

**HETEROPRAXIS AND HETEROGENEITY IN SOCIAL
CHANGE: TURKISH AND MOROCCAN WOMEN IN
BELGIUM**

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Vrije Universiteit Brussel

IPD-working paper 1994-1

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WORKING PAPERS

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East without any nuclearization of the family (e.g. Freedman et al., 1978).

We also wish to stay clear from other monocausal theories and their reference to a single paradigm or dominant mechanism. The neo-Marxist vision, for instance, holds that ethnic minorities can only reproduce themselves as a new proletariat as a consequence of mechanisms of exclusion and deprivation (cf. Castles and Kosack, 1973; Phizacklea and Miles, 1980; Noiriel, 1986). It cannot be our intention to underestimate the social stratification effects or to disregard deprivation, but an overly stringent concentration on these issues leads to the negation of substantial heterogeneity both within and between ethnic minorities.

In contrast to the neo-Marxist view, the rational choice theory puts the individual and his interest at the core of the action. The group becomes a much looser set of individual agents whose psychological and economic motivations provide the power of innovation. This view certainly provides a partial answer to the neo-Marxist view of collective marginalization into an "ethnic proletariat", and opens up multiple avenues for individually chosen strategies of adaptation and innovation. The migrant is not portrayed as a rebel, but as taking advantage of the available structures of opportunity. This would account for the adaptation to the two-children family, the increased investment in the education of the second generation, the growing activity of ethnic business, etc.

Yet, also the rational choice theory will fall short of providing an adequate explanation for both the heterogeneity and heteropraxis documented in this paper for the Turkish and Moroccan women. In Dahrendorf's (1979) model of "life chances", the game is not only played on the side of the "options" (i.e. structures of opportunity), but also on the side of "ligatures", i.e. the linkages of alliance and loyalty to a social and cultural entity. These bonds provide a meaning to action, a cultural filter through which opportunities are explored and conceptualized, and a set of characteristics that make the actor recognizable by third parties.

In the economic and rational choice literatures the maintenance or severance of such bonds may procure benefits or incur costs. This is a rather dichotomous conceptualization, which may fall short of the complexity involved. Such cultural bonds do not chain individuals, and hence the options are neither the complete maintenance or the abrupt severance. We prefer to conceptualize the "ligatures" as *flexible and elastic*, particularly when they exist in multicultural contexts. As such a form of behaviour can be legitimized by more than a single code of conduct, and actors are likely to construct *syncretic* cultures that *gradually* drift away from the original. As a result, a temporary balance can be maintained between, on the one hand, new aspirations or new forms of behaviour, and, on the other hand, older rules and forms of conduct that, for one reason or another, have maintained a definite degree of *functionality*. In this paper, we shall encounter several examples of such careful shifts, and document that the functionality of the "traditional" is in part responsible for the heteropraxis.

2. The data

The data stem from two successive surveys held in Flanders and Brussels among respectively Turkish women (1991-92) and Moroccan women (1992-93) in the age bracket between 17 and 50. The questionnaires existed in a Dutch-Turkish, Dutch-Arabic, French-Turkish and French-Arabic version. The interviewers were all young women (aged 20-30) recruited among their respective ethnic groups. Among the Moroccan

interviewers several were also selected because of their knowledge of the Berber language.

The samples are drawn from proportionally stratified clusters. First, all communes (= cluster) were selected with at least 10 Turkish or Moroccan inhabitants. These communes were stratified according to the degree of urbanization (= 12 strata). In each stratum, clusters were selected at random, and in each commune also individuals were randomly selected from the local register of aliens. After all interviewing was done, the sampling weights were recalculated to allow for disproportionalities in non-response rates by cluster type, and proportionality could be re-established. The only exceptions pertain to the communes of central Brussels and adjacent Schaarbeek. In these two instances the communal authorities refused collaboration, so that a random walk procedure had to be used. The other communes in the Brussels agglomeration collaborated without hesitation.

The survey yielded usable questionnaires for 850 Turkish and for 868 Moroccan women. The total non-response amounted to 15 percent for the Turkish and to 31 percent for the Moroccan women. The share of refusals in this non-response accounted for only 5 percent among the Turkish population, but for 16 percent among the Moroccans. The rest of the non-response is due to the fact that the selected person was either temporarily absent or could not be located. These differences between the two ethnic groups is in part due to their contrasting settlement patterns. A considerably larger segment of the Turkish population is living in medium-size and even small towns in Flanders and in the former coal-mining belt of Limburg. In these settings, refusals were rare. By contrast, the Moroccan population has a far greater concentration in the agglomerations of Brussels and Antwerp, and, as expected for such settings, more persons either refused or could not be located. As a result, the representativity of the sample is merely adequate for the Moroccan population, and probably excellent for the Turkish one.

The major problem encountered, however, was the difficulty of interviewing the respondents without the presence of a third person. In the Turkish survey, no less than 43 percent of the interviews were conducted, either partially or completely, in the presence of another adult. In the Moroccan survey, this occurred for 29 percent of the interviews. These percentages are even higher for the respondents aged 17-24: 54 percent among Turkish women and 36 percent among Moroccan women. A systematic analysis of the response bias is obviously required. This is currently being done in greater detail thanks to the fact that the nature of the relationship with the third person (husband, mother in law, friend...) is also known.

3. The comparisons

All the results in the subsequent sections are organized in such a way as to allow joint comparison by age and by duration of residence in Belgium. The comparison by age brings out the differences between the generations. Since Turkish and Moroccan immigration started during the early 1960s, the offspring of the earlier migrants are now reaching young adulthood and can be found in the age group 17-29. However, a strict interpretation in terms of a generation-effect is not possible because we do not know what the behaviour and attitudes were of the older women when they were younger adults, i.e. 20-25 years ago. We can only assume that, on average, their attitudes were then more traditional than they are currently, since longer durations of residence in the West is likely to have produced shift in the direction of greater adaptation to western conditions. Hence, it is likely that the inter-generational contrasts measured at equal ages (i.e. at age 17-29) are larger than those

currently measured at different ages (i.e. at 17-29 for the second generation and at ages 40-49 for the first generation).

The combination of age and duration of residence is also required for another reason. We need to make a distinction within the younger age groups (17-29) between, on the one hand, young women who were either raised and socialized in Belgium, and on the other hand, their age-mates who arrived much later and at older ages. The first group constitutes the actual "second generation", and the second consists predominantly of "imported brides" arriving mainly during the 1980s. The "imported brides" are young women of marriageable age who immigrate as a result of a marriage with a Turkish or Moroccan man who is already resident in Belgium.

The share of the imported brides among women 17-29 is particularly important in the Turkish population: in our sample 32 percent of these women had a duration of residence of 0-9 years only, and 95 percent of them immigrated at the occasion of their marriage. By contrast, in the Moroccan population far fewer imported brides were found: of the younger women aged 17-29 only 15 percent had a duration of residence of less than 10 years, and 75 percent of them immigrated as a consequence of a marriage (see also Surkyn, 1993, 1994).

In short, we shall systematically make a three-way comparison between:

- i) *The early first generation*, typically aged 40+, immigrating mostly during the 1960s and 1970s, and having durations of residence of 15 years or more.
- ii) *The second generation*, currently aged 17-29, who immigrated as children or who are Belgian-born, and equally having durations of residence of 15 years or more.
- iii) *The late first generation*, which is composed of young women aged 17-29, but who immigrated more recently, mostly at the occasion of a marriage to a Turkish or Moroccan man with Belgian residence (i.e. "imported brides").²

The distinctions just introduced obviously explain a major portion of the educational heterogeneity in both communities. In Table 1, the following indicators are presented:

- The percentage of all women who had no formal education.
- The average duration of schooling.
- The speaking and reading of Dutch or French at an elementary level.
- The understanding of the TV-news.
- The reading of one or several newspapers or weekly magazines in Dutch or French.

The data in Table 1 indicate that there are more younger women without formal education in the Moroccan community than in the Turkish one, but that the former have higher schooling levels among those that did receive an education. At ages beyond 30, this higher proportion of illiteracy among the Moroccan population is no longer compensated by average longer schooling. Moreover, the illiterate segment is predominantly found among the Berber-speaking segment of the Moroccan sample.

Table 1

By contrast, the knowledge of Dutch, and especially French, is noticeably higher in the Moroccan than in the Turkish population. Furthermore, this advantage of the Moroccan women seems to persist in all

²This continental European classification differs from the common American one that distinguishes between the migrant generation itself and the first generation American-born.

age groups. Even Moroccan women of the second generation report a more frequent contact with the Belgian press than the Turkish second generation. These distinctions are related to the following factors:

- i. the smaller proportion of imported brides among the Moroccan women;
- ii. the fact that more Moroccan women had already some knowledge of French prior to immigration;
- iii. the much greater concentration of the Moroccan community in Brussels;
- iv. many young Moroccan women no longer know the Arabic alphabet, and thus turn to reading in French or Dutch, whereas young Turkish women can continue to read their native press.

The conclusion from the data in Table 1 is that, despite a higher proportion of illiterate women in the older age groups and among the Berber segment, the Moroccan female population still has a higher degree of linguistic contact and integration than the Turkish one.

4. Desired family size, sex preference, utility of children and contraception: a decisive change

In Table 2 we have compared the indicators pertaining to ideal family size and the sex preference for children. Ideal family size was measured via the Thurstone procedure of pairwise comparison of the items indicating 2, 4, 6 or 8 children. The respondents state their preference in each pair ($4 \times 3/2 = 6$ pairs). Similarly, we also used pairwise comparison for assessing sex preference, the items being: 3 boys, 2 boys + 1 girl, 2 girls + 1 boy, or 3 girls. These procedures allow for a more detailed analysis of the preferences, both using Thurstone's original pairwise comparison technique and Coombs' unfolding (see Segaert and Page, 1994). A few simpler comparisons already bring out the most salient features.

Table 2

Women younger than 30 exhibit a very pronounced preference for two children in both Islamic communities. Yet, there are also a few clear differences between the Turkish and Moroccan samples. First, it is remarkable that older Turkish women (40+) have accepted the "two children"-ideal to a higher degree than the older Moroccan respondents. Second, also among the younger Moroccan generation there remains a larger segment preferring the four children family size ideal, and this even holds among Belgian-born Moroccan women.

The tolerance for childlessness, measured through the item "a woman can also be happy without children" and a rating scale (item E in Table 2), shows little variation between the two communities, but striking variation according to age and duration of residence. Among the older first generation women, such a proposition is only acceptable for some 10-15 percent, and among the imported brides (aged 17-29, duration of residence 0-9), this proportion increases to roughly 25 percent. But for the Belgian-born second generation, however, such a proposition is acceptable to more than 50 percent of the respondents.

The gender preferences for children exhibit distributions similar to those just described for the tolerance of childlessness: little variation between the two Islamic communities, but strong differentials by age and duration of residence. For instance, among older women and among young imported brides, there is still a marked preference for boys: roughly 60 to 80 percent of them prefer 2 boys + 1 girl (2B1G) over the reverse, and 3 boys over 3 girls. By contrast, the young women who grew up in Belgium or who are Belgian-born, show a preference for girls: less

than 50 percent pick the 2B1G-item, and less than 50 percent choose the 3B-item in the 3B versus 3G contrast!

Table 3

The perceptions of the utility of children are documented in Table 3. The respondents are presented with four items, two of which specifying a material utility ("children needed for old age care", and "children are a help in the household") and two specifying a non-material but psychological utility ("children strengthen the bond between husband and wife", and "children make one a more responsible person").³ A ranking procedure followed in which the respondents were requested to pick the two items that came closest to their preference (picking 2 out of 4). In Table 3, we present the proportions who either systematically picked the two material items or the two psychological ones. The remaining respondents obviously picked a mixed pair of items. The results are largely as expected: the likelihood of choosing the two psychological advantages strongly increases as the age of the respondents declines.

Two other features should be noted, however. First, the imported brides are now more similar to their Belgian-educated or Belgian-born age-mates, and further away from the older first generation. Second, the proportion of the older women still preferring the two traditional material items is small: only 12 to 20 percent. Hence, the older respondents overwhelmingly opted for a mixed pair of items.

To sum up, it seems that the shift away from seeing the utility of children in function of their economic value has entered into a final phase. Both among Turkish and Moroccan communities there is now a clear majority of younger women opting for the non-material aspects of child utility. For the younger Turkish women, this majority already covers about two thirds of the population.

Also with respect to contraception a major breakthrough has occurred. As expected, the use of contraception among the Turkish and Moroccan communities in Belgium is higher than in the countries of origin. Restricting the analysis to married women, the percentages of current users (all methods combined) by five-year age groups among Turkish women in Belgium (1991) exceed the percentages reported for Turkey (1988) by about 5 to 15 percentage points (cf. Lodewijckx, 1994). The largest differences are noted for women aged between 25 and 40. The same comparison between Moroccan women in Belgium (1993) and in Morocco (1992) produces even larger differences in favour of the former. These are of the order of 10 to 35 percentage points in current contraceptive use. Again, the largest differences are found in age groups beyond 25.⁴

³These items originally stem from Dawson's "modernity scale" and were pretested by C. Timmerman (1987) on a small Turkish sample in her licence-thesis. See also Timmerman et al. (1989). A factor analysis confirmed that the "strengthening of bond" and the "responsible person" items formed a pair in juxtaposition to the other two items.

⁴The percentages for current contraceptive use (all methods) among currently married women, by five year age groups, are (cfr. Lodewijckx, 1994, table 8):

	<u>20-24</u>	<u>25-29</u>	<u>30-34</u>	<u>35-39</u>	<u>40-44</u>	<u>45-49</u>
A. Turkish women						
- in Flanders & Brussels (1991)	59	79	77	91	64	56
- in Turkey (1988)	50	68	73	73	60	-
B. Moroccan women						
- in Flanders & Brussels (1992)	59	72	79	72	76	43
- in Morocco (1992)	35	40	45	48	47	35

The closer resemblance of the age profile of current contraceptive use between Turkish women in Belgium and in Turkey is obviously related to the earlier rise of contraceptive useage levels in Turkey than in Morocco. By contrast, especially the contraceptive breakthrough among Moroccan women in Belgium has been enhanced by their residence in a western European nation.

Even if residence outside Turkey is not a major factor affecting overall levels of use, it is a major factor differentiating Turkish women in Belgium and in Turkey with respect to the method-mix. Turkey has had high overall contraceptive use levels for quite some time, but the share of traditional and less effective methods is considerable. Hence, if use of modern methods (i.e. condom, IUD, hormonal contraception, female sterilization) is being used as criterium, a much clearer difference emerges between Turkish women in Belgium and those in Turkey. Age-specific percentages of current use of modern methods among currently married Turkish women in Flanders and Brussels now exceed those of women in Turkey by about 10 to 30 percentage points (Lodewijckx, 1994).⁵ Controlling for the fact that the 1988 survey in Turkey only gives figures for currently "exposed women", these differences still mean that the Turkish women in Belgium are some 5 to 20 percentage points further ahead in modern contraceptive useage than their age-mates in Turkey.

Another way of documenting the contraceptive revolution among both Islamic communities is to compare them with Belgian women (see also Lodewijckx, 1994). In fact, the age profiles of contraceptive use of the former two communities and that of Belgium women in Flanders resemble each other, except for two features. First, contraceptive use is still 20 to 25 percentage points higher among married Belgian women in the age group 20-24. This corresponds to the fact that Belgian women have a typically western pattern of postponement of parenthood, whereas women in both Islamic populations start procreation very shortly after marriage. The second feature pertains to sterilization. Male sterilization is virtually absent in Moroccan and Turkish families, whereas 14 percent of partners of Belgian women 35-39 have had a vasectomy. Female sterilization has been declining among Belgian couples, but this has become the second most important method for Turkish women aged 35+. Moroccan women have much lower levels of female sterilization, but the highest levels of hormonal contraception after age 30 (Lodewijckx, 1994). To sum up, after age 25, the comparisons of contraceptive patterns between these three populations in Belgium has become much more a matter of specific method-mix than of use levels.

⁵The percentages for current contraceptive use of modern methods only, by five year age groups (Lodewijckx, *ibidem*) are as follows for currently married women:

	<u>20-24</u>	<u>25-29</u>	<u>30-34</u>	<u>35-39</u>	<u>40-44</u>	<u>45-49</u>
A. Turkish women						
- in Flanders & Brussels (1991)	46	70	71	87	52	49
- in Turkey (1988)(*)	28	(-- 44 --)		(-- 38 --)		26
B. Moroccan women						
- in Flanders & Brussels (1993)	57	71	71	65	65	36
- in Morocco (1992)	32	35	39	39	39	28
C. Belgian women (Flanders, 1991)	71	65	74	74	-	-

(*) only "exposed" women (i.e. currently married, presumably fertile, and not pregnant)

One should also bear in mind that the older women are predominantly immigrants coming from rural areas, whereas the comparisons above are made with the Turkish and Moroccan national results, including urban areas. If only data for rural areas were singled out in the countries of origin, the above contrasts would have been even more striking.

5. Nuptiality and partner choice: the other transition

These two topics lead to domains of "life options" where traditions have not completely lost their functionality. We shall document that a nuptiality transition to later ages at marriage has occurred, but in combination with patterns of partner choice that are not completely individualized but still partially governed by third persons and group interests. Also, differences in this respect between the Turkish and Moroccan communities are noted.

Various indicators of age at first marriage and partner choice are given in Table 4. These are complemented by the quantile characteristics of ages at first marriage by duration of residence in Belgium. These distribution characteristics were computed with the life table method, and are presented in Table 5 for both Islamic minorities.

Tables 4 & 5

The indicators concerning the age at first marriage show that the experience of the second generation is clearly distinct from that of the older first generation and of the younger imported brides. Among the second generation only a small fraction married prior to the age of 18: 13 and 7 percent among the Turkish and Moroccan population respectively. Such early marriages were much more frequent among women aged 40-49 (43 and 39 percent) and among young women who immigrated recently (37 and 21 percent). As a result, the first decile (T1 in Table 5) for the second generation has shifted upward when compared to that of the others by about 1.5 to 2.5 years. This upward shift increases to about 2.0 years among Turkish women and to more than 3.0 years among Moroccan women when median ages at first marriage are considered. The distinctions between these two ethnic groups are even more pronounced at the upper tail of the distribution: for Moroccan women born in Belgium the third quartile has not been reached as yet, and would be of the order of 25 to 26 years.

The nuptiality transition has been accompanied by shifts in the mode of partner choice. Marriages that are arranged and imposed by parents are declining and replaced by marriages that are either arranged by parents but subjected to the approval of the partners concerned, or conversely, by marriages based on individual choice subjected to subsequent parental approval. Marriages that are completely based on free individual choice without further interferences of parents are still very rare, and more often than not, a source of conflict. We also suspect that marriages based on individual initiative and followed by parental approval are largely taking place because the young adults stick to the rules of social endogamy and choose "conservatively" precisely to avoid any subsequent problems with their parents' preference structure.

The indicators in Table 4 provide an idea of the orders of magnitude involved. Among the older women (40+), over a third indicate that they only met their prospective husband during a period of 2 months or less prior to the marriage date. This is a high proportion given that geographic and social endogamy produce large numbers of marriages between partners who have known each other since childhood. The percentage of partners making each other's acquaintance in the short 2 month period has been halved for the second generation, but it has remained almost intact among the imported brides. By contrast, the proportion of marriages resulting from the partners' own initiative have increased considerably with the changing of generations. For the older women, this type described the experience of 10 to 15 percent only, whereas more than half of marriages in the second generation started with the partner's initiative. Such shifts are not purely the effect of residence in Western Europe, though. Similar trends are also described for Turkey itself (cf. Kulu Glasgow, 1993).

When comparing the indicators of partner choice, one notices a difference between the Turkish and Moroccan populations. Among the former, the changes in the direction of more individual autonomy seem to have been slower. More young Turkish than Moroccan women with short durations of residence in Belgium report marriages with partners they did not know for longer than two months prior to the marriage ceremony, and fewer report marriages in which they could take the initiative. This is undoubtedly related to the continuity of chain migration via the recruitment of brides in the Turkish regions of parental origin. In other words, the system of arranged and strongly endogamous or homogamous marriage has retained its functionality with respect to immigration. Actually, there is also a flow of "imported grooms" along that of "imported brides" (Surkyn, 1993).

In the Moroccan community, this immigration connection of marriage has been less pronounced, which corresponds not only to smaller proportions of imported brides in the age segment below 30, but also to a faster transition to more individual initiative in partner selection. The ingredient of "parental approval" has remained essential, and marriages following elopement or "abduction" are equally rare and as problematic as among the Turkish population.

Another aspect of these forms of marriage is the formation of extended families, mostly as a result of coresidence with the husband's parents. The data in Table 6 show that such coresidence is again more common in the Turkish community than in the Moroccan one. Equally noteworthy is the fact that still a quarter of women belonging to the Belgian born second generation are found in extended families. The process of "splitting off", i.e. of establishing an independent household, seems to have occurred for the majority of women older than 30.

Table 6

The conclusion for this section is that a nuptiality transition has taken place in the wake of the fertility and contraceptive transition. This nuptiality change is partially a corollary of extended education, but virtually entirely restricted to the second generation educated or born in Belgium. Especially among the Turkish population, a parallel pattern of arranged marriages has survived as a channel for chain migration. Among the second generation, the dominant form of partner choice is becoming the one based on the partners' own initiative but subject to parental approval. In the Moroccan community this pattern has spread more rapidly, to some extent because of much less chain migration, more higher education for the second generation, and more concentration in Brussels and Antwerp. These differences between the two Islamic communities highlight that marriage is still too important an event to be left to the discretion of two individuals only, and that strong group interests have continued to be of relevance. Individual agency has gained some ground, but the calculus of individual choice is strongly bounded by that of third parties referring to traditional codes of conduct. The bonds with one's own community are rarely severed. Rather, the "elasticity" of these older cultural preferences is gradually being extended, and conflict avoided.

6. Female autonomy and modus vivendi: gender relations and socialization values

The tension between aspirations for more individual autonomy on the one hand, and loyalty toward their own culture and origins is a dominant feature in the lives of Turkish and Moroccan women. The point of gravity shifts definitely in favour of more female autonomy, particularly for the second generation, but confrontation remains far more the exception than

the rule. Moreover, the preservation of traditional gender relations is not solely to be interpreted as a form of female submission or passivity. As indicated, for instance by M. Renaerts (1991) or Y. Bartelink (1994), women can also choose a "traditionalist" strategy for uplifting their position along that of men within the religious community. In these instances, a female statement of religious integration is regarded as a sign of perseverance and a match to male participation in religious rites.

The issue of cultural preservation is much more deeply rooted than hypothesized by the rational choice variant of modernization theory (see also Münch, 1992, or Sciulli, 1992). This theory is capable of explaining the direction of the change, but not its speed.

The indicators used in Tables 7 and 8 give an idea of this "prudent" shift in the codes of conduct. The first set of indicators describes the rules governing gender roles, and the second set documents the attitudes on the "conformity-autonomy" scale in socialization values.

Tables 7 and 8

The situation for the older women of the first generation can be described as follows: the majority no longer feels obliged to retreat in another room when strange men visit; about half agrees with no longer wearing a scarf when outdoors, but only a minority approves of addressing unknown men. This ranking is also maintained by younger women of the second generation, but the proportions have shifted considerably in the less conformist direction: about three quarters agree with the abandonment of the scarf and with not retreating when unknown men visit. Addressing unknown men is not yet tolerated to the same extent.

This general profile has again a Turkish and Moroccan variant. Among the latter, the percentages of less conformism are again higher among older and younger women alike. The recently immigrated young women occupy positions that are again closer to the older, first generation women than to their Belgian-educated or Belgian-born age-mates. The imported brides are apparently recruited among the more conservative segments of the population in the sending areas.

The profiles for the socialization values are rather similar. The presentation of the four items was as follows:

"I find it important for a boy (respectively a girl) that he (she):"

- has good manners; (conformism)
- can think for himself (herself); (autonomy)
- is obedient to its parents; (conformism)
- is interested in the "how" and "why" of things (autonomy).

Respondents were requested to pick the two most desired traits among these four, once for a boy and once for a girl. The percentages that choose either a pair of two conformism items or a pair of autonomy items for sons and daughters respectively follow the expected direction: about a quarter of the young women of the second generation pick the conformism items, and a majority makes a mixed choice, whereas the selection of the two conformism items occurs among 50 to 60 percent of the older women. The choice of the two autonomy items is only found for a minority of women, but its likelihood is twice or three times as large for the Belgian-born Turkish women and four times as large for the Belgian-born Moroccan women when compared to the position of the older women. Once more, the position of the imported brides, whether Turkish or Moroccan, is much closer to that of the older generation than to that of their Belgian-born age-mates.

Among the older Moroccan respondents, conformity is more required of girls than of boys, but this relative discrepancy disappears for younger women, imported brides included. In the Turkish population, however, this discrepancy remains for women younger than 30, including for the Belgian-born. Among the minority that picks the two autonomy items, gender discrepancies are virtually non-existent. On the whole, Moroccan women choose less frequently for the two conformism items than the Turkish women, and this pattern tends to hold across all ages and residence durations.

The main conclusion is, however, that in this respect choices are being carefully balanced. The distinction between the generations is more adequately described by a gradual and prudent shift in the direction of greater autonomy than by the notion of a "generation gap".

7. Female employment: more than one model, but supremacy of "embourgeoisement"

In the analysis of female labour force participation for Islamic ethnic groups one cannot use a simple model with a "traditional" and a "modern" pole. Both in Turkey and Morocco a considerable number of women are de facto employed in agriculture and certain branches of industry (e.g. food processing, textiles), while the Islamic ideal is the confinement of women to domestic duties only. The transition from employment to non-employment in these countries is often associated with rising social status and male incomes, with urbanization or mechanization of agriculture (e.g. Cosar, 1978; Davis, 1978; Dwyer, 1978; Cammaert, 1991; Janssens, 1993). The caring for domestic quality gets priority as soon as the economic position permits. This has also been the dominant model for working classes in Western Europe, roughly from the late 19th Century to the 1950s. The improvement of all aspects of domestic quality was seen by virtually all political parties and pressure groups as a means of combatting the social ills inherited from the 19th Century industrialization, and the withdrawal of women from industrial employment were equally coupled to rising male real wages. This is essentially the model of "embourgeoisement". This model is almost in complete agreement with the older Islamic ideals of separate roles and divided life-worlds of men and women. It can, just like in the West, only develop as a result of increasing standard of living.

The model of "embourgeoisement" has been gradually abandoned by European women since the 1960s in favour of greater female economic autonomy. This resulted from rising levels of female education and rising aspirations with respect to consumption and/or professional self-realization. For the second generation of Turkish and Moroccan women, who have substantially benefitted from their European education, there is double pattern of "modernity": on the one hand, the "modern pattern" of their own ethnic reference group favouring withdrawal in the domestic sphere, and on the other hand, the contemporary European pattern stressing female employment and minimization of opportunity costs.

The choice between these opposite models of "modernity" is not made more easy for the second generation as a result of the experience of their mothers. To make ends meet, a sizeable segment of the latter had to take up certain kinds of jobs in Belgium, which they otherwise may not have done. In fact, judging from the proportions "ever employed" (see Table 9), about 40 percent of the first generation currently aged 40-49 was ever active outside the home. This older generation does not have a particularly favourable opinion about their experience, and of the 40 percent ever employed, only a quarter (Turkish women) or half (Moroccan women) are still currently employed. Hence, the older generation is not inclined to encourage their daughters or daughters in law to join the labour force (Desnerck, 1993). Also the preference of men, often

legitimized on religious or moral grounds, is mostly aversive to the labour force participation of their wives.

Table 9

Finally, another major factor of the female life-cycle should be mentioned. More specifically, parenthood and female labour force participation are still regarded as difficult to combine, or even as plainly irreconcilable. Since motherhood follows shortly upon marriage, there is a large withdrawal from the female labour force in the age group 20-29. This explains for instance why about half the women with a Belgian education (residence = 15+) in this age group have ever worked, and why only about 30 percent are currently employed (see Table 9). The differences between ever and currently employed by duration of residence in the age group 17-29 in Table 9 are less marked, but this is due to (i) the fact that the Belgian-born women are on average younger and more are still single, and (ii) to the overall very low labour force participation among the imported brides. Also subsequent return to the labour force is fairly low. For women aged 30-39 with durations of residence of 15 years or more, about only half of those who ever worked are currently employed.

The conclusion is that the model of "embourgeoisement" - with or without its legitimization in Islamic ideals - is preponderant. Imported brides immigrating during the 1980s stay overwhelmingly at home, and even those with far better education, language skills and other credentials are considerably more likely to stay out of the labour force or to withdraw from it than their Belgian age-mates. In this process, consumption aspirations must of necessity be tuned down and individual career opportunities forgone. A purely economic calculus is clearly giving way to a different cultural model and its concomitant group pressures.

8. The religious factor: group identity and community reconstruction retard secularization but do not forestall it

In this section we shall try to describe the opinions concerning the various dimensions of the religious factor. First, we shall devote attention to expressions of religiosity in its personal ideational sense, i.e. as a factor procuring consolation, comfort, strength, self-reflection and protection. We proceed with items related to religious rites and community involvement. Finally, we shall consider items that are more closely related to the political meaning of Islam.

The strictly individual meaning of religion was measured via the classic Likert-type rating of the following items (see also Timmerman, 1987):

- "Religion and prayer provide consolation and comfort to me in moments of difficulty or sadness";
- "I always try to involve my religious convictions in whatever I do";
- "I am protected against evil by religion and prayer";
- "Religion and prayer are important to me in order to be able to think about myself on certain moments"

The first item related to the functions of procuring consolation and comfort proved to be the best indicator of the set. The overall proportion agreeing with this statement is about 75 percent of the Moroccan and 85 percent of the Turkish respondents as shown in Table 10. Lower proportions agreeing, but still of the order of two thirds, are found among the Belgian-born Turkish women and in the broader category of young Moroccan women with at least 10 years of residence. The results for the last item pertaining to self-reflection are of the same orders of

magnitude, indicating that the function of religion as a source of comfort and self-reflection has been reduced for the second generation. The other two items draw some more support, also among the second generation where about three quarters of young women agree.

Table 10

The functions of protection against evil forces is, furthermore, of particular interest since a substantial part of these populations believe in sorcery, the evil eye or in spirits (cf. Renaerts, 1991).⁶ In contrast to western forms of superstition (horoscopes, cards etc.), sorcery, the evil eye and spirits are powers that can be invoked for the sanctioning of infringements against social rules. They are closely connected to the psychology of social control.

In the surveys, the respondents were asked to select the most appropriate statement among the following three (cf. Timmerman et al., 1989):

- "There are things such as *djinn*, *sihr*, *el aïne* that are completely beyond our control";
- "Only people who misconduct themselves run the risk of being hit by *djinn*, *sihr* or *el aïne*";
- "Djinn, sihr and el aïne have no influence on our lives, no matter how one behaves".

The proportions reported in Table 10 pertain to the respondents that opted for the first two opinions, thereby confirming a belief in such power. Among the older women about two thirds believed in such spirits, and there is hardly a reduction in this frequency for the imported brides. Much more surprising, however, was that the young Belgian-educated or Belgian-born women scored in the neighbourhood of 50 percent, with slightly higher frequencies among the Turkish than among the Moroccan second generation. We should also add that about a quarter of the respondents opted for the "do not know"-answer when this question was presented. All of this illustrates that the beliefs in evil forces have remained quite vivid and still constitute an important ingredient of religious syncretism.

The public and ritual aspects of religion are documented through indicators pertaining to the observance of Ramadan, the regularity of mosk attendance of husbands, and the sending of school age children to Koranic education.

The percentage following Ramadan is never lower than 90 percent in any of the categories considered in Table 10. This was to be expected since the Ramadan is a public event and the element of community integration *par excellence*. The non-observance of Ramadan constitutes a clear rupture with one's cultural roots and has therefore remained exceptional. Considerably more variation was found in the percentages of husbands with regular mosk attendance and percentages of mothers sending school age children to Koranic schools. Mosk attendance on at least a weekly basis declines significantly among husbands of younger Turkish and Moroccan women. For the older generation about 50 percent of husbands attend regularly, and this percentage drops to a third among husbands of second generation Turkish women, and to less than a quarter among husbands of second generation Moroccan women. Noteworthy in this respect is also that the husbands of imported brides are hardly different from husbands of second generation women.

The decline in weekly mosk attendance among younger men contrasts with the growth in the number of mosks during the last decade. This

⁶ In Turkish: *büyü*, *nazar*, *cinler*; in Arabic: *sihr*, *el aïne*, *djinn*.

growth can be explained by the fact that there were so few during the 1970s and by the strengthened community structure following the period of mass immigration (cf. Sierens, 1991). Many of these mosks are installed in ordinary houses and are of the "street corner" type. It has taken time and money to acquire such a house, and they are primarily the expression of community reconstruction rather than of a fundamentalist Islamic revival. Moreover, these mosks are predominantly serving specific local communities originating from the same areas in the sending countries. They are far more the expression of particularistic regional identification and not of the universalistic concept of the world community of believers. If the older, first generation men have been relatively successful in such community reconstruction for their own generation, they have been less successful in transmitting this effort to the younger generation of men. Particularly the younger Moroccan men seem to keep their distance from the centrality of the local mosk.

A similar distinction between the Turkish and Moroccan communities emerges with respect to the sending of children to Koranic schools. This indicator is considerably more ambivalent than the previous one since Koranic schools do not exist everywhere. Yet, as the results in Table 10 suggest, the Turkish communities seem to have put a greater effort in it, since about two thirds of women older than 30 report having sent their school age children to Koranic schools, against barely one third of the Moroccan women of a similar age. For the younger Turkish mothers of school age children, there seems to be a slight decline in the sending of children to Koranic schools, but such a tendency cannot be detected for the younger Moroccan mothers. Another complicating factor for the interpretation of the data is that Koranic education is offered as an option in the Belgian public (i.e. non-Catholic) school systems of the larger cities, and that the Moroccan population, with its far greater concentration in Brussels and Antwerp, has accepted this as an appropriate substitute for the traditional Koranic school. But in this instance, the locus of control is the governing board of the public school together with the communal, provincial or state authorities, and not the local Islamic community directly.

On the whole, the more regular mosk attendance of Turkish men and the far larger proportions of Turkish women sending children to Koranic schools is consistent with the picture that the Turkish communities, fragmented across much of Flanders, have retained their primary attachment to their areas and communities of origin to a greater extent than the Moroccans.⁷ Concomittantly, the reconstruction of such "transplanted communities" has received more attention among the Turkish than Moroccan population.

The last set of indicators presented in Table 10 pertain to perception of the political significance of Islam. The respondents were asked whether they felt that the religious influence in daily life was on the rise or declining. Subsequently, they were asked whether they thought this to be a positive or a negative evolution. The indicators in Table 10 are respectively (i) the proportion who felt that religious influence was increasing and considered this as being positive, and (ii) the proportion who felt that religious influence was declining and regreted this. The sum of these proportions corresponds with the population segment that has a positive evaluation of Islamic influence in general.

Among Turkish women older than 30 there is a dominant sentiment that religious influence increases and the majority approves of this. Two thirds of the respondents ended up with this combination. Among

⁷This also shows up in the larger proportions of Turks owing land and/or a house in the country of origin. For instance, 74 percent of Turkish women aged 40-50 indicate such ownership against 65 percent of Moroccan women. In the age group 30-39, 54 percent of Turkish women report ownership against 36 percent of Moroccan respondents.

their Moroccan counterparts, proportions are slightly below 50 percent. The imported brides in both groups are completely comparable in their responses to the older women. Among the younger women, however, percentages drop to just under 40 percent for the Turkish and below 30 percent for the Moroccan second generation. By contrast, the sentiment that religious influence declines followed by a disapproval is more frequent among the younger women, belonging to both the second generation and to the group of imported brides.

The complement of the sum of the above proportions indicates the size of the opposition to Islamic influence. Among Turkish older women and young imported brides, this opposition is barely of the order of 20 percent. Moreover, this proportion only increases to 32 percent for the second generation. Among the Moroccan women, the opposition is considerably stronger. First, the older Moroccan women have a percentage of disapproval (34%) that is higher than that of the Turkish second generation. Second, already more than half of the Moroccan younger women educated in Belgium (51%) or Belgian-born (54%) either react negatively to a presumed positive trend in Islamic influence, or react positively to a presumed negative trend.

The general picture emerging from these indicators is that religion is still fulfilling its primary functions with respect to individual ideation and as a basic element of group identification. However, these functions are weakening for the second generation, and this incipient process of secularization has already progressed to a significant degree among the Moroccan second generation.

9. Conclusions

Social change in the two largest Islamic communities in Belgium is, as expected, characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity and heteropraxis. The aspect of heterogeneity is partly attributable to the generational succession, but, the category of imported brides adds to the variance in a significant way as well. In most respects, the imported brides resemble the older generation more than their age-mates of the second generation of women. Equally striking is that the inter-generational change is better described by the notion of a prudent shift toward more female autonomy than by the concepts of a generation gap or generation conflict.

The aspect of heteropraxis emerges in the form of highly differentiated speeds of change in the various domains of life. If only one aspect were considered, one could have been misled quite easily. For instance, judging the speed of change solely on the basis of the modernization of contraceptive practice or on the basis of the disappearance of the gender preference for children would have led to an overestimation of the tempo. Conversely, if one were to judge the rate of social change on the basis of the indicators pertaining to partner choice or on the labour force participation rates of younger married women, one would conclude that, as has emerged in the feminist literature (e.g. Abadan-Unat, 1977; Kandiyoti, 1987), that these prudent shifts merely constitute a "pseudo emancipation". The reality is that aspects that are basically dependent on the couple's private choice and that are more future-oriented (e.g. desired family size, contraception, psychological utility of children) have changed quite markedly with generation replacement. On the other hand, matters that affect the broader kinship group (e.g. partner choice, socialization values, female employment) or the community at large (e.g. gender relations, religious identification) change at a much slower rate.⁸ In the latter domains

⁸ A part of the evidence is admittedly stemming from attitudinal responses, taken in conjunction with factual indicators. The fact that a sizeable proportion of respondents were interviewed in the presence of a

women seek a *modus vivendi* and use the elasticity of codes of conduct to move more gradually in the direction of greater individual autonomy.

The issue of religion deserves specific comments. As hypothesized by Bastenier and Dasetto (1993), there indeed seems to have been a "particularity of the Islamic cycle", in the sense that the older generation has used religious identification in the process of community reconstruction.⁹ This also explains why a fertility transition has occurred without a prior process of secularization. Yet, the pioneering work of community reconstruction coupled to Islamic identity is not completely transmitted to the second generation. The Islamic component of the observance of Ramadan may have remained virtually intact, but mosque attendance for men is definitely declining, and Koranic education for children is not universal. Also the second generation of Moroccan women shows a remarkable 50-50 split in their evaluation of the desirability of Islamic influence in daily life.

Another feature emerging from the two surveys is the differential tempo of change for Turkish and Moroccan women respectively. Again, a differentiation according to domain is in order. As far as desired family size, fertility and contraception (including abortion) is concerned, the Turkish women have benefitted from the earlier demographic transition in their country of origin. With respect to several of the other characteristics described in this paper, it is the second generation of Moroccan women in Belgium who have taken the lead. This is most striking with respect to the contact with the Belgian press, later ages at marriage, the socialization values and the degree of secularization. Furthermore, the relative size of the contingent of imported brides in the Moroccan community is less than half that in the Turkish population in Flanders and Brussels. The continuity of chain migration in tandem with the recruitment of brides, the higher proportions of real estate ownership in the areas of origin of the first generation, and the much weaker secularization are characteristics of the Turkish minority that seems to be tied to both the greater identification of Turks to the communities of origin and to their geographically more fragmented pattern of settlement in Belgium. These Turkish communities in Belgium seem to have been more successful in maintaining their religious affiliation in the process of their community reconstruction than the Moroccan community, which, especially in Brussels, has a second generation that is less committed to the ideals of their parental generation.

Finally, one should bear in mind that the picture presented here is taken with the distant camera of survey research. This wide-angle picture may serve as a general reference for more in-depth studies of particular issues and smaller communities.

third person may lead to a bias in the direction of more "conservative" or "traditional" responses in such attitudinal data. As already explained before, an investigation of this response bias by type of third person present is currently being performed on the data. In this analysis we also retain the hypothesis that third persons may also contribute corrections and not only biases.

⁹It should be pointed out, however, that there are numerous examples in which non-Islamic religious identification has been equally functional in migrant community reconstruction (e.g. Greek orthodoxy for the Greek community in Australia, Catholicism for the Italian, Irish, Polish or Ukrainian migrants in the US or Canada etc.).

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Table 1: Indicators of education and language knowledge; Turkish and Moroccan women in Flanders and Brussels (1991-93)

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)							
	(1)				(2)			All women (3)
	0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	40-49	
A. % never at school								
Turkish women	6%	6	3	0	12	23	56	17
n=147	61	187	63	60	169	106	819	
Moroccan women	31%	16	2	0	54	27	77	30
n= 58	45	125	164	74	168	119	824	
B. Average duration of schooling in years								
Turkish women	7.0	7.8	10.8	12.0	6.7	6.6	2.7	7.4
n=147	61	187	63	60	170	106	819	
Moroccan women	8.2	10.5	13.0	13.2	3.9	7.2	2.2	8.1
n= 58	45	126	164	74	168	119	824	
C. % speaking some French/Dutch								
Turkish women	57%	82	99	100	89	91	72	83
n=141	61	186	63	60	170	106	816	
Moroccan women	87%	98	98	100	92	97	94	95
n= 58	45	126	164	74	168	122	826	
D. % reading some French/Dutch								
Turkish women	21%	54	94	100	34	50	15	52
n=141	61	186	63	58	166	105	810	
Moroccan women	67%	84	96	100	50	65	38	71
n= 55	44	126	164	74	157	110	794	
E. % understanding TV-news								
Turkish women	29%	64	93	99	55	62	30	60
n=147	61	187	63	60	169	106	822	
Moroccan women	70%	84	98	100	67	84	77	83
n= 58	45	126	161	75	168	123	828	

Table 1: continued

	Age (1) & duration of residence (2)								
	(1)	17-29			30-39		40-49	All	
F. % sometimes reading French/Dutch newspaper	(2)	0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	15+	women (3)
Turkish women	7%	27	56	75		9	14	2	25
	n=147	61	187	63		60	170	106	822
Moroccan women	50%	60	82	93		26	48	14	54
	n= 58	45	126	164		75	169	123	832

Source: Values & Family Formation surveys among Turkish women (1991-92) and Moroccan women (1992-93) in Flanders and Brussels, Free University, Brussels, and University of Ghent (also all subsequent tables)

Notes: - Percentages are rounded

(3) Women in other combinations of age and durations of residence are included in the totals (also in all subsequent tables)

Table 2: Ideal family size and gender preference; Turkish and Moroccan women in Flanders and Brussels (1991-93)

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)							All women
	(1)	17-29			30-39		40+	
		(2) 0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	
A. % preferring 2 children (1B+1G)								
Turkish women	82%	80	86	91	62	73	62	77
	n=144	59	176	62	59	162	102	781
Moroccan women	60%	66	71	81	29	38	25	52
	n= 53	41	104	148	68	150	109	733
B. % preferring 4 children (2B+2G)								
Turkish women	14%	20	13	9	33	25	31	20
	n=142	59	179	60	57	158	99	781
Moroccan women	24%	20	25	18	40	30	28	26
	n= 53	41	104	148	68	150	109	733
C. % choosing 2B+1G over 1B+2G								
Turkish women	79%	78	50	51	66	69	74	67
	n=144	59	176	62	59	162	102	791
Moroccan women	66%	63	51	41	73	66	63	60
	n= 56	41	111	151	67	153	109	747
D. % choosing 3B over 3G								
Turkish women	72%	60	46	41	62	73	68	61
	n=143	59	173	61	54	157	102	774
Moroccan women	62%	59	47	42	75	59	66	58
	n= 53	37	110	148	65	150	108	729
E. % agreeing with "even without children a woman can have a happy life"								
Turkish women	23%	19	33	52	27	20	13	26
	n=141	60	179	62	60	166	104	801
Moroccan women	27%	35	38	56	17	16	14	29
	n= 56	45	124	157	75	164	121	811

Table 3: Perceived utility of children; Turkish and Moroccan women in Flanders and Brussels (1991-93)

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)							
	(1) 17-29				30-34		40-49	All women
	(2) 0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	15+	
A. % choosing "child makes person more responsible" + "creates strong bond husband-wife"								
Turkish women	65% n=144	64 54	62 176	70 62	38 55	48 167	28 104	54 791
Moroccan women	48% n= 56	56 45	44 122	58 157	23 74	37 167	17 119	39 806
B. % choosing "child = help in household" + "care old age"								
Turkish women	4% n=144	4 54	3 176	0 62	6 55	4 167	20 104	6 791
Moroccan women	9% n= 56	11 45	8 122	3 157	14 74	5 167	12 119	8 806

Table 4: Indicators of nuptiality and form of partner choice; Turkish and Moroccan women in Flanders and Brussels (1991-93)

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)							
	(1)	17-29			30-39		40+	All
(2)	0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	15+	women
A. % women aged 18+, married prior to age 18								
Turkish women	37% n=146	48 61	22 186	13 63	26 60	41 167	43 104	33 816
Moroccan women	21% n= 58	27 44	16 123	7 162	25 72	37 167	39 122	25 815
B. % women aged 20+, married prior to age 20								
Turkish women	63% n=129	71 57	57 160	28 45	49 60	71 167	64 104	60 751
Moroccan women	54% n= 53	54 40	27 104	16 107	46 72	61 167	67 122	47 732
C. % of married women knowing husband less than 2 months prior to marriage								
Turkish women	37% n=128	36 53	23 146	19 28	39 57	27 159	31 105	30 704
Moroccan women	23% n= 51	31 29	21 87	16 54	45 69	34 159	43 117	34 629
D. % of married women, with marriage decided by partners (followed or not by parental approval)								
Turkish women	18% n=143	22 55	30 159	53 28	22 59	25 166	11 106	23 746
Moroccan women	34% n= 50	20 29	48 90	57 54	16 74	33 164	14 123	29 653

Tabel 4: continued

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)								
	(1)	17-29			30-39		40+	All	
	(2)	0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	15+	women
E. <u>% married women with marriage arranged without prior consent of woman</u>									
Turkish women		13%	16	13	4	21	15	27	17
	n=143	55	159	28	59	166	106	746	
Moroccan woman		10%	14	5	4	14	13	12	12
	n= 50	29	90	54	74	164	123	653	
F. <u>% agreeing with "it is better for parents to arrange a marriage"</u>									
Turkish women		24%	32	17	9	19	27	37	24
	n=145	61	180	63	59	168	104	809	
Moroccan women		27%	26	12	7	31	22	33	22
	n= 56	41	123	163	74	159	117	800	

Table 5: Deciles and quartiles of ages at first marriage by duration of residence; Turkish and Moroccan women in Flanders and Brussels (1991-93)

	Duration of residence					Total
	0-9	10-14	15-19	20+	born in B.	
<u>Turkish women</u>						
T1	16.2	16.0	16.0	16.1	17.6	16.1
Q1	17.3	17.0	17.4	17.4	19.4	17.4
Me	18.9	19.2	19.0	19.2	21.4	19.2
Q3	20.7	21.3	21.5	21.0	23.6	21.4
<u>Moroccan women</u>						
T1	17.1	15.3	16.0	15.8	18.6	16.3
Q1	18.4	17.5	17.5	17.5	20.4	18.0
Me	20.6	19.0	20.0	19.6	23.1	20.4
Q3	24.6	21.8	22.9	23.0	--	23.6

T1 = first decile

Q = quartiles

Me = median

-- = third quartile not yet reached

Table 6: Percentages of married women residing in households containing at least one adult other than husband or child; Turkish and Moroccan women in Flanders and Brussels (1991-93)

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)							
	17-29				30-39		40+	All
	0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	15+	women
Turkish women	48%	31	17	26	19	7	22	23
n=142	53	158	28	56	165	99	729	
Moroccan women	33%	17	17	28	10	7	8	14
n= 51	29	86	44	67	149	100	584	

Table 7: Opinions concerning gender relations; Turkish and Moroccan women in Flanders and Brussels (1991-93)

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)							
	17-29				30-34		40-49	All women
	(1) 0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	15+	
A. % agreeing with "talking with unknown men"								
Turkish women	21%	18	33	48	29	35	26	30
	n=140	60	180	62	60	167	105	804
Moroccan women	26%	34	50	65	25	35	25	39
	n= 56	45	121	160	74	167	120	812
B. % agreeing with <u>not</u> retreating when visit unknown men"								
Turkish women	48%	49	67	76	36	57	31	53
	n=143	60	180	63	60	164	105	805
Moroccan women	57%	54	68	83	50	66	51	63
	n= 56	45	122	162	72	167	121	817
C. % agreeing with <u>not</u> wearing scarf in public								
Turkish women	30%	45	52	76	30	39	24	41
	n=133	58	178	62	56	154	99	767
Moroccan women	56%	48	74	85	58	61	43	62
	n= 55	43	121	152	73	162	119	796
D. % preferring new insights over tradition								
Turkish women	34%	33	34	42	38	28	23	32
	n=131	54	169	60	54	152	80	725
Moroccan women	29%	33	38	49	37	26	30	34
	n= 55	45	124	158	72	162	118	803

Table 8: Preferences with respect to socialization values; Turkish and Moroccan women in Flanders and Brussels (1991-93)

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)							
	(1)	17-29			30-34		40-49	All
	(2)	0-9	10-14	15+ born in B.	0-14	15+	15+	women
A. % choosing "good manners + obedience" for boys								
Turkish women	46%	48	38	29	32	43	62	43
	n=143	61	181	63	60	167	105	810
Moroccan women	44%	40	32	20	53	36	47	37
	n= 57	45	124	161	75	169	122	824
B. % choosing "good manners + obedience" for girls								
Turkish women	57%	60	44	38	38	49	64	50
	n=144	61	181	63	60	167	105	810
Moroccan women	43%	58	31	19	54	43	60	42
	n= 57	45	124	163	75	169	122	826
C. % choosing "thinking for oneself + interested" for boys								
Turkish women	12%	6	16	12	22	8	7	12
	n=143	61	181	63	60	167	105	810
Moroccan women	8%	10	16	22	7	7	5	11
	n= 57	45	124	161	75	169	122	824
D. % choosing "thinking for oneself + interested" for girls								
Turkish women	7%	4	13	12	22	7	4	9
	n=144	61	181	63	60	167	105	810
Moroccan women	10%	10	13	22	9	10	6	12
	n= 57	45	124	163	75	169	122	826

Table 9: Labour force participation experience of Turkish and Moroccan women in Flanders and Brussels (1991-93)

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)								
	(1)	17-29			30-39		40-49	All	
	(2)	0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	15+	women
A. % ever employed									
Turkish women	14%	29	57	36		36	49	40	39
	n=144	60	179	61		59	162	102	796
Moroccan women	17%	15	45	31		22	42	37	33
	n= 57	44	125	159		74	166	120	816
B. % currently employed									
Turkish women	13%	24	34	31		25	24	10	22
	n=144	60	179	61		59	162	102	796
Moroccan women	12%	13	31	24		13	24	19	21
	n= 57	44	125	159		74	166	120	816

Tabel 10: Indicators of superstition, religiosity and ritual conformism; Turkish and Moroccan women in Flanders and Brussels (1991-93)

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)							
	17-29				30-39		40-49	All
	0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	15+	women
A. % believing in evil eye, spirits, witchcraft								
Turkish women	55%	58	58	53	58	58	61	57
n=127	48	160	54	52	147	95	710	
Moroccan women	60%	55	42	43	64	64	73	58
n= 50	36	110	126	57	132	102	674	
B. % agreeing "religion provides consolation"								
Turkish women	85%	80	80	67	90	87	98	85
n=142	55	177	60	60	166	105	794	
Moroccan women	86%	68	67	66	81	79	85	76
n= 52	39	113	149	64	146	102	726	
C. % of married women with husband visiting mosk at least once a week								
Turkish women	39%	42	38	32	58	46	57	45
n=138	51	148	28	53	161	98	699	
Moroccan women	22%	40	19	24	37	30	48	32
n= 50	29	81	42	67	148	99	574	
D. % feeling influence religion increases + approval								
Turkish women	50%	42	38	36	61	62	65	51
n=127	53	161	58	56	160	102	739	
Moroccan women	40%	34	27	27	51	45	43	37
n= 46	34	99	120	49	123	85	601	
E. % feeling influence religion declines + disapproval								
Turkish women	29%	28	30	32	14	12	17	23
n=126	53	163	55	56	157	103	737	
Moroccan women	19%	30	22	19	10	8	23	19
n= 46	35	96	118	47	122	85	599	

Table 10: continued

	Age (1) and duration of residence (2)							
	17-29				30-39		40-49	All women
	0-9	10-14	15+	born in B.	0-14	15+	15+	
F. <u>% with children going to Koranic school (4)</u>								
Turkish women	30%	55	51	(20)	88	67	72	64
	n= 27	35	42	(7)	46	153	84	408
Moroccan women	(34%)	(64)	26	-	37	34	29	34
	(n= 6)	(9)	24	-	57	126	93	356
G. <u>% observing Ramadan</u>								
Turkish women	94%	97	93	90	97	93	98	94
	n=141	60	179	61	56	165	105	810
Moroccan women	98%	98	99	97	98	98	99	98
	n= 57	45	121	158	75	169	122	854

(3) all results are for Muslim women (only a few cases of Christians are omitted)

(4) only currently married women with school-age children