): secularism	1.97	28.73**	.07**	.33	.17**
III-B. RESIDUAL factor II (Polit. right; anti-emancipation; intolerance; authority; law & order)	[.24**]	[.16**]	[.14**]	[.00]	[.08*]
Highest quartile (Q1) (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	1.44	.93	.75	.69	.45
Q3	8.87**	4.48**	.23**	.38	.29
Lowest quartile (Q4): "new left"	8.14**	4.06**	.20**	.31	.52
III-C. RESIDUAL factor III (Tradit. gender roles preferred)	[.00]	[.06*]	[.00]	[.00]	[.15**]
Highest quartile (Q1) (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	2.49	.36*	.91	1.39	.85
Q3	.99	.67	.67	1.09	.44*
Lowest quartile (Q4): non-tradit.	.76	1.23	.57	.59	.22**

[.12] R-statistic of partial contribution of the variable.
( ) Less than 30 cases
(a) For students, the age at planning to end education is being used.
** Significant at .01-level; * at .05-level.

Table 5: Likelihood for current status characteristics according to three sets of covariates. Men aged 20-29 in the European Values Surveys for West Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands (weighted pooled sample), 1990

MEN 20-29	Dependant variable & relative risks			
	Home-leaver (vs. home-stayer)	Cohabiting (vs. married)	Parent (vs. non-parent) (cohab. + marr.)	Parent (vs. non-parent) (married)
I-A. Education (age at leaving school)	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]
Before 16 (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
16-17	2.12	.99	.77	1.53
18-19	1.29	.30	.76	.87
20-21	1.13	1.21	.23	.12
22+	2.27	.51	.37	1.18
I-B. Religious upbringing & denomination	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]
No religious upbringing (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Relig. brought up & Catholic	.79	.53	1.60	.87
& Protestant	(1.08)	(1.35)	(.57)	(.24)
& other	(3.39)	(.21)	(1.21)	(.35)
I-C. Age	[.20**]	[.20**]	[.09*]	[.00]
20-21 (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
22-23	2.15	.50	1.91	.33
24-25	3.25**	.21	3.23	.21
26-27	9.33**	.16**	4.53	.33
28-29	6.59**	.04**	10.33*	.35
II-A. Socioeconomic position	[.17**]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]
Blue collar + Junior white col. (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Upper & middle white collar	5.32**	2.38	2.60	1.95
Unemployed	(1.72)	(2.31)	(.92)	(1.71)
Student	(.67)	(7.55)	(.01)	(.01)
III-A. RESIDUAL factor I (Religiosity, strict civil morality	[.22**]	[.29**]	[.28**]	[.00]
Highest quartile (Q1) (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	1.00	3.19	.31*	.80
Q3	2.31	12.10**	.24*	.61
Lowest quartile (Q4): secularism	7.30**	27.40**	.04**	.17*
III-B. RESIDUAL factor II (Political right; anti-emancipation; intolerance; authority; law & order)	[.06*]	[.13**]	[.21**]	[.09*]
Highest quartile (Q1) (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	.44	5.70**	.21*	.55
Q3	.40*	7.56**	.06**	.13*
Lowest quartile (Q4): "new left"	1.07	9.14**	.17*	.35
III-C. RESIDUAL factor III (Tradit. gender roles)	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]
Highest quartile (Q1) (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	.98	.77	1.99	1.51
Q3	1.22	.82	1.83	.77
Lowest quartile (Q4): non-tradit.	1.40	3.06	.60	.61

For footnotes: see table 4.

Table 6: Sub-samples, dependant variables and incidence of demographic characteristics. Respondents aged 30-50 in the European Values Surveys for West Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands (weighted pooled sample), 1990

Sub-sample	Dependant variable	Incidence & sample sizes:	
		Women (N)	Men (N)
1. Respondents currently cohabiting or married	% Currently cohabiting (=1) vs. currently married (=0)	9.1% (1070)	12.9% (887)
2. Respondents currently divorced, separated or married	% Currently div./sep. (=1) vs. currently married (=0)	10.1% (1082)	9.2% (851)
3. Respondents ever in a union	% non-parent (=1) vs. parent (=0)	10.6% (1178)	14.5% (965)
4. Parents	% with parity 3+ (=1) vs. parity = 1 or 2 children (=0)	26.4% (1053)	23.6% (825)

Table 7: Likelihood for current status characteristics according to three sets of covariates. Women aged 30-50 in the European Values Surveys for West Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands (weighted pooled sample), 1990

WOMEN 30-50	Dependant variables & relative risks			
	1. Currently cohabiting (vs. married)	2. Currently div./sep. (vs. married)	3. Non-parent vs. parent	4. Parity = 3+ (vs. 1,2)
I-A. Education (age at leaving school)	[.11**]	[.11**]	[.09*]	[.03]
Before 16 (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
16-17	1.63	3.19**	1.06	1.00
18-19	.78	1.12	2.80	.58*
20-21	1.15	1.90	.65	.62
22+	4.12**	1.44	.83	1.24
I-B. Religious upbringing & denomination	[.00]	[.00]	[.15**]	[.07*]
No religious upbringing (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Relig. brought up & Catholic	.67	.92	.27**	1.28
& Protestant	.40	.49	.61	.56*
& other	(.34)	(3.03)	(.76)	(1.41)
I-C. Age	[.17**]	[.00]	[.08*]	[.00]
30-34 (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
35-39	.40**	1.59	.78	1.14
40-44	.17**	1.16	1.39	.94
45-50	.29**	1.26	.34*	1.14
II-A. Socioeconomic position	[.17**]	[.27**]	[.11**]	[.14**]
Blue collar + Junior white col. (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Upper & middle white collar	.57	.55	2.36*	1.11
Unemployed	(.43)	(3.14*)	(3.28)	(1.70)
Housewife	.17**	.12**	.68	2.50**
II-B. Current living arrangement	-	-	[.33**]	[.00]
Married (ref.)	-	-	1.00	1.00
Cohabiting	-	-	21.36**	.65
Divorced/separated	-	-	3.53**	.99
III-A. RESIDUAL factor I: Religiosity, tradit. gender roles	[.14**]	[.00]	[.04]	[.07**]
Highest quartile (Q1)(ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	1.96	.12	2.13	.72
Q3	5.75**	.62	1.96	1.04
Lowest quartile (Q4)	4.39**	1.46	2.94**	.51**
III-B. RESIDUAL factor II: Strict morality, tradit. marital values	[.19**]	[.15**]	[.15**]	[.09**]
Highest quartile (Q1) (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	.87	.51	4.43**	.84
Q3	.57	2.35*	6.94**	.71
Lowest quartile (Q4)	3.39**	2.18*	5.24**	.39**
III-C. RESIDUAL factor III: political right, intolerance, authority	[.05]	[.00]	[.00]	[.06*]
Highest quartile (Q1) (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	.87	1.78	1.43	.70
Q3	2.05	1.22	1.67	.59**
Lowest quartile (Q4) ("new left")	2.05	1.94	1.35	.51**

For footnotes see Table 4.

Table 8: Likelihood for current status characteristics according to three sets of covariates. Men aged 30-50 in the European Values Surveys for West Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands (weighted pooled sample), 1990

MEN 30-50	Dependant variable & relative risk			
	1. Currently cohabiting (vs. married)	2. Currently div./sep. (vs. married)	3. Non-parent vs. parent	4. Parity = 3+ (vs. 1,2)
I-A. Education (age at leaving school)	[.13**]	[.00]	[.06*]	[.00]
Before 16 (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
16-17	1.96	.65	.49*	.55*
18-19	2.60*	1.35	1.56	.75
20-21	4.21*	1.62	1.20	.50
22+	7.41**	.58	1.34	.62
I-B. Religious upbringing & denomination	[.10*]	[.00]	[.00]	[.04]
No religious upbringing (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Relig. brought up & Catholic	.41**	.71	.74	1.63*
& Protestant	.32**	.14*	1.88	1.53
& other	(.25)	(.01)	(.82)	(3.47)
I-C. Age	[.14**]	[.00]	[.22**]	[.05]
30-34 (reference)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
35-39	.68	1.93	.24**	1.24
40-44	.42*	2.19	.18**	2.08*
45-50	.16**	3.02*	.16**	2.09*
II-A. Socioeconomic position	[.13**]	[.03]	[.00]	[.05]
Blue collar + Junior white col. (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Upper & middle white collar	.27**	1.47	.77	1.17
Unemployed	(2.33)	(3.72*)	(.37)	(3.19**)
II-B. Current living arrangement	-	-	[.30**]	[.00]
Married (ref.)	-	-	1.00	1.00
Cohabiting	-	-	11.03**	.54
Divorced/separated	-	-	5.17**	.91
III-A. RESIDUAL factor I: Religiosity, traditional gender roles	[.11**]	[.03]	[.05]	[.00]
Highest quartile (Q1)(ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	1.48	1.50	1.36	1.06
Q3	2.87**	2.87*	.49	.60
Lowest quartile (Q4)	3.40**	1.85	1.17	.67
III-B. RESIDUAL factor II: Strict morality, tradit. marital values	[.14**]	[.20**]	[.05]	[.00]
Highest quartile (Q1) (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	4.09**	.88	1.54	.77
Q3	2.94*	4.57**	1.80	.66
Lowest quartile (Q4)	5.03**	4.53**	2.80*	.61
III-C. RESIDUAL factor III: political right, intolerance, authority	[.00]	[.00]	[.00]	[.04]
Highest quartile (Q1) (ref.)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Q2	.79	1.11	.67	1.59
Q3	.88	1.24	1.57	2.13**
Lowest quartile (Q4) ("new left")	.44	.97	1.10	1.86*

For footnotes see Table 4.